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Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
Financierings- en investeringsbeslissingen zijn twee fundamentele aspecten binnen iedere 
onderneming. De manier waarop ondernemingen een kapitaalsverhoging doorvoeren of hoe ze een 
overname financieren hebben verstrekkende gevolgen zowel voor de onderneming zelf als voor 
andere belanghebbenden zoals aandeelhouders, banken of concurrenten. Het doel van dit 
proefschrift is om na te gaan welke factoren een invloed hebben op de financierings- en 
investeringsbeslissingen van beursgenoteerde ondernemingen. 
 
In de eerste studie onderzoeken we waarom bedrijven die een kapitaalsverhoging uitvoeren al dan 
niet een voorkeurrecht toekennen aan de bestaande aandeelhouders. Bovendien kunnen bedrijven 
er in sommige landen (zoals in België, Nederland, Duitsland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, de Verenigde 
Staten) voor kiezen om het voorkeurrecht niet verhandelbaar te maken. In andere landen (zoals in 
Denemarken, Portugal, China) zijn bedrijven verplicht het voorkeurrecht verhandelbaar te maken. Uit 
ons onderzoek concluderen we dat er verschillende drijfveren zijn om al dan niet een verhandelbaar 
voorkeurrecht toe te kennen. Eerst en vooral zullen ondernemingen in moeilijkheden trachten een 
kapitaalsverhoging door te voeren door bij de eigen aandeelhouders aan te kloppen. Bijgevolg zal de 
onderneming een (niet-verhandelbaar) voorkeurrecht toekennen aan de bestaande aandeelhouders 
aangezien externe investeerders moeilijker te overhalen zijn om te investeren in de onderneming in 
moeilijkheden. Een tweede verklaring waarom bedrijven kiezen voor een niet-verhandelbaar 
voorkeurrecht is de garantie dat de aandeelhoudersstructuur proportioneel niet zal wijzigen. Grote 
aandeelhouders zullen verwatering van hun aandeel trachten tegen te gaan om hun positie en 
bijhorende potentiële voordelen veilig te stellen. Tot slot, kan de onderneming het voorkeurrecht ook 
niet-verhandelbaar maken om haar eigen aandeelhouders te beschermen indien het aandeel en het 
voorkeurrecht ondergewaardeerd zijn. Daarnaast tonen we ook aan dat de aankondiging van een 
kapitaalsverhoging negatief onthaald wordt op de beurs. Een uitgifte zonder voorkeurrecht, waarbij 
alle investeerders de mogelijkheid hebben om in te tekenen, zorgt bovendien voor een sterkere daling 
van de koers in vergelijking met een uitgifte met voorkeurrecht. 
 
De tweede studie binnen dit proefschrift onderzoekt op welke manier Europese beursgenoteerde 
ondernemingen een fusie of overname financieren. Bij een overname heeft de overnemer de keuze 
tussen cash of aandelen als betalingsmogelijkheid. We merken op dat bedrijven meer met cash 
betalen wanneer er grote aandeelhoudersi zijn in de aandeelhoudersstructuur van de overnemer of 
de overgenomen onderneming. Dit wijst erop dat de grote aandeelhouders hun proportioneel aandeel 
                                                          
i Grote aandeelhouders werden gedefinieerd als aandeelhouders die minstens 25% van de aandelen bezitten. 
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en de bijhorende machtspositie niet willen zien verwateren. Bovendien tonen we aan dat 
informatieasymmetrieën een grote impact hebben. De overgenomen onderneming zal minder 
geneigd zijn om een betaling in aandelen te aanvaarden wanneer de overnemer in het buitenland 
gevestigd is of wanneer diens aandelen minder liquide zijn. Tot slot  concluderen we ook dat bedrijven 
niet beïnvloed zijn door hun optimale kapitaalstructuur bij de keuze van financiering van de overname.  
 
In de derde studie, onderzoeken we de premie die overnemers betalen bovenop de marktwaarde van 
de overgenomen onderneming. Overnemers die schuldfinanciering aantrekken voor de overname 
betalen typisch een 24% hogere premie voor het overgenomen bedrijf dan wanneer ze niet met 
schulden gefinancierd zijn. Indien de overgenomen onderneming echter investeert in onderzoek en 
ontwikkeling, verdwijnt dit positieve effect van schuldfinanciering. We tonen dus aan dat banken 
strengere controlemechanismen opleggen indien er meer onzekerheid is m.b.t. de waarde van het 
overgenomen bedrijf. 
 
In de vierde studie, tot slot, gaan we dieper in op de impact van fusies en overnames op de 
concurrenten. Hoewel de literatuur de nadruk legt op positieve effecten voor concurrenten van de 
fuserende ondernemingen, toont onze studie aan dat de gevolgen meer genuanceerd zijn. Enerzijds 
zal de competitieve positie van de concurrent er relatief op achteruitgaan (efficiëntie-effect). De 
overnemer zal immers trachten de efficiëntie van het overgenomen bedrijf op te voeren. Anderzijds 
zal de concurrent voordeel kunnen halen uit de toegenomen beschikbaarheid aan informatie omtrent 
het overgenomen bedrijf (informatie-effect). Zowel tijdens de overname-negotiatie als nadien zal de 
overnemer informatie m.b.t. het overgenomen bedrijf moeten beschikbaar maken. Het relatieve 
belang van deze twee tegengestelde invloeden voor de concurrent zal afhankelijk zijn van het type 
bedrijf dat wordt overgenomen. In geval van een overname van een divisie, in vergelijking met de 
overname van een volledige onderneming, zal het efficiëntie-effect meer doorwegen met meer 
negatieve effecten voor de concurrenten tot gevolg. Bij de overname van een private onderneming, 
in vergelijking met de overname van een beursgenoteerde onderneming, zal het positieve informatie-
effect meer doorwegen voor de concurrenten.  
 
In dit proefschrift tonen we aan hoe marktimperfecties verstrekkende gevolgen kunnen hebben voor 
de onderneming en haar aandeelhouders maar ook voor concurrenten en 
minderheidsaandeelhouders. Zo hebben informatieasymmetrieën tussen het management en de 
aandeelhouders of tussen meerderheids- en minderheidsaandeelhouders niet alleen een grote 
invloed op financierings- en investeringsbeslissingen, maar ook op de aandeelhouderswaarde. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Financing and investment decisions are two fundamental decision areas for every company. How firms 
raise equity or how they finance acquisitions have far-reaching consequences for the company itself 
as well as for other stakeholders such as shareholders, banks, or competitors. The aim of this 
dissertation is to determine which factors affect financing and investment decisions of listed 
companies and to analyze the consequences of these decisions for shareholders and competitors. 
 
The first study analyzes why companies worldwide choose to issue equity through a rights offer rather 
than a cash offer. Additionally, we study the choice to allow or restrict tradability of rights, a topic 
which is underdeveloped in the finance literature. In some countries (such as Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.) companies have the choice to make the rights non-
tradable. However, other countries (such as Denmark, Portugal, China) make tradability of rights 
mandatory. We identify several motives to explain the choice between tradable and non-tradable 
rights offers. First, firms in or close to financial distress will prefer to issue a rights offer rather than a 
cash offer as existing shareholders, compared to outside investors, will be more easily convinced to 
invest in the company. Second, a non-tradable rights offer is used to protect the current shareholder 
structure from dilution. It is hence especially used when the firm has blockholders, who will try to 
prevent their stake from diluting and preserve the private benefits associated with their ownership 
stake. Finally, companies choose to restrict tradability of the rights to protect their shareholders if 
their shares and rights are undervalued. Hence, we contribute to the finance literature by providing 
new insights into fundamental financing decisions. 
 
The second study of this dissertation determines how European listed acquirers finance their mergers 
and acquisitions. When acquiring a company, the acquirer can choose between cash and equity as 
method of payment. Our findings indicate that acquirers pay more often with cash when there is a 
blockholderii in the acquirer’s or target’s ownership structure. This indicates that blockholders try to 
secure their stake and the private benefits associated with this stake. Furthermore, our findings 
indicate the prominent role of informational asymmetries. The target firm will be cautious in accepting 
the acquirer’s shares when the acquirer is headquartered in a different country or when the acquirer’s 
shares are illiquid. Finally, we conclude that acquirers’ financing decisions are not influenced by their 
optimal capital structure. 
                                                          
ii Blockholders are defined as shareholders owning at least 25% of the shares. 
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In the third study, we research the premium paid by acquirers relative to the target’s market value. 
Acquirers using debt financing typically pay a 24% higher premium to the target company compared 
to acquirers without debt financing. However, the positive effect of debt financing on the premium 
paid disappears when the target company invests in R&D. As such, we illustrate that banks use tighter 
control mechanisms when the target’s value is more uncertain. Hence, information asymmetry 
surrounding R&D investments has important consequences in terms of financing terms and the 
premium paid. 
 
In the fourth and final study, we focus on the impact of mergers and acquisitions for competitors. Even 
though finance scholars have focused on positive externalities for competitors of the merging firms, 
this study demonstrates that the effects for competitors are more nuanced. On the one hand, the 
relative competitive position of competitors deteriorates as the acquirer improves the target’s 
efficiency (efficiency effect). On the other hand, competitors can take advantage of an increase in 
information dissemination about the target (information effect). The relative importance of these two 
opposite effects (efficiency and information) depends on the type of target being acquired. For 
instance, when divested assets are being acquired, compared to a stand-alone target, the efficiency 
effect will dominate which will in turn lead to more negative price reactions for competitors. When a 
private target, compared to a public target, is acquired the information effect is expected to prevail 
which explains more positive competitor reactions. Identifying these two mechanisms through which 
rival firms are affected adds to both the M&A literature as well as the competitive dynamics literature. 
 
In this dissertation we demonstrate how market frictions can have far-reaching consequences for 
organizations, shareholders, competitors and minority shareholders. More specifically, information 
asymmetries between management and shareholders and between minority and majority 
shareholders affect corporate investments and financing choices as well as shareholder wealth. 
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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
This dissertation studies several aspects of two of the most crucial decisions in corporate finance: the 
financing decision and the investment decision. More specifically, we look at seasoned equity offerings 
which are one of the key financing mechanisms for listed companies and acquisitions which are one 
of the most impactful investments in a firm’s lifecycle. Combining these two decisions provides a 
unique setting in which we can study the financing choice while at the same time knowing which 
purpose the resources will be used for. Furthermore, seasoned equity offerings and acquisitions have 
meaningful implications in terms of shareholder wealth, company growth, industry structure, and 
industry incumbents’ wealth. The remainder of this first chapter is structured as follows: first we 
briefly review the financing literature and identify some research gaps, second we discuss the mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) literature and we identify the focus of our research questions. Finally, we go 
more into detail with respect to the empirical setup and the main findings of this dissertation. 
1.1. Financing literature 
Based on decades of research, scholars have departed from the Modigliani-Miller (1958) models of 
irrelevance of capital structure. Taxes, bankruptcy costs, imperfectly informed investors, among other 
market frictions, explain why firms choose one financing method over another. Based on these market 
imperfections two foundational finance theories were developed: the static trade-off theory 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Titman, 1984) and the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984). According to 
the static trade-off theory firms trade-off the costs and benefits of debt financing to eventually reach 
an optimal leverage where theoretically the marginal cost of one additional unit of debt equals the 
marginal benefit of one additional unit of debt. Also, agency costs of debt and equity affect the trade-
off decision of debt versus equity. Debt financing, for instance, can be used to monitor management 
and reduce free cash flow concerns (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The backdrop of too much debt 
financing, however, is a potential situation of debt overhang in which case firms cannot take on new 
profitable investment opportunities because of a too high current debt burden (Myers, 1977).  
Building on the static trade-off theory a stream of literature has developed around the concept of 
optimal capital structure. 
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1.1.1 Optimal capital structure 
Based on studies that tried to reconcile the different theoretical expectations with the empirical 
findings a more dynamic capital structure theory was developed (Fischer et al., 1989; Leary and 
Roberts, 2005). Empirical findings, for instance, indicate that firms have a target capital structure but 
that adjusting the capital structure towards this target might take time due to adjustment costs (Leary 
and Roberts, 2005; Strebulaev, 2007). Next to this transitory component, firms were also found to 
have a permanent component which is firm specific and is related to the firm’s existence prior to IPO 
(Lemmon et al., 2008). Alternatively, Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that firms time the equity 
market by issuing equity when shares are overvalued and buying back stock when undervalued. As 
such, a firm’s capital structure is the result of historical market timing attempts. Numerous studies 
have tested this market timing hypothesis and found evidence consistent with it. For instance, 
seasoned equity offers (SEOs) are typically observed in times of high valuation (Hovakimian et al., 
2001), while buybacks correspond to periods of low valuation (Ikenberry et al., 1995). Negative stock 
returns following SEOs provide additional evidence for the market timing hypothesis (Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1999). Furthermore, buybacks are followed by positive long-term returns because 
markets interpret the buyback announcement as a signal of undervaluation (Peyer and Vermaelen, 
2008). 
1.1.2 Seasoned equity offerings 
Seasoned equity offerings can typically be structured in two ways: either through a cash offer or 
through a rights offer. With the majority of studies being carried out in the U.S., one of the most 
consistent findings related to SEOs is that cash offers are followed by negative returns, while rights 
offers are followed by insignificant returns. The reason for this being that management will not sell 
overvalued shares to its own shareholders through a rights offer (Myers and Majluf, 1984). A cash 
offer, on the other hand, creates a problem of adverse selection because informed management 
issues equity when it is overvalued to sell its shares to new – less informed – investors. In that sense, 
non-tradable rights offers should be a solution for this adverse selection problem as shares are offered 
to existing shareholders on a pro-rata basis without the option to trade the rights (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992). Much less is known, however, about the choice of trading versus non-trading of rights offers. 
While regulation certainly explains some part of the worldwide differences, other factors are to be 
considered. In Germany for example, 70% of all SEOs are through a rights offer but 40% of these rights 
offers come with non-tradable rights. In Norway, on the other hand, 52% of all SEOs are rights offers 
with only 6% of non-trading rights offers.  
 
3 
 
We observe three gaps in the existing SEO literature. First, the majority of all studies have focused on 
cash offers by U.S. firms given that rights issues have disappeared over time in the U.S. (Heron and 
Lie, 2004). Other studies, also suffer from the single-country bias (Hietala, 1994; Balachandran et al., 
2008) making it extremely difficult to distinguish between the actual drivers of the choice of cash 
versus rights offers and the differences due to specificities in institutional setting and regulatory 
framework. Additionally, evidence on long-term stock performance of cash versus rights offers is 
scarce. Third, empirical studies related to the differences between tradable and non-tradable rights 
are very limited even though the dollar value of all rights offers worldwide keeps growing 
continuously. As such, more research on the choice of tradability as well as the valuation 
consequences of cash and rights offers and trading and non-trading rights offers is highly 
recommended. 
1.2. M&A literature 
Scholars from many distinct fields such as finance, strategic management, innovation, organizational 
behavior, industrial organization among many others have studied the drivers and outcomes of M&As 
(King et al., 2004). Several well-established findings have emerged from this broad stream of 
literature. First, on average acquirers seem to obtain negative or zero returns at best, while target 
shareholders gain significant positive abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement 
(Haleblian et al., 2009). Second, acquiring private targets shows to be more value-creating than 
acquiring public targets for the acquirer’s shareholders due to increased bargaining power and higher 
information asymmetry (Faccio et al., 2006; Capron and Shen, 2007). Third, cash payment is typically 
associated with higher acquirer announcement returns than equity payment (Carow et al., 2004). 
Fourth, related acquisitions (within the same industry) as well as domestic acquisitions lead to higher 
acquirer returns than diversifying or cross-border deals (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). Two large 
areas of research can be identified within the M&A field: determinants of the acquisition decision and 
determinants of the acquisition outcome. First, we will study the impact of acquisitions on rivals of 
the merging firms, which is related to the area of acquisition outcomes. Second, we will focus on the 
choice of financing in acquisitions, which relates to the determinants of the acquisition decision. A 
third related question studies how the method of financing affects the premium paid in a context of 
high information asymmetry.  
1.2.1 Acquisition finance 
Early on researchers were interested in the method of payment in mergers and acquisitions (Eckbo et 
al., 1990). Two types of studies can be distinguished: the first looks at the method of payment as a 
driver of the acquisition premium or the combining firms’ cumulative abnormal returns and the 
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second studies the determinants of the method of payment choice. As such, cash paid deals lead to 
higher acquirer abnormal returns compared to stock paid deals (Huang and Walkling, 1987). This 
relation, however, only holds for deals with publicly listed targets. In case of privately-held targets the 
opposite relation was found: stock paid deals led to higher acquirer abnormal returns than cash paid 
deals (Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004). Similarly, higher acquisition premia are observed in 
cash paid deals, partly due to a higher tax burden on the target in case of a cash payment (Hayn, 1989; 
Eckbo, 2009). 
 
The second type of studies analyze the method of payment as the dependent variable. Findings 
indicate that cash offers are more likely in tender offers, when multiple bidders are competing for the 
same target, and in case of pre-emptive mergers (Fishman, 1989). This all refers to the fact that equity 
offers take more time to complete, while fast completion is key in competitive acquisition negotiations 
(Dikova et al., 2010). Later on, more scholars have focused on the method of financing in M&As (Faccio 
and Masulis, 2005; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). While the payment method is restricted to 
cash, equity or a combination of both, financing options include available cash, debt, or a seasoned 
equity offer as well as combinations of these three types of financing. Studies on the method of 
financing have two options: observing the actual method of financing used for a certain acquisition, 
or making the assumption that cash paid deals are debt financed. The former has the advantage of 
precision but has the disadvantage of having to make an assumption about the causality between the 
method of payment choice and the method of financing choice. By choosing the second option, one 
assumes that cash paid deals are debt financed but additional controls can rule out the potential 
influence of ex-post equity issues. 
 
Empirical findings show negative long-term returns after equity financed deals, which is in line with 
the market timing hypothesis (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009; Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). According 
to Myers and Majluf (1984) firms issue equity when their stock is overvalued, which in the long term 
leads to negative returns as markets find out that the stock was overvalued. Deals financed with cash 
typically generate negative returns, which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis according 
to which managers use financial slack for zero or even negative NPV projects (Schlingemann, 2004). 
Debt financing on the other hand is perceived positively by investors as it reduces managerial 
discretion, increases monitoring, and serves as an external certification of the acquisition’s value 
creation potential (Bharadwaj and Shivdasani, 2003; Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). More 
recently, Vermaelen and Xu (2014) show evidence of U.S. firms choosing their acquisition finance to 
move closer towards their optimal capital structure. 
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Evidence regarding European firms’ financing choices in M&As has indicated the importance of 
corporate control threats and financial constraints (Faccio and Masulis,2005; Martynova and 
Renneboog, 2009). Yet, no paper has studied the move towards an optimal capital structure by 
European firms in M&A financing choices. Additionally, prior evidence on European financing choices 
in M&As dates back to deals announced between 1993 and 2001. Finally, several authors have 
indicated the high incidence of stock payment in U.S. mergers (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014) compared to 
a higher incidence of cash paid deals in Europe (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Studying European firms’ 
choice of acquisition financing is extremely relevant given that generalizations of U.S.-based findings 
should be done very carefully. European firms are typically much more bank-oriented compared to 
U.S. firms. This difference in bank-dependence is an important factor when studying financing choices. 
1.2.2 Acquisition premium 
Typically, the consideration paid covers the value of the target firm’s assets as well as a premium 
reaching up to 50% for listed U.S. targets (Ayers et al., 2003). The premium paid is an important 
variable in the M&A literature, both as dependent and as independent variable. As such bid premia 
are typically larger in case of higher target resistance or when acquirers engage in pre-emptive bidding 
(Dimopoulos and Sacchetto, 2014; Calcagno and Falconieri, 2014). Following a more behavioral 
approach, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) indicate that CEO hubris is associated with higher bid premia. 
Based on high prior performance CEO’s become overconfident and consequently overestimate their 
abilities in creating synergies and hence pay a too high premium. Malmendier and Tate (2008) go even 
further in that hubris leads to overpayment especially when the investment is internally financed, 
suggesting an agency problem of free cash flow. Taken together these different explanations all refer 
to the bid premium as a proxy of bad management. Others have argued that high premia reflect high 
synergies and should thus be interpreted as positive signals of value-creation potential (Laamanen, 
2007). Especially targets with R&D investments seem to create high synergies and hence receive a 
higher premium. Furthermore, the acquisition financing also affects the acquisition premium 
(Vladimirov, 2015).  Firms that are able to attract debt financing, which is more competitive compared 
to equity financing, are able to pay higher premia thanks to the higher flexibility associated with debt 
compared to equity. Debt financing in the context of R&D targets, however, might create some specific 
problems of information asymmetry affecting the acquisition premium. 
1.2.3 Rivals of horizontal M&As 
Mergers and acquisitions are important events not only for the merging firms, but for the entire 
industry or strategic group. Basically,  the structure of the competitive scenery is changed by a merger 
or acquisition. Acquisitions of stand-alone firms eliminate one firm and create a larger competitor 
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instead. At the other side of the spectrum are acquisitions of divested assets which is essentially a 
reallocation of resources from the selling parent to the acquirer. The focus of our research study is on 
horizontal acquisitions, meaning that the acquirer and target firm operate in the same product 
market. Vertical or diversifying mergers are ignored because motives for these mergers can be highly 
divergent making it ambiguous to make predictions about rival effects.  
 
Prior literature has found mainly positive effects for rivals of acquisitions (Clougherty and Duso, 2009). 
Four main hypotheses have been put forward to explain why rivals are better off when competitors 
merge. The first hypothesis and probably one of the most widely known is the acquisition probability 
hypothesis (Song and Walkling, 2000). According to this hypothesis, rivals’ positive stock returns 
reflect an increased likelihood of these rival firms to be acquired in the near future. Despite its 
popularity, the acquisition probability hypothesis lacks empirical support. The second hypothesis is 
based on the idea that horizontal acquisitions consolidate the industry and allow for easier collusion 
both between competitors and along the supply chain (Fee and Thomas, 2004). Governments and 
other antitrust authorities, however, are highly concerned with potential antitrust issues and prohibit 
M&A deals if free competition is at risk. This might explain why empirical studies have struggled to 
find consistent evidence of collusion following horizontal M&As (Eckbo, 1992; Shahrur, 2005). The 
third hypothesis on rival returns is the productive efficiency hypothesis (Eckbo, 1983). According to 
this hypothesis M&As indicate that there could be inefficiencies within the industry. Hence, rivals are 
expected to also improve their efficiency which explains why rivals have positive abnormal returns. 
The fourth hypothesis which was advanced more recently posits that acquisition announcements 
indicate future growth in that industry which in turn positively affects all incumbent firms (Gaur et al., 
2013). 
Empirical findings, however, are highly fragmented and often contradictory. Despite the large body of 
research no solid explanation exists as to why rivals are revalued when competitors announce an 
acquisition or merger. A potential reason why this could be the case is because existing studies, except 
a few notable exceptions1, have used industry classification codes to identify rival firms. Typically, 
rivals are identified as all firms active in the same 4-digit SIC industry (Akhigbe and Madura, 1999; 
Gaur et al., 2013). Similarly, rivals have been selected based on the Dow Jones Global Index industry 
classification (Bley and Madura, 2003) or the Value Line Industry classification (Song and Walkling, 
2000). The problem, however, is that these firms, although active in the same industry, might not 
actually compete with one another. As such, customers or suppliers can be misclassified as rivals or 
                                                          
1 To our knowledge, Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2007) are the first to use the European Commission’s 
identification of rival firms.  
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firms that target different segments of customers might be wrongly included as rivals. Hence, 
customers, suppliers, industry incumbents, and competing firms have been grouped together as being 
rivals. Therefore, we should treat the results of these studies with caution as they study industry 
effects, at best, rather than rival effects.  
 
A second shortcoming in the M&A rival literature is the obvious focus on deals between listed firms 
motivated by the lack of data of non-listed firms. Consequently, the existing findings only hold for 
rivals of listed targets. Not only are non-listed targets very different from listed targets, also the 
motives for these acquisitions and the acquisition process are very distinctive (Capron and Shen, 
2007). Hence, we assume that rival effects might also be different for deals with divested assets and 
private targets. Adding to this the fact that the vast majority of all deals worldwide include non-listed 
targets (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009), more research on rivals of private targets and divested 
assets is highly recommended. 
 
1.3. Research questions 
This doctoral dissertation studies different aspects in the empirical corporate finance field. Building 
on existing findings and theories we try to extend the financing literature as well as the M&A field. 
Below we briefly introduce the four research questions that we identified and how we will contribute 
to the existing literature. 
1.3.1 Study 1: Choices in equity finance: A global perspective 
Firms raising equity have to decide whether to raise equity through a cash offer or a rights offer. 
Additionally, in many countries firms that choose a rights offer will have to decide on the tradability 
of the rights. Yet, literature on the tradability of rights is scant, while literature on the choice of cash 
versus rights offers is country-specific. Based on the finance literature we advance three hypotheses 
that can explain why firms choose cash or rights offers and whether they restrict or allow tradability 
of the rights. By applying different methods, this study tries to distinguish between adverse selection, 
corporate control, and distress as determinants of these two choices (cash /vs/ equity; trading /vs/ 
non-trading) 
1.3.2 Study 2: Acquisition finance: Are European companies different? 
Based on the static trade-off theory and the associated costs and benefits of debt financing every 
company has an optimal capital structure. Acquirers can move towards this optimal capital structure 
by choosing the method of financing for the acquisition wisely (Harford et al., 2009). Evidence of this 
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move towards an optimal capital structure through M&A financing was found in a U.S. setting 
(Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). We study how European acquirers choose their method of financing and 
investigate whether the optimal capital structure matters. Given that European firms typically have a 
much more concentrated ownership structure (Faccio and Lang, 2002) and engage more in cross-
border deals (Rossi and Volpin, 2004) we can expect different financing choices. Even more striking, is 
the strong bank dependence in Europe compared to U.S. Hence, studying acquisition financing choices 
in a European context is non-trivial. 
 
1.3.3 Study 3: Acquisition premium: The interplay of debt financing and target firm’s 
R&D 
This paper studies how the R&D funding gap, typically studied in small, high-growth companies, can 
affect large listed acquirers when acquiring R&D targets with debt financing. Given the high 
information asymmetry and the lack of collateral for R&D investments debt financing is typically more 
difficult to obtain or when provided some strenuous terms are imposed by the debt-providers (Hall, 
2002; David et al., 2008). Research on acquisition premia has indicated that acquisitions that are 
financed with debt are associated with higher premia compared to equity financed acquisitions 
(Vladimirov, 2015). Additionally, target firm R&D investments are positively correlated with the 
acquisition premium (Laamanen, 2007). We build on the R&D funding gap literature to build our 
hypotheses concerning the interaction of debt financing and target R&D investments for the 
acquisition premium. 
 
1.3.4 Study 4: Competitive effects for rivals of divestitures and stand-alone 
acquisitions 
The final study analyzes why rivals are revalued when competing firms merge. Building on the 
competitive dynamics literature we suggest two fundamental competitive forces that are affected by 
a horizontal merger. First, the granularity of the provided information and information flows are 
altered by intra-industry mergers and acquisitions. Given the competitive value of information, these 
changes in information availability can change the competitive game. Second, the reallocation of 
resources through a merger or acquisition affects the relative positions and relative efficiency of all 
industry incumbents. These two mechanisms are used to build the hypotheses on rivals of stand-alone 
targets compared to divested assets and rivals of public versus private targets. 
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1.4. Empirical setting 
We use four different datasets for the four studies in this dissertation. The study on SEOs takes a global 
angle including seasoned equity offerings in 127 countries. Whereas, all three M&A studies focus on 
European M&A deals. We first provide a brief overview of the evolution of the SEO market as well as 
the M&A market. 
1.4.1 Global SEO market  
Seasoned equity offerings are an important source of financing for listed companies worldwide. Yearly 
millions of dollars are raised through SEOs. U.S. firms, for instance, raised more than 200 billion USD 
in 2015 (Thomson Datastream). The number of SEOs has increased significantly over the past two 
decades (see figure 1.1). This increase is mainly driven by the stock market liberalization in many 
emerging markets over the past decades. The number of issues in the U.S. and Europe has remained 
quite stable over the years, despite a peak in 2007 in Europe and an all-time low in 2008 in the U.S. 
 
Figure 1.1. Number of SEOs. 
 
 
The average size of a seasoned equity offering in the U.S. is also quite stable over time, with 2008 
being an exceptional year. Due to the financial crisis some companies massively rebalanced their 
capital structure resulting in some very large equity issues. The average size of European SEOs is far 
less stable throughout the years, especially when compared to SEOs worldwide (see figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2. Average dollar value SEO. 
 
1.4.2 European M&A market 
The M&A literature is undoubtedly dominated by studies on the U.S. acquisition market. For many 
decades it was argued that the European M&A market was very small compared to the U.S. and less 
sophisticated, hence making it irrelevant to be studied. Furthermore, it was assumed that findings 
from U.S. studies were generalizable to Europe and new insights could not be found in Europe. 
Through time, however, more research related to the European market was carried out (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008). We believe there to be two main reasons for this development: first, the 
European M&A market has increased dramatically in size to become an important player in the global 
M&A market and second the institutional differences between the U.S. and Europe allow for many 
new questions to be answered. 
 
Typically, M&A activity is clustered in waves over time but across regions (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008). Worldwide six large M&A waves have been studied, each with their own typical features. The 
fourth M&A wave (during the 1980’s) for instance, is known for its large deals by conglomerates or 
firms aiming at becoming a conglomerate. Many deals during the fourth wave were hostile 
acquisitions financed through debt. The fifth wave (late 1990’s) was largely driven by technological 
innovation and deregulation (Harford, 2005). Historically the European M&A market has been very 
small but as of the 1990’s with the continuous development of the European Union the M&A market 
has grown tremendously. In fact, the number of M&A deals in Europe has exceeded the number of 
deals in the U.S., as of 1999 (see figure 1.3). In terms of aggregate dollar value, however, the U.S. 
market has almost always been larger than the European market (see figure 1.4).  
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   Figure 1.3. Number of M&A deals.  
 
    Figure 1.4. Dollar value M&A deals. 
 
 
This dissertation will study the European M&A market not only because of its growing size but also 
because of the interesting institutional setting which differs from the U.S. environment in many 
aspects. Furthermore, continental Europe is much more bank oriented compared to the U.S. 
(Antoniou et al., 2008). This difference in bank dependence could have strong implications in terms of 
method of payment and method of financing and hence bias generalizations from U.S. studies to the 
European context. 
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1.5. Empirical approach and findings 
In this section we describe how the data was collected for each of the four studies. Additionally, we 
also introduce the methodology used as well as the main findings. 
1.5.1 Study 1: Choices in equity finance: A global perspective 
The first study looks at the way firms structure their seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) worldwide. Two 
choices are important: whether firms use a cash or a rights offer and in case of a rights offer whether 
they make the rights tradable or not. The regulatory framework is very important for both these 
decisions. As such, we study 37,767 seasoned equity offerings in 127 countries during the period 1995-
2011. This will allow us to draw more generalizable conclusions compared to single-country studies. 
Information on the SEOs was obtained from Bloomberg, SDC, and Capital IQ in an effort to maximize 
global coverage. Given that we only study listed companies all accounting and stock information was 
obtained from Datastream. 
 
Our evidence suggests that financial distress is an important driver of the issuing choice. As such, 
management coerces existing shareholders to invest in the company by raising equity through a (non-
trading) rights offer. We also find evidence of private benefits of control inducing managers to issue 
rights instead of cash offers. The very negative long-term abnormal returns following rights offers, 
however, lead us to reject the adverse selection hypothesis. If management is concerned about 
existing shareholders and protects them by offering rights we wouldn’t observe the highly significant 
negative returns in the long run.  
 
This study adds to the discussion about the role of adverse selection and shareholder protection in 
rights offers. The “disappearing rights phenomenon” in the U.S. has been explained by the lack of 
shareholder protection offered by these rights offers (Holderness and Pontiff, 2016). Our worldwide 
evidence also rejects this adverse selection hypothesis. Not only do we observe negative returns 
following rights offers, we also depict the significant illiquidity and underpricing of rights. Yet, rights 
offers are still a popular issuing method in our worldwide sample. While this paper resolves some of 
the puzzling facts, other questions remain unanswered. For instance, if not driven by overvaluation 
and market timing, why then do markets react more negatively to cash offers compared to rights 
offers?  
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1.5.2 Study 2: Acquisition finance: Are European companies different? 
The second study of this dissertation analyzes the determinants of the method of financing choices in 
European acquisitions. The sample contains 664 deals announced between 1997 and 2014 between 
listed European acquirers and listed European targets. We focus on listed firms only because of the 
detailed information needed to study the choice of financing. Deal information was collected from 
SDC and Zephyr, while target and acquirer accounting and stock price information was retrieved from 
Compustat and Datastream.  
 
Remarkably, European firms do not consider capital structure deviations when choosing the method 
of financing. Following prior studies (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) we test the corporate control and 
information asymmetry hypotheses and find evidence consistent with both. For instance, cash 
financing is preferred in cross-border deals and when acquirer shares are illiquid. Furthermore, 
blockholders in the target or acquiring company will typically be associated with cash rather than 
equity financing. Finally, we observe positive long-term stock returns after expected and unexpected 
cash financed deals. In line with a market timing explanation, we observe negative returns following 
unexpected equity deals. Expected equity deals, however, do not lead to negative long-term returns. 
 
This paper contributes to the market timing literature. We can explain the high incidence of cash 
payment in Europe by the concentrated ownership structure in European firms as well as the cross 
border nature of many acquisitions. Yet, we have no explanation as to why so many firms finance with 
equity while their optimal capital structure would require cash. Furthermore, we add to the literature 
on the optimal capital structure. Some of our findings can be explained by a strong bank-dependence 
in Europe. The fact that firms have easier access to debt in Europe compared to the U.S. explains why 
so many European deals are cash paid. 
1.5.3 Study 3: Acquisition premium: The interplay of debt financing and target firm’s 
R&D  
In the third paper, we analyze how financing sources affect the acquisition premium of R&D targets. 
Our sample consists of 407 acquisitions between listed European firms, announced between 1997 and 
2010. The deals were retrieved from Thomson One SDC and additional deal and firm information was 
collected using Zephyr, Reuters LPC Dealscan as well as Datastream.  
 
Our findings confirm the positive effects of debt financing on the premium paid. Additionally, targets 
with R&D investments typically receive a higher premium of 11% on average compared to targets 
without R&D investments. This positive effect of target R&D on the premium only holds when 
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acquirers do not finance with debt. Hence, the presence of debt financing curtails managers’ ability to 
pay a higher premium. This is in line with the R&D funding gap literature according to which debt 
financing for R&D investments is characterized by tighter governance mechanisms (David et al., 2008). 
As such, we contribute to the R&D funding gap literature in two ways. First, we demonstrate that listed 
companies are also affected by the information asymmetries associated with R&D investments. While 
we do admit that small, high-growth firms probably suffer more from this gap, we show that large 
listed firms obtain debt financing but managerial discretion is severely restricted. Second, to the best 
of our knowledge we are the first to consider the implication of the R&D funding gap in a M&A setting. 
Based on our findings we conclude that the implications of difficult access to debt financing for R&D 
investments reach much further than previously assumed. 
1.5.4 Study 4: Competitive effects for rivals of divestitures and stand-alone 
acquisitions  
The fourth study analyzes rival reactions following M&A announcements of competing firms. A crucial 
concern for this dataset is the precise rival identification. We use reports of the European Commission 
(E.C.) in which rival firms have been identified by European Commission officials. As soon as M&A 
deals exceed certain thresholds with respect to combined turnover the European commission 
scrutinizes the proposed deal to make sure that free competition will not be harmed by the 
transaction. During their investigation the E.C. experts determine in which product and geographical 
markets the merging firms are operating. Additionally, all directly competing firms are listed. We use 
these rival firms listed by the E.C. to study the implications of horizontal M&A announcements on rival 
firms. 
 
Our sample consists of 182 European deals announced between 1997 and 2011, for which 776 rivals 
were identified. All acquirers are listed companies, while target firms can be listed firms, privately-
held firms or divested assets of either listed or private parent companies. As such our sample 
comprises 49 listed targets (27%), 53 private targets (29%), and 80 divested assets (44%). Several data 
sources were used to compile our dataset. First, deal information was collected using Zephyr, a Bureau 
Van Dijck database which has excellent coverage of European M&A deals. Second, Amadeus (also 
Bureau Van Dijck) and Datastream were used to collect accounting information and trading data for 
the targets, acquirers, and rival firms.  
 
In line with our contentions we find rivals to be better off when a stand-alone firm is acquired 
compared to the acquisition of divested assets. Within the group of stand-alone acquisitions private 
target acquisitions are associated with higher rival returns compared to public target acquisitions. 
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These differences in valuations are consistent with changes in relative efficiency and changes in 
information flows triggered by the horizontal merger of two competitors. 
 
As such, this papers adds to the M&A literature by shifting the focus back to the core competitive 
forces driving rival revaluations. While prior literature has been largely inconclusive, we show that the 
existing hypotheses cannot explain our differences in valuations of rivals. By studying different types 
of target firms, we are able to test our hypotheses on a sample of diverse targets. Hence, we propose 
relative efficiency changes and changes in information availability to be particularly important for 
rivals of horizontal acquisitions. 
 
Additionally, we contribute to the strategic management literature by showing how competitive 
dynamics can be applied in a M&A setting. Typically, competitive dynamics scholars have studied all 
sorts of competitive moves but ignored mergers and acquisitions, with Haleblian et al. (2012) being a 
notable exception. Hence, we depict the relevance of competitive dynamics in a M&A context by 
showing how M&As fundamentally affect competitive factors and how this consequently affects rivals. 
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Chapter 2 
Choices in Equity Finance: A Global Perspective 
 
M. Massa a , V. Mataigne b , T. Vermaelen a, M. Xu c 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
When companies raise equity finance they have to make choices: the issuing method (cash versus 
rights) and, when they choose the rights issue method, whether rights should be traded or not. We 
study these choices using a sample of 15,751 rights issues and 22,016 cash offers announced during 
1995-2011 in 127 countries. To explain these choices we consider three hypotheses: the adverse 
selection hypothesis, the control hypothesis and the financial distress hypothesis. The general 
conclusion is that none of these theories by themselves can fully explain what we observe. However, 
we clearly reject the most popular explanation in the literature, i.e., the adverse selection hypothesis, 
as both rights issues and cash offers are followed by long-term negative excess returns. When we 
examine the second choice, i.e., the choice to have tradable rights, we find that in the short run the 
market appreciates the fact that rights are not trading, but in the long run firms with non-tradable 
rights underperform. In fact, firms seem to restrict rights trading in order to raise financing when the 
prospect of restructuring is more doubtful and the need to force the hand of the existing shareholders 
is higher. This provides additional support for the hypothesis that many rights issues are made by firms 
in financial distress. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a  INSEAD, Fontainebleau, FRANCE. 
b Ghent University, Ghent, BELGIUM. 
c London School of Economics, London, UNITED KINGDOM 
21 
 
2.1. Introduction 
When listed companies raise equity capital (i.e., make seasoned equity offers) they can either make a 
rights issue or a cash offer. While theory has provided a lot of insights on this topic, the empirical 
analysis has been much more limited. Indeed, the focus in the academic literature has traditionally 
been on the U.S., where the overwhelming majority of equity issues have taken the form of cash 
offers. However, this is not the case if we look at the rest of the world. Indeed, out of 37,767 equity 
issues around the world in the period 1995-2011, over 41% have been rights issues. Moreover, what 
is less widely known is that, in many countries, when firms make rights issues they have an additional 
choice: to have the rights traded or not. Specifically, out of 8,193 rights issues over the same period 
announced in countries in which the companies are allowed to make rights non-tradable (“choice 
countries”), approximately 37% of the issues did not have tradable rights. The purpose of this paper 
is to improve our understanding of the SEO process using a global (worldwide) view that accounts for  
the choice of rights versus cash as well as the choice of tradability. This approach allows us to provide 
new insights on a topic traditionally studied with a US-centric perspective mostly focused on cash 
offers.  
 
In the case of rights issues, the company gives the existing shareholders a priority to buy new shares 
in the company. If the rights are traded, the shareholders who do not want to subscribe are supposed 
to sell the rights to others. However, unless brokers automatically sell the rights of the shareholders 
who don’t communicate2 their preference – i.e., to subscribe or not – these shareholders will lose. 
Their loss will be a gain to the underwriter (in an underwritten offer) or to other shareholders (in a 
non-underwritten offer) who are given an oversubscription privilege. In the case of cash offers, firms 
sell their shares without giving priority to the existing shareholders, effectively putting them on an 
equal footing with the outside investors. Because these investors can always buy shares in the open 
market, in cash offers shares are offered at a small discount from market prices.  
 
Three hypotheses are advanced to explain the issuing choice. First, the adverse selection hypothesis 
builds on the premise that management protects current shareholders and that firms raise equity 
when shares are overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Hence, rights, especially non-trading rights, are 
issued to protect shareholders from adverse selection when shares are undervalued. The second 
hypothesis is based on private benefits of control. As such, (non-trading) rights issues prevent dilution 
and ensure that private benefits of control do not have to be shared with “intruders” (Wu, Wang, and 
                                                          
2 Investors may “forget” to reply to their broker if, for example, they are on holiday. Evidence that in the U.S. 36 
% of investors forget to exercise or sell rights is documented by Holderness and Pontiff (2016). 
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Yao, 2014). Finally, the distress hypothesis posits that management will turn to its own shareholders, 
with a (non-trading rights offer) when the company is close to financial distress.  
 
Because rights issues are almost non-existent in the U.S. (let alone a proper market for rights), in order 
to test these hypotheses, we have to examine equity issues in other countries but the U.S. This will 
also provide the critical information on differences in the market for rights. This can now be done in a 
proper way given the growing trend of international equity issuances. Within this trend, rights issues 
have become increasingly important (Figure 2.1.). For example, in 2011, firms around the world raised 
$214 billion through rights issues, compared with $356 billion through cash offers and $170 billion by 
initial public offers. The popularity of rights issues worldwide is partially a result of the fact that they 
are mandatory in many European and Latin American countries (Spamann, 2010), unless shareholders 
give explicit approval for cash offers.  In some countries brokers and banks will automatically sell rights 
if investors don’t specify whether they want to exercise the rights or not (Holderness and Pontiff 
2016). If firms are concerned about wealth transfer from small investors who don’t pay attention, they 
may prefer to use cash offers. We will explicitly control for all these effects. 
 
Figure 2.1. Seasoned equity offers over time. 
Source: Securities Data Corporation (SDC). 
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We use a sample of 15,751 rights issues and 22,016 cash offers around the world announced during 
the period 1995-2011. Although in the total sample short-term excess returns are both negative for 
rights issues and cash offers, returns to cash offers are significantly more negative than the returns to 
rights issues. Moreover, in countries where firms don’t have a choice on tradability and rights have to 
be tradable (“no-choice countries”) we find that cash offers earn significant negative excess returns 
while announcement returns to rights issues are not significantly different from zero. So negative 
announcement returns observed after rights issues are only observed in countries where firms have a 
choice on tradability (“choice countries”).  
 
On closer inspection, we see that these negative announcement returns are generated by offers 
where rights are tradable. When rights are non-tradable, announcement returns are positive and the 
difference for firms with tradable rights and cash offers is statistically significant. The fact that non 
tradability is good for shareholder value is consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis. When 
firms have to make rights tradable (i.e., in the no-choice countries), the market assumes that a rights 
issue reduces adverse selection problems. When firms do have a choice to make rights tradable, 
markets are convinced that the rights issue choice is driven by adverse selection considerations if the 
rights are not tradable.  
 
When we examine the long-term excess returns, we find that excess returns after rights issues are 
significantly negative although less so than in cash offers. Note that this conclusion holds both in 
choice countries and non-choice countries. But, negative excess returns are clearly inconsistent with 
the adverse selection hypothesis. Moreover the fact that long-term returns are more negative after 
cash offers is inconsistent with the control hypothesis as well as the financial distress hypothesis.  
 
When we examine the subset of firms in choice countries, we find that firms with non-tradable rights 
have significantly lower excess returns than firms with tradable rights, which is the opposite of the 
short-term result and clearly inconsistent with the adverse selection hypothesis, but consistent with 
the control hypothesis and the financial distress hypothesis: making rights non-tradable signals large 
private benefits of control or more serious distress issues.  
 
So the bottom line is that the combined stock return evidence once we properly account for both the 
effect of the choice between rights issue and cash offer and the choice of whether to restrict the 
tradability of the rights in the case of rights issues is not consistent with any of the alternative 
24 
 
hypotheses. So the reasonable conclusion is that the issuance choice is possibly driven by a 
combination of factors such as adverse selection, control considerations, or financial distress.  
 
Next, we focus on the link between tradability and firm future profitability. In line with the distress 
hypothesis, we find strong empirical evidence that issuers perform better after offers with tradable 
rights. Such a positive relation between profitability and tradability is consistent with the argument 
that issuers with bad prospects restrict trading (distress hypothesis), while it does not support the 
adverse selection hypothesis or the control hypothesis that posit that issuers restrict trading when 
they believe the firm will perform better in the future. That is, the performance patterns after the 
offer indicate that the decision on tradability is related to the need to restructure and this leads to 
better firm profitability afterwards.  
 
To sum up, the joint set of results based on long-term stock returns and long-term profitability is 
consistent with the distress hypothesis and fails to support either the control or the adverse selection 
hypothesis. In contrast, the results based on the short-term announcement returns seem to support 
the adverse selection hypothesis.   
 
An additional method to test why firms choose rights issues rather than cash offers is to run a 
multivariate analysis of the determinants of the choice of offerings. This analysis is helpful also to rule 
out potential confounding effects and/or alternative explanations not properly accounted for in the 
previous analysis. As such, we estimate a probit specification of whether the firm chooses a rights 
issue or a cash offer and find that, after adjusting for country and year fixed effects, a firm is more 
likely to resort to rights issues in the presence of higher probability of distress. However, rights issues 
are also more likely when more than 25 % of the shares are held by a controlling blockholder which is 
consistent with the control hypothesis. Rights issues are chosen by firms with low market-to-book 
ratios and when the stock markets have been performing relatively poorly in the previous months. 
This is consistent with an adverse selection story to the extent that a poor stock price performance 
increases the likelihood that firms believe that they are undervalued (although the negative long-term 
excess returns after rights issues show that this belief was not justified). So again, we have to conclude 
that no single theory can explain the choice between rights and cash offers. 
 
Next, we focus on the choice of restricting tradability. First, we find that tradability is less prevalent 
when the probability of distress (inverse of Altman Z-score) is low, but also when the issuer is a small 
firm with low current and future profitability. This sends inconclusive signals about the distress 
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hypothesis. Next, tradability does not seem to be affected by block ownership (i.e., more than 25 % of 
the shares are held by a controlling blockholder). This is inconsistent with the control hypothesis. 
Finally, the fact that tradability is chosen by firms with high market-to-book ratios and not during the 
crisis is inconsistent with an adverse selection argument.   
 
This paper is, as far as we know, the first comprehensive international study of equity issues and 
contributes to the literature in several ways. First, previous research on long-run returns has been 
largely based on cash offers because the alternative issue method – i.e., rights issues – is largely non-
existent in the U.S. (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; Eckbo, Masulis, 
and Norli 2000). Moreover many international studies on long-run returns after seasoned equity offers 
(SEOs) (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; McLean, Pontiff, and Watanabe, 2009) do not distinguish 
between rights and cash offers. Also, previous research on long-run returns after SEOs is mostly 
country specific and focuses primarily on cash offers or does not make a distinction between cash 
offers and rights issues. Even more important no paper, to the best of our knowledge, studies the 
feature of tradability of the rights and uses it to distinguish between alternative theories on equity 
issuance. Therefore, the main contribution of this paper is to make a clear distinction between cash 
offers and rights issues, as well as between rights issues with tradable rights and non-tradable rights.  
 
Second, in contrast to our global perspective existing research on SEOs is mainly country specific, 
which is due perhaps to the wide variation in regulations and incidences of rights issues across 
countries. In the U.S., only a few companies have made rights issues in recent decades. This 
“disappearing rights phenomenon” has been documented by Smith (1977), Hansen (1988), Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992), Kothare (1997), Armitage (1998), Heron and Lie (2004), and Ursel (2006). Holderness 
and Pontiff (2016) explain the lack of U.S. rights issues by arguing that they do not offer sufficient 
protection to uninformed or irrational shareholders. In a direct survey of issuers, these authors 
document that fewer than two-thirds of shareholders sell or exercise rights. Rantapuska and Knupfer 
(2008) find similarly low participation rates in Finland and also document that Finnish shareholders 
exercise rights too early or sell them below the intrinsic value. Balachandran et al. (2008, 2012) 
document take-up, liquidity, and announcement returns for non-tradable rights in Australia. In one 
other international study, McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2008) report a relation between country-wide 
governance standards and the choice between rights and cash offers.  
 
Finally, our documentation of the existence and liquidity of the secondary rights market contributes 
to the discussion on the costs and benefits of rights issues relative to cash offers. We provide evidence 
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on both the undervaluation and tradability of rights in a larger international sample and describe how 
they are linked to the regulatory framework. Rights tend to be undervalued and illiquid which may be 
one reason why firms don’t believe it is in the interest of the current shareholders to make them 
tradable. So, we add to the literature on law and finance. La Porta et al. (1998) list the countries where 
rights issues are mandatory, a feature that has been widely used, sometimes (Spamann, 2010) in 
refined form, as a measure of shareholder protection. We show that the effect of rights issues on 
shareholder protection is more complex than previously indicated. 
2.2. Hypotheses 
 
Why should firms prefer rights to cash offers?  First, rights issues avoid the adverse selection problem 
that arises when informed managers – caring about existing shareholders more than new 
shareholders – have an incentive to issue equity if the shares are overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
In a rights issue such an incentive does not exist as long as all shareholders exercise their rights, in 
which case new and existing shareholders are the same. That is, rights issues do not send the signal 
that the stock is overvalued. In fact, exactly because existing shareholders are solicited, rights issues 
should be preferred to cash offers if the shares are undervalued. Indeed, the fact that the existing 
shareholders subscribe prevents a wealth transfer from the existing shareholders to new 
shareholders. However, to the extent that rights are not exercised but sold, current shareholders can 
still suffer if the rights are undervalued (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). One way to completely eliminate 
the adverse selection problem is to make the rights non-tradable. Therefore, non-tradability is a sort 
of extreme solution to the adverse selection problem. We will call this the “adverse selection” 
hypothesis (H1). 
 
A second intuition is linked to the private benefits of control. When choosing between cash offers and 
rights issues, firms prefer rights issues to preserve private benefits of control (Wu, Wang, and Yao, 
2014).  In a cash offer, new equity is sold to outside investors and the incumbent ownership will be 
diluted, whereas in a rights issue there is no dilution as long as the incumbent shareholders exercise 
all their subscription rights. However, dilution of control can still happen if non-controlling investors 
sell their rights to “intruders, newly emerging substantial shareholders who are unable to take over 
the firm but intend to share the private benefits with the incumbent”.3 Wu, Wang, and Yao (2014) 
assume that these potential intruders know the value of private benefits of control but outside 
investors do not. Hence, in contrast to the adverse selection hypothesis, they predict that rights issues 
reveal negative information: the private benefits of control (which are ultimately paid for by non-
                                                          
3 Wu, Wang, and Yao (2014) 
27 
 
controlling shareholders) are so large that incumbent management prefers a rights issue. Note that a 
rights issue may still give an opportunity to intruders to accumulate a stake by buying the rights.  
Accumulating a stake through buying rights may be less costly than simply buying shares in the open 
market if the rights are underpriced (e.g., Hietala, 1994; Poitras, 2002; Rantapuska and Knupfer, 2008). 
Non-tradability is therefore a solution to prevent such change of control.  The choice of the existing 
shareholders to use rights issues and, even more importantly, to restrict tradability to prevent a 
change in control, sends a signal to the market that the private benefits of control are large. Hence, 
stock prices should decline more after a rights issue if trading is restricted. We will call this the 
“control” hypothesis (H2). 
 
Alternatively, rights issues can be considered as a financing of last resort in the case where the firm is 
unable to attract outside investors through a cash offer. This would be the case if outside investors 
suspect that the purpose of the issue is to reduce financial distress. Ursel (2006) argues that in recent 
years U.S. rights issuers are in financial distress. Existing shareholders have a larger incentive to keep 
their option alive and avoid losing everything in bankruptcy. In this context, issuing rights may give a 
bad signal (distress) that may be worse than any signal provided by a cash offer. Restricting trading 
may be seen as a way to coerce existing investors to bail out the firm, or sell their shares before the 
ex-rights date to investors who believe that a financial restructuring will ultimately turn out to be a 
good investment. As remarked by the chairman of an investment firm: “The company is holding a gun 
against your head.”4  So rights issues with non-tradability should be linked to the more “desperate” 
cases in which the probability of future restructuring is lower and the need to force the hand to the 
market is higher. In other words, non-tradability reduces execution risk5, a risk that is more important 
for companies in financial distress. Tradability increases execution risk in two ways. First, if rights are 
underpriced (as mentioned above) it may provide a negative information signal that insiders are selling 
their rights. Second, tradability requires additional time, prolonging the average period between 
announcement and effective date from 14 days to 28 days. During this extended period, negative 
                                                          
4 “Rights issues: Devil lies in detail,” Financial Review, July 4, 2012. 
5 Note that execution risk can be reduced in other ways, such as offer deep discounts and underwriting. Yet, 
discounts are costly to those who do not exercise or sell their rights, a substantial proportion of shareholders 
[34%, according to a survey of U.S.-based issuers conducted by Holderness and Pontiff (2016)]. Furthermore, a 
deep discount may signal management’s belief that the stock is overvalued. Such signals can increase execution 
risk. Discounts also increase the number of new shares needed and thereby reduce the post-issuance earnings 
per share, a measure that determines the bonus of many executives. Underwriting is not available to some issuers 
and costly to others: both regulators and customers often complain about fees they think are too high with 
respect to the insurance they provide, which can be priced as a put option (Marsh, 1980; Office of Fair Trading, 
2011). 
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information about the firm or about market liquidity could leak and thereby reduce demand.6 We will 
call this the “distress” hypothesis (H3).    
 
The three hypotheses provide different implications for the impact on share prices. The adverse 
selection hypothesis posits that, given that outsiders anticipate the opportunistic behavior of the firm, 
cash offers generate negative announcement returns. Also, to the extent the market underreacts (a 
necessary condition for market timing to benefit current long-term shareholders), cash offers will also 
display negative long-run excess returns. This would be consistent with previous research on long-run 
returns after U.S. cash offers (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995). In 
rights issues, there should be no adverse selection problem as in theory the current and new investors 
are the same. Therefore, the adverse selection hypothesis makes two testable predictions. The first 
(H1a) posits that cash offers generate negative returns and rights issues create positive (or at least 
non-negative) excess return in the short run. To the extent the market underreacts, this short-term 
prediction should also hold in the long run: negative excess returns after cash offers and non-negative 
excess returns after rights issues. The second prediction (H1b) is based on the intuition that non-
tradability eliminates wealth transfer to new shareholders by selling undervalued rights: short-term 
and possibly long-term excess returns will be higher when rights are not tradable.  
 
The control hypothesis argues that rights issues are chosen when there are large private benefits of 
control. To the extent the market was not fully aware of the size of these benefits (an assumption 
made by Wu, Wang, and Yao (2014)) we obtain hypothesis (H2a): rights issues will generate more 
negative returns than cash offers in the short run, and to the extent the market underreacts, also in 
the long run. Making the rights non-tradable signals to the market that these benefits are very large. 
Indeed, when they are really large, the controlling shareholders want to make sure that no “intruder” 
can build up a large stake by buying rights and therefore restrict their tradability. Hence, H2b predicts 
that rights issues with non-tradable rights should generate more negative returns than rights issues 
with tradable rights. Note that the adverse selection hypothesis and control hypothesis make 
diametrically opposed predictions. The distress hypothesis posits that the announcement of a rights 
issue is not a signal of undervaluation, as predicted by the adverse selection hypothesis. It may simply 
mean that the firm is unable to raise funds via a cash offer because of concerns about financial distress. 
                                                          
6 The concern about the impact of negative information is exacerbated by the stricter prospectus requirements 
that apply to traded rights issues—namely, requirements to provide more detailed information about the planned 
use of proceeds and risks associated with the firm. Disclosing such information could have a significant negative 
effect, as high levels of financial distress are presumed if a firm announces that issue proceeds will be used to 
repay debt. 
29 
 
So the first prediction (H3a) is that excess returns following a rights issue will be negative both in the 
short and in the long run and more negative than in the case of cash offers. Moreover in the more 
“desperate” cases the firm may want to “hold a gun against the head of investors” and coerce a 
successful issue by making the rights non-tradable. Hence, (H3b) predicts more negative returns (both 
short-run and long-run) when rights are not tradable.  
 
In other words, the hypotheses can be summarized by the following alternative intuition if  financing 
is perceived as beneficial to the existing shareholders, then the choice of a rights issue, by restricting 
the financing to the existing shareholders, sends a good signal to the market (adverse selection 
hypothesis). If the financing is perceived as detrimental to the existing (minority) shareholders, either 
because it benefits the majority blockholders (control hypothesis) or because it forces them to bear 
the cost of restructuring (distress hypothesis), then the choice of a rights issue sends a bad signal to 
the market. 
 
While these restrictions are based on the stock returns that reflect market expectations and therefore 
also involve a joint hypothesis of market efficiency, we can consider restrictions based on real 
profitability of the firm (e.g.., ROA). The adverse selection hypothesis posits that issuers restrict 
trading when they believe the firm will perform better in the future and therefore predicts a negative 
relationship between tradability and future profitability (H1c). The control hypothesis posits that 
blockholders reserve for themselves part of the private benefits of control. While these will accrue 
mostly to the controlling blockholders  such benefits will only exist if the firm is profitable. Therefore, 
the control hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between tradability and profitability (H2c). 
Finally, the distress hypothesis suggests that tradability will be restricted exactly in the cases in which 
future profitability is more doubtful, suggesting a positive link between tradability and future 
profitability (H3c). 
 
These considerations suggest that the control hypothesis and the distress hypothesis are 
observationally equivalent unless we focus on tradability, while the adverse selection and the control 
hypotheses are observationally equivalent unless we focus on returns. In both cases, it is critical to 
focus on the restrictions imposed by tradability. An overview of the predictions is provided in Table 
2.1. 
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Table 2.1. Overview hypotheses. 
 This table provides an overview of the expected performance implications according to the different hypotheses. 
  
 Abnormal Returns   
CASH /vs/ RIGHTS    
Adverse Selection Cash: negative abnormal returns    
Rights: non-negative abnormal returns   
    
Private Benefits of Control Cash: positive abnormal returns     
Rights: negative abnormal returns   
    
Financial Distress Cash: positive abnormal returns     
Rights: negative abnormal returns   
    
 Abnormal Returns  Future profitability 
TRADING/vs/NON-TRADING    
Adverse Selection Non-trading higher returns compared to 
trading  
Non-trading higher future profitability 
compared to trading 
    
Private Benefits of Control Non-trading lower returns compared to 
trading  
Non-trading higher future profitability 
compared to trading 
    
Financial Distress 
Non-trading lower returns compared to 
trading   
Non-trading lower future profitability 
compared to trading 
 
 
2.3. Institutional Characteristics of Rights Issues 
2.3.1 Anatomy of a rights issue 
In this section, we provide an overview of the rights issue process. We describe its main features. 
The offer. In a rights issue, the issuer’s shareholders have the preemptive right to purchase a pro rata 
portion of the new shares. The subscription price is typically set at a discount to the recent market 
price to encourage participation. Some issuers (notably, U.S. and Austrian firms) first announce a 
range for the subscription price or the discount and do not actually set the price until after the 
subscription period. This procedure ensures that the stock price does not fall below the subscription 
price.7 The number of rights given to shareholders is based on the number of shares owned on a 
                                                          
7 Curiously, the main source of transaction risk is the number of shares subscribed rather than the event that the 
market price falls below the subscription price. Some offers are fully subscribed despite a market price below the 
subscription price, and many offers are not fully subscribed despite a market price far above the subscription 
price, especially in illiquid markets. The stock price also only rarely falls below the subscription price, 21 times in 
our sample. Consistent with the execution risk hypothesis, all 21 transactions involved tradable rights. 
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specified “record date”. That is, shareholders have a window of time during which to sell their shares 
if they prefer not to participate. The record date is, on average, five days after announcement of the 
rights issue. In only 15 of the non-tradable rights issues in our sample is the record date before the 
announcement. 
 
Trading of rights. In tradable rights issues, shareholders who choose not to exercise their rights can 
trade them in a secondary market during the offer period. Trading in the absence of a market is rare 
and costly, and it typically involves larger blocks of rights. Thus, issuers effectively restrict the trading 
of rights when they do not provide a market for them. 
 
Non-exercised rights. After the subscription period, the issuer can sell any rights that were not 
exercised (or sell the non-purchased new shares directly) to a so-called standby buyer or place them 
in the public market. Standby buyers are usually controlling shareholders, related parties, or 
underwriters. Public placements typically occur in an accelerated book-building process that is 
comparable to cash offers. Issuers can also give shareholders an “oversubscription privilege” that 
entitles subscribers to a second preemptive right to the unsubscribed shares. Very few regulators 
(notably, Hong Kong and the U.K.) require issuers to reimburse non-exercising shareholders from the 
proceeds due to purchased new shares. 
 
Regulations and discretion. Rights issues, tradability, and reimbursements are regulated by securities 
laws and listing rules. By definition, preemptive rights are optional; hence, shareholders can waive 
them (subject to country-specific limitations), typically in a majority vote. This fact makes rights issues 
susceptible to possible conflicts of interest between groups of shareholders. For example, issuers in 
most countries exclude foreign shareholders from the distribution and/or tradability of rights. Further 
variants arise as a function of differences in brokerage agreements. In many European countries, most 
brokers will sell rights even when shareholders give no instructions to exercise or sell. Such behavior 
reduces the losses of the investors who do not actively decide about the subscription (e.g., Holderness 
and Pontiff, 2016). 
 
Prospectus. Issuers must provide a prospectus that details the offer’s characteristics and states its 
objectives and the risks involved. Exemptions to this rule typically apply to small offers and offers to a 
limited number of (new) shareholders. These exemptions apply to most offers with non-tradable 
rights. 
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2.3.2 Regulations and tradability 
Regulations in different countries require, enable, or are silent on the tradability of rights. As a result, 
depending on the country, all, some, or none of the issued rights are traded. Following La Porta et al. 
(1998) and Spamann (2010), we interviewed lawyers, investment bankers, and regulators about the 
existence and regulation of secondary rights markets.8 While we asked for and recorded explicitly the 
state of the regulations at the end of 2011, we also verified whether changes occurred throughout our 
sample period. Non-traded rights are the norm in only a few countries, most of whom are former 
communist countries that have seen a wave of privatization and in which the government still holds a 
large stake in public firms.9  
 
At the other end of the spectrum are many countries in Europe and Asia (and in all of Latin America), 
where issuers are required to make a market for rights. We refer to such countries as “mandatory 
trading” countries. In the rest of the world, companies can choose whether or not the rights will be 
traded. We refer to these as “choice” countries. Within most of the Commonwealth, this choice is 
structured and regulated. In Hong Kong, Singapore, and the U.K., offers without tradable rights are 
called open offers and are subject to a separate set of regulations (Korteweg and Renneboog, 2002). 
In Australia and New Zealand, offers without a secondary rights market are called non-renounceable 
(Balachandran et al., 2008, 2012). Open and non-renounceable rights issues often have size or 
discount requirements. In the U.K., for example, open offers are allowed unless the discount exceeds 
10%. Open offers require only a simplified prospectus (or none at all). In contrast, U.S. and Swiss firms 
are free to choose whether to make their rights tradable. In other countries (e.g., Germany, Austria, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands), rights are always tradable but issuers are not required to provide a 
market for them. It is typical in these countries for issuers to be (at least partially) exempt from 
prospectus requirements if existing shareholders are the only ones subscribing to the new rights. 
                                                          
8 For general descriptions of regulations on rights issues, see Myners (2005) for an overview of European 
regulations. See also Balanchandran, Faff, and Theobald (2008) for Australia, Fung, Leung, and Zhu (2008) for 
China, Rantapuska and Knupfer (2008) for Finland, Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) for France, Stehle, Ehrhardt, 
and Przyborowsky (2000) for Germany, Tsangarakis (1996) for Greece, Ching, Firth, and Rui (2006) for Hong Kong, 
Marisetty, Marsden, and Veeraraghavan (2008) for India, Bigelli (1998) for Italy, Kang and Stulz (1996) for Japan, 
Salamudin, Ariff, and Nassir (1999) for Malaysia, Marsden (2000) for New Zealand, Bøhren, Eckbo, and Michalsen 
(1997) for Norway, Tan, Chang, and Tong (2002) for Singapore, Dhatt, Kim, and Mukherji (1996) for South Korea, 
Pastor-Llorca and Martin-Ugedo (2004) for Spain, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) for Sweden, Loderer and 
Zimmermann (1987) for Switzerland, Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004) for Thailand, Adaoglu (2006) for 
Turkey, and Armitage (1998) for the U.K. and U.S. 
9 For example, Atanasov et al. (2010) give a detailed description of diluted minority shareholder value due to 
Bulgarian rights issues before a 2002 reform that required rights to be tradable. As in Bulgaria prior to 2002, 
trading occurs only rarely in Russia and China. 
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2.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.4.1 Data 
We use a sample of SEOs obtained from Bloomberg, SDC, and Capital IQ. Our sample starts in 1995 
(when data on rights trading became available from Bloomberg) and ends in 2011. We exclude offers 
of preferred stocks, loan stocks, shares in related companies, rights with warrant sweeteners, and 
poison-pill rights. If the offer extends to cross-listed securities, we include only the main security. 
Bloomberg lists rights and cash offers in its corporate action calendar. Most of this information is listed 
on dedicated screens for each transaction that can be accessed from the corporate action calendar 
list. We collect this information by looking up the transaction window for each offer. These screens 
state whether the right is traded and provide trading dates and sometimes tickers in addition to event 
dates, currency, subscription price, number of rights issued, and number of rights needed to buy one 
share. When no ticker is listed, we identify the ticker as the related security that was listed and delisted 
on the dates provided. These tickers are named after country-specific conventions and are usually 
identifiable as rights (e.g., by a suffix “R”). Accounting and market data on the underlying stock are 
obtained from Datastream. Based on Bloomberg, SDC, and Capital IQ our sample consists of 15,751 
rights issues for which we were able to find accounting information from Thomson Datastream and 
for which we were able to determine if rights were trading. We find 5,150 (63%) of the offers in choice 
countries could be traded. Bloomberg provides rights trading data for most countries. We lose 
observations because of Bloomberg’s policy of storing and reusing security tickers, which varies across 
countries. For example, Bloomberg recycles security tickers for rights in Hong Kong and does not 
maintain records of all their trading histories; hence, we are able to retrieve trading data for only 10% 
of the traded Hong Kong rights issues. Overall, our sample covers 127 countries and is not dominated 
by the largest markets. For stock exchanges that are large and more developed, the number of events 
per country is in line with data reported by the European study of Rinne and Suominen (2008) and 
also with other data sources such as the Securities Data Corporation (SDC). The SDC data include more 
transaction details than are available from Bloomberg, but only for a select sample of large offers. The 
coverage of smaller, less developed markets (e.g., Panama, Turkey, Brazil) varies across databases. 
Appendix A compares the number of observations listed in Bloomberg with those listed by SDC 
(ordered by the number of transactions). Bloomberg lists cash offers as a corporate actions category 
separate from rights issues; in contrast, SDC simply “flags” rights issues within its single list of all offers. 
As a consequence, mixed offers may appear in each Bloomberg list but only once in SDC (sometimes 
flagged as a rights issue), which may explain the discrepancy between the two databases in the 
fraction of rights issues. On the one hand, SDC generally provides better coverage on cash offers. This 
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advantage is consistent with its widespread use in the cash offer literature [for an overview, see Eckbo, 
Masulis, and Norli (2007)].  
 
On the other hand, Bloomberg offers a more comprehensive coverage of rights issues in all countries 
but Japan (56 vs. 68 covered by SDC). In total, Bloomberg describes 28,240 rights issues, compared to 
12,694 described by SDC, for the period 1995–2011. Another potential source of equity issuance data 
is Capital IQ, which is available starting from 2003. In Appendix A, we also provide a comparison of the 
number of rights issues per country covered by Bloomberg and Capital IQ, in this time period. Capital 
IQ covers a similar number of offers in most markets, but misses many observations in important 
markets such as Australia, China, and South Korea. In total, it covers 7,677 rights issues in the period 
2003–2011, compared with 15,897 covered by Bloomberg.10 We integrated our existing sample based 
on Bloomberg and SDC with the information from Capital IQ when missing in Bloomberg or SDC.  
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Table 2.2. lists our sample countries and the number of rights that were actually traded with 
Datastream data available. We also document the number of cash offers for which Datastream data 
are available. In total we have 22,016 cash offers. What is striking is the small number of firms that 
choose the rights issue method in the U.S., Canada and Japan. The number of rights issues with a 
secondary rights market varies. In the U.S. and in most British Commonwealth countries, a substantial 
portion of rights is not traded. In particular, the fraction of offers without trading is 55% in the U.S., 
where issuers have a free choice;11 7% in the U.K., where such open offers are allowed only if the 
discount does not exceed 10%, and 23% and 73% in Hong Kong and Australia (respectively), where 
neither has a discount limit. In Singapore, where the 10% discount limit does apply, companies provide 
a market for rights in all but 7% of the offers. In Western Europe, issuers in several countries restrict 
trading in offers: 40% of offers in Germany provide no rights market; the fraction is 24% in Belgium 
and 20% in Switzerland. In most Scandinavian, Southern European, and Latin American countries, 
nearly all rights are traded, except for a few small offers that involve controlling shareholders. 
  
                                                          
10 Curiously, Capital IQ’s coverage of US issuers is much more comprehensive than the other two databases, with 
834 designated rights issues compared to 325 identified by Bloomberg (and 372 by SDC in the entire period 
between 1995 and 2011). Many of these offerings, however, seem to be shelf offers for which we are not able to 
find information on subscription rights. 
11 This figure is similar to the 51% reported by Holderness and Pontiff (2016). 
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Table 2.2. Sample data by country. 
This table gives a breakdown of the sample by country of incorporation (50 largest in terms of all offers) listed 
by the number of offers. “Choice countries” are those in which firms have the possibility to issue non-tradable 
rights. The last column indicates countries in which there was a change in regime from no-choice to choice 
country during our sample frame 1995-2011. 
Country  Total Offer   Rights  Choice 
country 
 Change in 
regime     Cash Rights   non traded traded   
Australia 5438 3318 2120  73% 27%  x   
Canada 4407 4283 124  1% 99%    x 
US 4258 4016 242  55% 45%  x   
UK 3148 2708 440  7% 93%  x   
China 2755 1144 1611  0% 100%     
Hong Kong 1651 1195 456  23% 77%  x   
Taiwan 1137 595 542  0% 100%     
South Korea 1132 0 1132  0% 100%     
Japan 949 897 52  0% 100%     
Sweden 913 116 797  3% 97%    x 
Germany 845 251 594  40% 60%  x   
Brazil 749 191 558  1% 99%    x 
Turkey 720 37 683  31% 69%    x 
Greece 653 94 559  29% 71%    x 
France 652 167 485  7% 93%    x 
Malaysia 593 296 297  1% 99%    x 
India 524 390 134  1% 99%    x 
Singapore 483 289 194  7% 93%  x   
Spain 398 78 320  3% 97%    x 
Italy 389 94 295  1% 99%    x 
Norway 379 181 198  6% 94%  x   
Indonesia 342 86 256  1% 99%    x 
Vietnam 327 29 298  52% 48%    x 
South Africa 281 89 192  0% 100%     
Thailand 258 53 205  14% 86%    x 
Poland 241 94 147  0% 100%     
Ireland 200 158 42  5% 95%    x 
Denmark 196 53 143  0% 100%     
New Zealand 180 77 103  17% 83%  x   
Switzerland 178 96 82  20% 80%  x   
Chile 171 19 152  0% 100%     
Austria 159 41 118  20% 80%  x   
Mexico 157 32 125  0% 100%     
Bermuda 144 125 19  5% 95%  x   
Netherlands 127 112 15  33% 67%  x   
Philippines 126 56 70  0% 100%     
Israel 123 85 38  0% 100%     
Sri Lanka 106 1 105  0% 100%     
Portugal 105 22 83  0% 100%     
Finland 102 47 55  98% 2%    x 
Peru 96 3 93  0% 100%     
Kuwait 95 2 93  0% 100%     
Russia 94 0 94  100% 0%  x   
Belgium 92 50 42  24% 76%  x   
Ivory Coast 88 16 72  0% 100%  x   
Pakistan 86 1 85  0% 100%     
Jersey 83 72 11  0% 100%  x   
Jordan 82 0 82  0% 100%     
Isle of Man 75 0 75  9% 91%     
Bulgaria 75 0 75  0% 100%     
Others 1205 257 948   8% 92%         
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We use the term “choice countries” when we refer to the countries that allow the issuer to restrict 
tradability of the rights. We identify these countries by observing the de facto incidence of secondary 
rights markets. Thus, choice countries are those in which each type (tradable and non-tradable) 
accounts for more than 5% of the market. Actual trading incidences are important because they reflect 
a true market choice, rather than merely a rule imposed by regulations, which may or may not actually 
be enforced. We employ a 5% threshold because there are exceptional cases where issuers deviate 
from their regulatory regime; for example, when they cater to foreign shareholders or to a controlling 
shareholder. A 1% threshold yields similar results, but it would misclassify certain countries as choice 
countries when both regulators and issuers regard trading as mandatory. It is important to note that 
a classification based on interviews with regulators and lawyers confirms our assessment for almost 
all countries. The only exception is Malaysia where issuers have a choice yet 99% of all rights are 
traded. None of our results changes qualitatively when we employ a 1% threshold. 
 
In Table 2.3., we describe the characteristics of the cash and rights issues in our sample for all 127 
countries. Firms choosing a rights issue rather than a cash offer tend to have larger assets, but smaller 
market capitalization. In line with the adverse selection hypothesis, firms issuing cash offers have  
higher market-to-book, higher runup, and higher market capitalization than firms that use rights 
issues. Furthermore, rights issuers typically have higher leverage, lower z-score, more blockholdership 
and lower governance scores which lend support to both the distress hypothesis as well as the private 
benefits of control hypothesis. Typically, the percentage of new shares issued is much higher in rights 
issues than in cash offers. 
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In Table 2.4., we compare the characteristics of rights issues in choice countries, distinguishing the 
offers with and without rights markets. (See Appendix B for a description of all the variables.) There 
are 8,193 rights issues made in choice countries. The transaction costs of setting up a rights market 
are likely to be more relevant for small firms. Consistent with this argument, issuers that choose non-
tradable rights (in choice countries) tend to be smaller, with average assets of $2,172 million versus 
Table 2.3. Equity offers: cash versus rights issues. Descriptive statistics. 
Table 2.3. provides descriptive statistics for the 37,767 world-wide equity offers in our sample, distinguishing between cash and 
rights issues. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
    Cash offers   Rights issues   t-stat of 
difference     mean median  mean median   
General firm characteristics Assets (thousands of US $) 
    
2,844,703  
        
121,443      4,716,445  
   
180,634   (18.79) *** 
 Market cap (thousands of US $) 
       
674,055  
          
94,985         381,100  
     
67,821   24.33  *** 
 Market-to-book 
             
1.70  
              
1.26               1.40           1.08   24.82  *** 
 EBIT (thousands of US $) 
       
116,286  
            
1,113         163,358         5,235   (11.66) *** 
 Sales (thousands of US $) 
    
1,153,553  
          
50,183      1,808,979  
     
89,935   (17.49) *** 
 Employees (thousands) 
           
3,387  
               
486             2,576            534   11.20  *** 
Liquidity information asym. Amihud 1.52E-05 2.00E-07  2.22E-05 4.38E-07  (13.04) *** 
 # Analysts 58.61 3.00  19.24 0.00  34.44  *** 
Financial constraints Leverage 18.4% 29.7%  46.6% 32.4%  (34.45) *** 
 Z-score 7.09 3.88  3.97 2.55  39.28  *** 
 Distress (dummy) 25.7% 0.0%  30.7% 0.0%  (10.67) *** 
 Interest coverage 1.86 0.45  1.96 0.28  (0.66)  
Recent performance ROA -9.1% 0.9%  -4.2% 2.9%  (18.03) *** 
 Runup 20.9% 10.4%  3.0% 0.0%  17.42  *** 
Post-offer performance Change in ROA (year 1) -4.2% 0.3%  -4.5% -0.3%  0.72   
 Change in ROA (year 2) -6.8% 0.1%  -4.0% -0.2%  (4.71) *** 
 Change in ROA (year 3) -6.4% 0.0%  -2.9% -0.2%  (5.80) *** 
Ownership and governance Block >25% 2.7% 0.0%  3.7% 0.0%  (7.36) *** 
 % held (>25%) 37.6% 29.0%  25.1% 13.4%  27.81  *** 
 Governance (AEFM) 46.0% 46.3%  44.2% 43.9%  2.48  ** 
Transaction characteristics % sold 19% 11%  57% 33%  (64.06) *** 
 Discount 2% 1%  27% 24%  (21.45) *** 
 Trading days (actual)    14.79 11.00    
  During financial crisis 12%     13%     0.95    
N   22,016   15,751       
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$4,293 million for offers with rights markets. A similar relationship holds if we compare tradable and 
non-tradable offers in all countries. 
 
However, small firms are also more opaque and engender a greater dispersion of opinions. They also 
tend to be covered by fewer analysts (13 vs. 29). Hence, markets may assume that insiders are better 
informed than outsiders. Moreover, we find that, in the choice countries, issuers with non-tradable 
rights are less liquid [with a mean Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure of 3.84 × 10-5 vs. 2.76 × 10-5 for 
issuers with tradable rights]. So small firm size may also proxy for higher execution risk which may 
explain why they want to avoid rights trading.  
 
We can make a similar argument for firms in financial distress: the success of the transaction should 
be more important for such firms, but the distressed state will make it more difficult to convince 
investors to insert new equity capital (e.g., Myers, 1977). However, issuers with non-tradable rights 
are, on average, less leveraged than those with tradable rights (29% vs. 49%) and have a significantly 
higher Altman Z-score (7 vs. 4) which is inconsistent with financial distress driving non-tradability. On 
the other hand, they have significantly lower interest coverage (1.52 vs. 2.39 in the sample with rights 
trading). Issuers with non-tradable rights are far less profitable (ROA of -15% vs. -5%) and a greater 
proportion of non-tradable offers is made during the financial crisis (15% vs. 12% of all offers).  
 
We report the difference between the ROA in the year of the offer and the ROA in each of the three 
following years. On average, their profitability declines by 11% in the first and second year after the 
offer and recovers only by 4% in the third year after the offer. This performance is significantly better 
for issuers with tradable rights: in the first year after the offer, the change in ROA of issuers of tradable 
rights is 7% higher than that of issuers of non-tradable rights.  
 
Nevertheless all rights issues seem to be followed by negative ROA. In the case of the rights issues, 
according to the control hypothesis, blockholders may be concerned about having to share private 
benefits of control with other shareholders who may build up a large stake by buying rights. We 
measure block ownership with a dummy variable that equals 1 in the presence of a shareholder with 
ownership greater or equal to 25% (block), and another variable that indicates the total percentage 
held in such blocks (% held). Table 2.4. shows that, in choice countries, tradable rights are associated 
with more blocks than non-tradable offers (4.7% vs. 2.5%). This observation is inconsistent with the 
control hypothesis that blockholders use non-tradable rights to preserve the private benefits of 
control.  
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Table 2.4. Rights issues: trading versus non-trading. Descriptive statistics. 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the 8,193 rights issues in choice countries, distinguishing between trading and non-
trading rights issues. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
  Rights issues  Rights issues    
  trading   non-trading  t-stat of 
difference     mean median  mean median   
General firm 
characteristics Assets (thousands of US $)  4,293,881  
    
160,400   
 
2,172,402        21,563   (9.34) *** 
Market cap (thousands of US $)     474,498  
      
68,402   
    
236,585        16,682   (10.63) *** 
 Market-to-book           1.41  
          
1.07             1.65            1.25   9.64  *** 
 EBIT (thousands of US $)     142,410  
        
3,174   
      
79,204  -389  (7.17) *** 
 Sales (thousands of US $)  1,510,581  
      
69,563   
    
737,252          6,355   (9.54) *** 
 Employees (thousands)         2,803  393  
        
1,534  125  (8.12) *** 
Liquidity information asym. Amihud 2.76E-05 1.14E-06  3.84E-05 6.01E-06  7.17  *** 
 # Analysts 29.38 
          
1.00   13.21 0  (9.93) *** 
Financial constraints Leverage 49.2% 40%  29.0% 14%  (18.19) *** 
 Z-score 4.33 
          
3.80   6.90           5.11   16.19  *** 
 Distress (dummy) 31.0% 0%  25.5% 0%  (5.30) *** 
 Interest coverage 2.39 
          
0.58   1.52           0.28   (2.64) *** 
Recent performance ROA -5.0% 2.1%  -14.6% -2.3%  (15.74) *** 
 Runup 2.0% 0.0%  -4.5% -6.0%  (3.21) *** 
Post-offering performance Change in ROA (year 1) -4.4% -0.5%  -10.5% -0.4%  (5.42) *** 
 Change in ROA (year 2) -3.9% -0.3%  -11.1% -0.1%  (5.01) *** 
 Change in ROA (year 3) -3.1% 0.1%  -7.5% 0.3%  (2.74) *** 
Ownership and governance Block >25% 4.7% 0.0%  2.5% 0.0%  (6.79) *** 
 % held (>25%) 34.4% 21.5%  22.5% 12.2%  (10.42) *** 
 Governance (AEFM) 45.0% 43.9%  44.2% 41.5%  (0.42)  
Transaction characteristics % sold 64% 40%  42% 25%  (14.52) *** 
 Discount 27% 24%  22% 17%  (9.56) *** 
 Trading days (actual) 14.40 11       
  During financial crisis 12%     15%     16.10  *** 
N   5,150   3,043       
 
 
Among the descriptive statistics, given that the adverse selection hypothesis proposes that firms with  
valued shares restrict trading to protect their shareholders from selling undervalued rights, we also 
consider governance quality. We use the “corporate governance quality” index of Aggarwal et al. 
(2011), which is a composite measure of board composition, auditing thoroughness, anti-takeover 
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provisions, compensation policies, and ownership quality (governance (AEFM)). We report the results 
in Table 2.4. We do not find any evidence that governance explains the difference between issuers of 
tradable versus non-tradable rights in either the all-country or the choice-country sample.  
 
Finally, we document transaction-specific characteristics. Recall that some countries allow non-
tradability only if the offer does not exceed certain size and discount limits. We measure the offer size 
with the number of shares offered as a percentage of shares outstanding prior to the offer, and the 
discount as the offer price relative to the closing stock price five days prior to the announcement. In 
line with such rules, offers with non-trading rights in choice countries are smaller (42% vs. 64%) and 
have smaller discounts (22% vs. 27%). This finding is consistent also with the idea that firms use non-
tradability to minimize execution risk without offering a deep discount.  
 
Trading takes time, on average, rights are traded over a span of 14 days in choice countries. Altogether, 
28 days pass between the announcement and the effective date when rights are traded, which is 11 
days more than for offers with non-trading rights. Eleven days can lead to considerably higher 
execution risk, especially during a financial crisis. The Australian Securities Exchange (2010, p. 25) 
points out that “during times of extreme market disturbances the longer timetable for completing a 
renounceable issue (issue with tradable rights) carries the potential for exposure of the issuer to 
greater market risk.” Table 2.5. provides descriptive statistics of characteristics for countries with 
different trading regimes. Choice countries have a significantly higher gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita. This reflects the prevalence of developed countries in this group, which includes most 
Commonwealth countries and the U.S. However, choice and non-choice countries do not differ in 
terms of real interest rate, government debt, size of the equity market, or inflow of foreign direct 
investment. This also suggests that they are not fundamentally different in terms of their equity 
markets or investor sophistication. 
 
Owing to the predominance of British Commonwealth countries in the choice-country sample, the 
legal system of the majority is of English origin. The other choice countries are mostly European, and 
25% (resp., 17%) of them feature a legal system of French (resp., German) origin. Overall, the choice 
countries are less often governed by civil law (only 50%) than by common law. Table 2.5. also shows 
that, as a group, choice countries have better governance than countries where trading is mandatory. 
This difference is significant when governance is measured by judicial efficiency and the quality of 
accounting standards. The implication is that, in countries where shareholder rights are promoted, 
regulators will more likely support the freedom of companies to deny rights tradability. Regulators 
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may well believe that there are good reasons, based on maximizing shareholder value (via reduced 
transaction costs, execution risk, or adverse selection arguments), for allowing non-tradable rights. 
Table 2.5. Country characteristics. 
This table shows univariate statistics for countries under different rights trading regimes. Listed are the 
means for mandatory trading versus choice countries and the results of tests for differences between them 
(i.e., 24% of countries with mandatory regime have legal systems of English origin, and those countries have 
an average GDP/capita of USD 17,509). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
    Trading     
    Mandatory Choice t-stat of difference 
Economic GDP/capita 13,670 43,878  (5.92)*** 
 Real interest 1.84 3.17  (0.62) 
 Debt/GDP 52.58 52.10  0.04 
 Market/GDP 38.38 98.99  (2.86) 
 FDI inflow/GDP 6.40 8.09  (0.70) 
      
Legal Origin English 26% 50%  (1.65)* 
 French 51% 25%  1.63 
 German 19% 17%  0.19 
 Nordic 4% 8%  (0.57) 
 Civil 74% 50%  1.65† 
      
Regulation of Preright 2.40 2.25  0.48 
pre-emptive rights Prevote 2.53 2.58  (0.19) 
 Preexpl 2.53 2.50  (0.57) 
      
Governance Anti-director 3.57 4.40  (1.38) 
 Judicial efficiency 8.18 10.00  (2.13)** 
 Accounting 63.45 71.80  (1.65) 
 Governance (GMI) 4.42 5.95  (1.09) 
            
 
 
2.5. The Choice Between Rights and Cash Offers: Multivariate Tests 
We now formally study the choice between rights issues and cash offers in a multivariate setting. We 
estimate probit specifications of issuance choice. Given that in some countries firms have to use rights 
issues unless shareholders approve a cash offer, we use a country fixed effect variable. This variable 
is also supposed to incorporate the fact that in some countries brokers will automatically sell rights if 
investors don’t specify whether they want to exercise the rights or not.    
 
The results, reported in Table 2.6. (all countries), indicate that small firms and firms with weak prior 
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performance (measured by ROA and runup), high leverage and low Altman Z-scores and a large 
blockholder are more likely to raise equity through a rights issue. This confirms that private benefits 
of control induce firms to opt for rights rather than cash offers and that the less financially healthy 
firms don’t go to the open market to raise funds. Firms with a higher likelihood of distress and weak 
prior performance would rather turn to existing shareholders who, they believe, might be easier to 
convince to provide more resources. In line with the idea that firms time the market, we find that 
firms with a higher market-to-book and higher runup are more likely to choose a cash offer. 
Furthermore, firms are more likely to use rights issues in choice countries and in countries with higher 
fractions of rights issues. Hence, the option to make rights tradable or non-tradable seems to persuade 
firms to opt for a rights rather than a cash offer.  
 
Column (2) of Table 2.6. (all countries) is still based on the complete sample but now more country-
specific variables are included.  It seems that cash offers are more common than rights issues in more 
“financially sophisticated” countries, i.e., countries with more substantial debt markets and equity 
markets (measured by Debt/GDP and Market/GDP, respectively). Column (3) focuses on the choice 
countries and tests for the relevance of another country-specific variable: pre-right which is the 
Spamann (2010) estimate, which is set equal to 1 if pre-emptive rights can be waived under special 
conditions. The results are qualitatively similar to the results of the total sample. The fact that the pre-
right variable has a statistically significant negative coefficient is expected: when shareholders’ pre-
emptive rights can be waived, rights issues are less likely. Our findings are robust to including firm 
fixed effects, also, adding country dummies in Model 2 does not affect our results. 
 
Overall, these results are consistent with all three hypotheses: firms try to time the market with cash 
offers (as predicted by the adverse selection hypothesis), they prefer rights to cash offers when there 
are large blockholders who presumably want to prevent dilution of their private benefits of control 
(as predicted by the control hypothesis) and firms use rights issues when there are indications of 
financial distress such as poor performance and high leverage (as predicted by the distress 
hypothesis). Therefore, to distinguish the alternative hypotheses, we now focus on the market 
reaction. 
  
43 
 
Table 2.6. Choice of offer type: cash versus rights. 
This table shows the results of probit regressions in which the dependent indicator variable is set equal to 1 if 
a rights issue is used and zero for a cash offer. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
    Dependent variable = rights 
  All countries  All countries  Choice countries 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
Firm characteristics Log assets -0.153 ***  -0.085 ***  -0.145 *** 
  (-25.28)   (-12.97)   (-20.49)  
 Market-to-book -0.130 ***  -0.135 ***  -0.134 *** 
  (-10.31)   (-9.30)   (-9.31)  
 Block >25% 0.002 **  0.002 **  0.002 *** 
  (2.13)   (1.97)   (2.65)  
 ROA -0.022   -0.190 ***  -0.008  
  (-0.41)   (-3.16)   (-0.13)  
 Runup -0.244 ***  -0.215 ***  -0.226 *** 
  (-17.04)   (-12.88)   (-13.58)  
 Z-score -0.008 ***  -0.001   -0.004 ** 
  (-5.25)   (-0.83)   (-2.56)  
 Leverage 0.087 ***  0.154 ***  0.196 *** 
  (2.98)   (4.35)   (5.55)  
 Financial crisis 0.039   -0.005   0.002  
  (1.12)   (-0.01)   (0.05)  
Country 
characteristics 
Fraction of rights 
offerings 1.487 ***  2.835 ***  1.561 *** 
  (21.64)   (35.61)   (12.47)  
 Choice country 0.249 ***  -0.381 ***    
  (3.81)   (-6.28)     
 GDP/capita    -2.24E-06     
     (-1.63)     
 Real interest    0.024 ***    
     (4.84)     
 Debt/GDP    -0.003 ***    
     (-5.45)     
 Market/GDP    -0.002 ***    
     (-6.07)     
 FDI inflow/GDP    0.019 ***    
     (5.69)     
 Preright       -1.220 *** 
        (-4.47)  
Constant Constant 1.603 *  -0.026   1.837 *** 
  (1.86)   (-0.16)   
         
(5.91)  
Fixed Effects Year Yes   Yes   Yes  
 Country Yes   No   Yes  
N   22,651          14,824      
        
15,371    
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2.6. Short-term and Long-term Performance After Seasoned Equity Issues 
2.6.1 Short-term announcement returns 
In this section, we examine the short-term and long-term responses to cash offers and rights issues. 
We use Datastream-adjusted returns12 for this exercise and we follow the usual procedure of short-
term event studies by cumulating excess returns from day -1 until day +1 relative to the 
announcement date. We estimate the parameters of the market model using returns from 250 trading 
days until 42 trading days before the announcement. We use the regional MSCI index to which the 
firm belongs as a proxy for the market index. We cumulate the abnormal returns from the day before 
the announcement until the day after.  
 
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2.7. The market reacts negatively to rights issues in 
general: on average, -0.42% (t = -3.81) over the (-1,1) event window. Average announcement returns 
for cash offers, however, are also negative (-1.02%) and statistically significantly different from zero  
(t = -12.55). 
 
Market reactions to cash and rights issue are highly dependent on whether the firm has the option to 
make rights non-tradable. In countries where firms have the choice to make rights non-tradable, 
announcement returns of rights issues are significantly negative (-0.66%; t = -4.13) but the reaction 
does not differ much from the reaction to a cash offer (-0.96%, t = -10.34). We see quite the opposite 
picture in countries where there is no choice to have rights traded: on average excess returns are 
significantly negative -1.35 % (t = -8.73) for cash offers and not significantly different from zero -0.17 
% (t = -1.10) for rights issues. Panel B of Table 2.7. shows that announcement returns after rights issues 
in choice countries are only negative when rights are tradable. We conclude that excess returns after 
cash offers are always negative. However, excess returns after rights issues are only significantly 
negative in choice countries and only when rights are tradable. This result is consistent with the 
adverse selection hypothesis H1b: the decision to make rights non-tradable convinces markets that 
the stock is not overvalued. At least in the short run the market seems to believe the adverse selection 
hypothesis, as long as the company decides that current shareholders cannot sell their rights. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Datastream-adjusted returns take into account dividend payments. 
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Table 2.7. Announcement returns. 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns for the 3-day event window centered around the announcement 
date of the issue. The standard market model is used, with the regional MSCI index to compute normal returns. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A: Cash versus rights issues          
Announcement return (-1,+1) Cash offers   Rights issues   
t-stat of 
difference 
           
All countries n = 22016 -1.02% ***  n = 15751 -0.42% ***  -4.47 *** 
Choice countries n = 18387 -0.96% ***  n = 8193 -0.66% ***  -1.72 * 
No choice countries n = 3629 -1.35% ***   n = 7558 -0.17%     -4.80 *** 
           
           
Panel B: Trading versus non-trading rights issues        
Announcement return (-1,+1) Trading rights   Non-trading rights   
t-stat of 
difference 
           
Choice countries n = 5150 -1.08% ***  n = 3043 0.05%   3.44 *** 
                      
           
           
Panel C: Small versus large firms        
Announcement return (-1,+1)             
t-stat of 
difference 
Choice countries  Cash offer     Rights issue    
Small firms  -0.44% ***   -0.29%   -0.55  
Large firms  -1.63% ***   -1.13% ***  -2.61 *** 
           
No choice countries           
Small firms  -0.94% **   0.84% **  -2.79 *** 
Large firms  -1.49% ***   -0.72% ***  -3.53 *** 
           
Choice countries  Trading rights   Non-trading rights    
Small firms  -0.72% **   0.22%   1.93 * 
Large firms  -1.41% ***   -0.31%   2.55 ** 
                      
 
Panel C of Table 2.7. compares the announcement returns of small and large firms. Such comparison 
is helpful to rule out the base alternative that just transaction costs (which are more relevant for small 
firms) drive the decision to make rights non-tradable. And indeed, we find that announcement returns 
are significantly larger (0.94%, t = 1.93) when small firms make rights non-tradable. However, the same 
conclusion holds for large firms where non-trading generates 1.10% (t = 2.55) larger excess returns. 
Moreover, there is no statistically significant difference between announcement returns of large and 
small firms when the rights are not traded. When the rights are not traded, the announcement returns 
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are larger, regardless of firm size. This makes us comfortable in ruling out a story just based on 
transaction costs.    
2.6.2 Long-term returns 
If the market is not efficient, then the impact of tradability and/or choice of issuance method on 
shareholder value will not be confined to short-term announcement returns. We therefore study 
monthly abnormal returns in the two years starting from the month after the effective date.13 We use 
the Ibbotson RATS (Returns across time and securities) event study method which adjusts for risk 
changes after the event. This method involves running each event month cross-sectional regressions 
of returns against a number of factors (the Carhart-augmented Fama-French model (Fama and French, 
1993; Carhart, 1997)). The results presented are based on the Fama and French (2012) global factors. 
The results, however, are qualitatively similar when using regional factors. The intercept of the 
regression is the abnormal return in the event month. Abnormal returns are cumulated and the results 
for cash offers and right issues are shown in Figure 2.2a in choice countries and in Figure 2.2b for non-
choice countries. Cumulative abnormal returns for various horizons are shown in Table 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.2. Long-term returns following the Ibbotson RATS methodology 
 
Figure 2.2a: Choice countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 We impose the one-month embargo to avoid any systematic Datastream mistakes in adjusting for the rights 
and new shares, as documented by Espenlaub, Iqbal, and Strong (2012) for UK open (i.e., non-tradable) offers. 
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Figure 2.2b: No choice countries 
 
 
 
Table 2.8. Long-term abnormal returns. 
The long-term abnormal returns in this table are computed using the Ibbotson RATS methodology. The difference in 
return for cash versus rights (Panel A) and trading versus non-trading (Panel B) is tested using a parametric t-test. 
Significance at 5% level or less is indicated in bold. 
Panel A: Cash versus rights issues          
Cumulative abnormal 
returns - Ibbotson RATS 
methodology Cash offers   Rights issues   
t-stat of difference          
(cash /vs/ rights) 
    (1,12) (1,24) (1,36)  (1,12) (1,24) (1,36)  (1,12) (1,24) (1,36) 
All countries -20% -41% -57%  -13% -24% -35%  -1.83 -3.18 -3.61 
Choice countries -21% -43% -61%  -19% -34% -46%  -0.77 -1.98 -2.81 
No choice countries -13% -26% -34%   -5% -10% -20%   -1.61 -2.44 -1.78 
 
Panel B: Trading versus Non-trading        
Cumulative abnormal 
returns - Ibbotson RATS 
methodology Trading rights issues   Non-trading rights issues   t-stat of difference 
 (1,12) (1,24) (1,36)  (1,12) (1,24) (1,36)  (1,12) (1,24) (1,36) 
Choice countries -16% -28% -38%  -23% -41% -55%  2.42 2.86 3.19 
                        
 
Focusing on choice countries, after 36 months long-term excess returns for cash offers are -61 %, 
which is significantly smaller than the -46 % return observed after rights issues (t = -2.81). However, 
when the rights are not tradable the excess return after 36 months falls to -55 %, which is significantly 
(t = -3.19) smaller than when rights are trading. The 36 month cumulative excess returns after cash 
offers and rights issues with non-traded rights are no longer statistically significantly different (t = 
1.01). This is strong evidence that the decision of the managers not to have the rights traded is not 
benefitting shareholders in the long run.  
 
These results show that, while the short-run results are consistent with the adverse selection 
hypothesis H1b, the rest of the evidence is inconsistent with the adverse selection story. The control 
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hypothesis that predicts rights doing worse than cash (H2a) is not supported by either short-term or 
long-term excess returns, although the prediction that non-trading is bad (H2b) as it reveals large 
private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders is consistent with the results. 
However a negative abnormal return of -55 % is too large as a plausible estimate of private benefits 
of control. Finally, the financial distress hypothesis is consistent with the negative consequences of 
non-trading in the long run (H3b), but by itself cannot explain why long-term returns after cash offers 
(which are supposedly not driven by distress) are more negative than after rights offers, the opposite 
of H3b. So no single simple theory can explain what we observe in the stock market.   
 
The striking result is that rights issues are bad in the long run. This means that investors who buy rights 
and exercise them overpay, on average. In the next section we will test to what extent this is 
anticipated by investors during the rights trading period. 
 
2.7. The Market for Rights 
Finance textbooks often assume that investors are indifferent between exercising rights and selling 
rights to other investors. Such a stance presupposes that rights are liquid and priced correctly. In this 
section, we address two fundamental questions. First, just how liquid are the rights? Second, are the 
rights priced close to their intrinsic value? Answering these questions may help us better understand 
why firms can justify making rights non-tradable. Indeed, if rights are underpriced they may give a 
negative signal, i.e., insiders are selling rights because they believe the stock is overvalued, possibly 
because they have superior information about financial distress. Also, if the rights are systematically 
underpriced and at the same time are costly to the firm (transactions cost) existing shareholders may 
be better off by not selling them. So concern about existing shareholders (the basic underlying 
assumption behind the adverse selection hypothesis) may convince firms to make rights non-tradable. 
2.7.1 Liquidity of the rights market 
Panel A of Table 2.9. displays univariate statistics on the liquidity measures for the rights and for the 
underlying stocks. The average sample firm had zero returns (Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka, 1999; 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2007) for 23% of the rights trading period and a bid-ask spread of 4%, 
which is in line with previous research on the liquidity of international firms (e.g., Lesmond, 2005; 
Lang, Lins, and Maffett, 2012). We also report the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure; following 
Lesmond (2005), we exclude prices that exceed ±50% of the prior day’s price. The mean of this 
measure is 1.57 × 10-5, a value comparable to the estimates of Lesmond (2005). 
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The rights are less liquid than the underlying shares. The mean bid-ask spread of rights is 28%, or seven 
times the 4% spread of the underlying stock. Rights are not traded on average 28% of all the days 
listed on the market. The mean Amihud illiquidity measure is almost ten times that of the stock. 
2.7.2 Mispricing in the rights market 
To compare the quoted and theoretical prices, we follow the methodology of Hietala (1994), Poitras 
(2002), and Rantapuska and Knupfer (2008) in counting the days on which the quoted price is lower 
(higher) than the lower PCP bound. Violations of the PCP bound enable positive returns from an 
arbitrage strategy that involves shorting the stock and buying the right.  
 
Table 2.9. Liquidity and mispricing characteristics. 
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum of rights liquidity and of the 
underlying stock (Panel A) in addition to underpricing characteristics (Panel B). 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A: Liquidity measures     
Right     
Bid-ask 28% 34% 0% 159% 
Zero return days 27% 29% 0% 93% 
Amihud 1.50E-04 6.77E-04 0.00E+00 5.31E-03 
     
Underlying     
Bid-ask 4% 6% 0% 34% 
Zero return days 23% 20% 0% 100% 
Amihud 1.57E-05 3.66E-05 0.00E+00 1.45E-04 
          
     
Panel B: Underpricing     
% Violated     
Close 17% 34% 0 100% 
Ask 13% 31% 0 100% 
Bid 14% 31% 0 100% 
If violated, underpriced by     
Close 62% 34% 10% 100% 
Ask 64% 33% 11% 100% 
Bid 60% 34% 8% 100% 
% risk arbitrage possible (no short sales)     
No transaction costs 9% 27% 0% 100% 
Transaction costs 5% 18% 0% 92% 
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Given that short selling is not possible in all countries, we compute an additional, more conservative 
lower bound. We therefore first assume an underlying risk arbitrage strategy of buying the right and 
exercising it only if the share price exceeds the exercise price on the day before expiration. Then, we 
calculate the subsequent returns and count the number of days on which they are positive. To obtain 
an even more conservative estimate, we calculate the returns after transaction costs. In other words, 
these are the returns after compensating the investor for the trouble of buying and exercising the 
right. Following Lesmond (2005), we use data from Bloomberg and various exchanges to find the 
commissions and fees paid. We use the worldwide average commission and transaction fee for the 
countries for which we cannot find (respectively) an estimate of commissions or a list of official fees. 
As a conservative proxy for price impact, we use the full bid-ask spread at the close of the trading day. 
Panel B of Table 2.9. reports the statistics for our measures of undervaluation. The mean right is 
cheaper (62%, on average) than the lower bound on 17% of all days (% violated). These results are not 
much affected if we consider bid-ask prices instead of closing prices. Our estimates are comparable 
with the results of single-country studies. For example, in his analysis of a sample of Finnish rights 
during the period 1977-1981, Hietala (1994) finds that 58% of rights are mispriced. Poitras (2002) 
documents violations on 91% of all days in a sample of Singaporean rights issues for the period 1992–
1998. In a more recent Finnish sample for 1995–2002, Rantapuska and Knupfer (2008) find that rights 
are underpriced by 15% on average. These values are much higher than the 3% of underpriced days 
observed for U.S. S&P 500 Index options (Ackert and Tian, 2001), 1% for the French CAC 40 Index 
options (Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury, 2001), and 2% for the Italian MIB 30 Index options (Brunetti 
and Torricelli, 2007). The bound based on a risk arbitrage strategy reduces the proportion of positive-
arbitrage days to 9%. Even after transaction costs, 5% of trading days allow for positive arbitrage. 
While relative mispricing may indicate that either the stock itself is overvalued or that the rights 
traders have (negative) inside information, these results still suggest that shareholders who prefer not 
to exercise their rights will not be fully compensated for the dilution entailed by selling those rights.  
 
Overall, these findings document that rights markets are illiquid and often undervalued. So firms can 
make an argument that, considering the inefficiency and illiquidity of the market for rights, 
shareholders are better off if the rights are not traded. This is in line with the adverse selection 
hypothesis that the management has the best interests of the existing shareholders at heart when 
restricting trading. However, the long-term negative returns observed in Table 2.7. suggest that such 
protection is rather inadequate: if firms are concerned about their current stockholders they should 
encourage them to sell overvalued rights. The decision to restrict trading is more in line with the 
financial distress hypothesis which is concerned about execution risk if the market believes that the 
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undervaluation of rights reflects informed insider selling. This leads to a further examination of the 
motivation to make rights non-tradable. 
2.8. Choice of Tradability 
We now investigate why firms deliberately choose to make rights non-tradable. Our long-run excess 
returns in Figure 2.2a reject the adverse selection hypothesis: there is no evidence that non-tradability 
is associated with larger long-term returns, quite the opposite.  
 
We estimate the probability of making rights tradable as a probit function of firm, transaction, and 
country characteristics. Firms do not randomly choose rights issues rather than cash offers as shown 
in section 3. However, we control for this choice by using a Heckman (1979) model, including model 3 
of Table 2.6. to control for the choice between rights or cash offers. The variable Preright (Spamann, 
2010) identifies countries in which waiving preemptive rights is only allowed in special cases – e.g., 
with supermajority rules or substantive conditions. Given that this variable is likely to be unrelated to 
the tradability choice, we use it as an identifying restriction for our first stage choice between cash or 
rights. We control for year and country fixed effects. The regression results for the second stage of the 
Heckman model are reported in Table 2.10. The independent variables included are the natural 
logarithm of assets to test the transaction cost hypothesis14, ROA, Altman Z-score, and the number of 
analysts to test the execution risk hypothesis and a dummy for blockholder presence to test the 
control hypothesis. Additional control variables are market-to-book, runup, and the Amihud illiquidity 
index to verify if management is concerned with shareholder value, i.e., they are concerned with 
shareholders selling undervalued rights. Leverage and the percentage of new shares sold are included 
because the firm’s capital structure might affect the choice between tradable and non-tradable rights. 
Higher leverage may indicate that expected costs of financial distress are larger, encouraging non-
trading to minimize execution risk. 
 
Table 2.10. shows that issuers with tradable rights are significantly larger. This is consistent with the 
univariate results (Table 2.4.) and supportive of the argument that transaction costs are a key driver 
of trading restrictions. However, small firms are also more opaque and therefore rights issues by small 
firms are more subject to execution risk. Tradability is also associated with higher market-to-book 
ratios, larger profitability (measured by ROA), higher default risk (measured by the z-score), and larger 
issues. These results are comparable to findings based on the Australian sample of Balachandran et 
                                                          
14 The hypothesis that having rights traded is costly. 
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al. (2008, 2012) and support the intuition that larger firms with more liquid stock and better 
performance have fewer incentives to restrict the trading of rights.  
 
Next, we focus on the choice of restricting tradability. To do this, we also need to broaden the picture. 
Indeed, we need to exploit the multivariate framework to control for other potential explanations for 
the choice to make rights non-tradable. Tradability is higher when the probability of distress (inverse 
of Altman Z-score) is higher, when a firm is more profitable (as measured by ROA) and when the firm 
is larger. Moreover the fact that leverage is not a significant predictor to tradability suggests that the 
results are not unambiguously supporting the distress hypothesis. Next, tradability does not seem to 
be affected by block ownership (i.e., more than 25 % of the shares are held by a controlling 
blockholder). This again is inconsistent with the control hypothesis. Finally, the fact that tradability is 
chosen by firms with high market-to-book ratios and not during the crisis is inconsistent with an 
adverse selection argument. This suggests that tradability is better explained by other factors than  by 
the three main existing theories. 
 
In column 2 of Table 2.10., we replace the country-fixed effects with country-specific variables related 
to market development (GDP/capita, the real interest rate, ratios of debt, market capitalization, and 
foreign direct investment inflows to GDP). The negative association between equity market size and 
tradability is most likely driven by the U.S. and the U.K., and this underscores the importance of 
controlling for economic conditions or country-fixed effects.  Overall, firms that restrict trading differ 
from firms that allow rights to be traded freely, especially with respect to size, performance, and 
financial health. All findings are robust when including firm fixed effects. 
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Table 2.10. Choice of offer type: Trading versus non-trading rights issues. 
This table shows the results of probit regressions in which the dependent indicator variable is set equal to 1 if a 
trading rights issue is used and zero for a non-trading rights issue. The models presented are a Heckman model, in 
which the Inverse Mills ratio is retrieved from Table 2.6. (model 3). This table is based on a subsample of choice 
countries only. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
     Dependent variable = trading 
    (1)   (2) 
Firm characteristics Log assets 0.130 ***  0.200 *** 
  (4.11)   (7.58)  
 Market-to-book 0.113 ***  0.187 *** 
  (2.80)   (4.78)  
 Block >25% 0.000   0.000  
  (-0.01)   (-0.07)  
 ROA 0.302 **  0.348 ** 
  (2.34)   (2.43)  
 Runup 0.040   0.086 * 
  (0.78)   (1.89)  
 Z-score -0.009 **  -0.012 *** 
  (-2.25)   (-2.93)  
 Leverage 0.118   0.089  
  (1.43)   (0.97)  
 % sold 0.442 ***  0.593 *** 
  (7.52)   (8.53)  
 Amihud -519.59   -645.99  
  (-0.99)   (-1.13)  
 # Analysts 0.000   -0.001  
  (0.36)   (-0.99)  
 Financial crisis -0.249 **  -0.178  
  (-2.48)   (-1.59)  
Country characteristics GDP/capita    0.000 *** 
     (-3.97)  
 Real interest    -0.023  
     (-1.49)  
 Debt/GDP    0.019 *** 
     (8.68)  
 Market/GDP    -0.004 *** 
     (-4.45)  
 FDI inflow/GDP    0.061 *** 
     (5.25)  
Constant Constant -0.823 *  -0.631  
  (-1.74)   (-1.15)  
Heckman Inv.Mills (Table 2.6. model 3) 0.214 **  -0.145  
  (0.81)   (-1.27)  
Fixed Effects Year Yes   Yes  
 Country Yes   No  
N             3,154      2,425   
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2.9. Profitability and Performance 
We have documented that seasoned equity offers are followed by significant negative long-run excess 
returns regardless of the issue method and more negative when rights are not traded. One explanation 
for these abnormal returns is misspecification of the assumed model of market equilibrium (as 
suggested by Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli, 2000). An alternative explanation is that the negative excess 
returns reflect deteriorating profitability after the issuance. This will help to further distinguish our 
competing hypotheses. Indeed, as we argued, the adverse selection hypothesis posits that issuers 
restrict trading when they believe the firm will perform better in the future and therefore predicts a 
negative relationship between tradability and performance (H3a). The control hypothesis posits that 
blockholders reserve for themselves part of the private benefits of control. While these will accrue 
mostly to the controlling blockholders, still it will be possible only if the firm is profitable. This implies 
that tradability will be mostly restricted in the case of future profitability. This implies a negative 
relationship between tradability and profitability (H3b). In case of the distress hypothesis, firms with 
bad prospects will need to improve their capital structure, and for them a failed rights issue may be 
more costly. Such firms may therefore seek to coerce shareholders into subscribing to a non-tradable 
rights issue. If this is a predominant reason for trading restrictions, then we should observe inferior 
economic performance after non-tradable offers (H3c). We implement our tests in the following way. 
We measure long-term economic performance after rights issues and cash offers. To account for self-
selection into the trading regime, we use a two-step switching regression model with endogenous 
switching, as described in Li and Prabhala (2007). In Table 2.11. we use the specification of Table 2.6. 
to model the choice of issuing cash or rights issues, using the entire sample. We use the equation 
whose results are described in column 1 of Table 2.10. to model the choice of issuing tradable rights 
while restricting the sample to choice countries only. We model the change from the firm’s last 
reported ROA before the offer to the firm’s ROA in the three years after that offer as follows: 
 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖+𝜀𝑖.           (1a) 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽4 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖+𝛾𝑖      (1b) 
 
Here, we allow the residuals Ɛi and ƴi to correlate with the residual of the selection equation. Because 
the error terms are correlated, the conditional expectations of the residuals are nonzero. Augmenting 
equations (1a) and (1b) with generalized residuals from the selection regression, we are able to obtain 
consistent estimators via a straightforward extension of the Heckman (1979) procedure (Idson and 
Feaster, 1990). For each offer i, our set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of book assets; 
blockholdership, defined as a dummy equal to 1 if any shareholder held more than 25% of all shares  
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and the size of the blockholdings; the change in free float from the year-end before the effective date 
to the year-end after that date; and a financial crisis dummy. We control for a set of firm- and 
transaction-specific characteristics such as a dummy variable for cross-listed offers, the number of 
previous rights issues undertaken by the same issuer in the sample period, ROA, leverage, and the 
market-to-book ratio.  
 
The results are reported in Table 2.11. and Table 2.12. Columns 1 to 3 give the results for different 
years: the dependent variable in column 1 (2; 3) is the difference between the ROA in the pre-offer 
year and the ROA in the first (second; third) year after the offer. Each column reports first the 
coefficients and z-statistics for the cash offers (Table 2.11.) or offers in which rights could not be traded 
(Table 2.12.), next to which are the coefficients and z-statistics for the rights issues (Table 2.11.) or 
offers in which rights could be traded (Table 2.12.). 
Table 2.11. Subsequent performance: Cash versus Rights issues. 
This table reports the results of switching regressions where the choice between cash and rights offers is endogenized (using 
the specification of Table 2.6.). The dependent variable is the change in ROA from the year prior to the SEO up to 1, 2, or 3 
years after the announcement. The last column (model 4) reports the OLS regression. *,**,*** represent significance levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Model                             
Dependent variable 
Window 
Switching regressions                     
Change in ROA                                          
Year 1 post minus pre 
offer  
Switching regressions                     
Change in ROA                                          
Year 2 post minus pre 
offer  
Switching regressions                     
Change in ROA                                          
Year 3 post minus pre 
offer  
OLS                        
Change in ROA       
Year 2 post 
minus pre offer 
Offertype Cash Rights   Cash Rights   Cash Rights   Both 
Constant -0.345*** -0.214***  -0.525*** -0.227***  -0.564*** -0.206***  -0.331*** 
 (-9.77) (-6.42)  (-11.07) (-5.81)  (-11.69) (-5.40)  (-9.85) 
Rights          0.014* 
          (1.93) 
Log assets 0.026*** 0.016***  0.033*** 0.018***  0.037*** 0.017***  0.025*** 
 (14.73) (7.28)  (13.50) (7.10)  (14.31) (6.94)  (16.63) 
Block >25% 0.000 0.001**  0.000 0.001**  0.000 0.001**  0.000 
 (0.68) (2.06)  (0.36) (2.25)  (1.17) (2.51)  (1.47) 
Change in free float 0.000 -0.001  -0.002 -0.006  0.007 0.003  -0.004 
 (-0.04) (-0.17)  (-0.26) (-0.65)  (1.00) (0.30)  (-1.01) 
Crisis 0.007 -0.005  0.006 0.081***  0.021 0.042  0.024* 
 (0.41) (-0.21)  (0.27) (2.95)  (0.88) (1.45)  (1.71) 
Cross-listed 0.036*** -0.021**  0.043** -0.014  0.011 -0.032***  -0.01 
 (2.57) (-2.00)  (2.25) (-1.17)  (0.51) (-2.74)  (-1.11) 
Past rights issues -0.013 -0.007**  0.014 -0.006*  0.098*** -0.005***  -0.005 
 (-0.99) (-2.27)  (0.61) (-1.65)  (3.01) (-1.45)  (-1.60) 
ROA (pre offer) -0.272*** -0.347***  -0.217*** -0.401***  -0.301*** -0.520***  -0.268*** 
 (-16.21) (-15.67)  (-8.92) (-15.09)  (-11.69) (-20.14)  (-16.89) 
Leverage 0.018† 0.037***  0.073*** 0.042***  0.070*** 0.023*  0.049*** 
 (1.83) (3.51)  (5.30) (3.41)  (4.92) (1.91)  (6.26) 
Market-to-book -0.014*** -0.034***  0.012** -0.029***  0.005 -0.028***  -0.002 
 (-3.67) (-5.82)  (2.32) (-4.18)  (0.78) (-4.11)  (-0.50) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 20,798   17,072   14,080   20,727 
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Column 4 reports the results of an OLS regression, which includes the same explanatory variables with 
the addition of an indicator for rights (Table 2.11.) or traded rights issues (Table 2.12.) and an inverse 
Mills ratio that controls for selection into a rights issue (based on Table 2.6. model 3). 
 
The results show that, consistent with figure 2.2a, issuers perform better after offers with tradable 
rights, as indicated by the significantly positive intercept for such issuers. This effect is evident also in 
the OLS specification (column 4 in Table 2.12.). The intercept is economically large, with 35% for the 
first year, and increasing further in the next two years. Such a positive relation between profitability 
and tradability is consistent with the argument that issuers with bad prospects restrict trading (distress 
hypothesis (H3c)), while it does not support the adverse selection hypothesis that posits that issuers 
restrict trading when they believe the firm will perform better in the future (H3a) or with the fact that 
majority owners restrict tradability to restrict to themselves the right to appropriate the future 
benefits of the firm (H3b).  
 
Also, we observe that large firms perform better after offers with non-trading rights. Similarly, highly 
leveraged firms perform better after offers with non-trading rights. Firms have lower performance 
after large non-trading offers. The presence of blockholders, change in free float, financial crisis, cross-
listing, or history of past rights issues does not matter consistently for performance. The lack of 
explanatory power of blockholders is inconsistent with the control hypothesis. Overall, performance 
patterns after the offer indicate that the decision on tradability is related to the need to restructure 
and this leads to better firm profitability afterwards.  
 
Also, irrespective of the offer being cash or rights, larger firms and highly leveraged firms always have 
higher profitability in the years following the equity issue. More profitable firms and firms with higher 
market-to-book values, on the other hand, always have lower profitability after the issue, regardless 
of the offer type. This indicates that other factors besides market timing explain the negative long-
term performance of firms issuing cash offers. Interestingly, cross-listed firms issuing a rights offer 
typically have lower performance in the subsequent years.  
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Table 2.12. Subsequent performance: Trading versus non-trading rights issues. 
This table reports the results of switching regressions where the choice between trading and non-trading rights offers is 
endogenized (using the specification of Table 2.10.). The dependent variable is the change in ROA from the year prior to the 
SEO up to 1, 2, or 3 years after the announcement. The last column (model 4) reports the OLS regression. *,**,*** represent 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Model                             
Dependent variable 
Window 
Switching regressions                     
Change in ROA                                          
Year 1 post minus pre 
offering 
 
Switching regressions                     
Change in ROA                                          
Year 2 post minus pre 
offering 
 
Switching regressions                     
Change in ROA                                          
Year 3 post minus pre 
offering 
 
OLS                        
Change in ROA       
Year 2 post minus 
pre offer 
Trading No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  Both 
Constant -0.422*** 0.352***  -0.335** 0.391***  -0.565*** 0.584***  -0.441*** 
 (-3.28) (6.02)  (-2.13) (5.07)  (-3.82) (7.43)  (-6.54) 
Trading          0.057*** 
          (3.24) 
Log assets 0.060*** -0.015***  0.068*** -0.022***  0.054*** -0.024***  0.031*** 
 (5.93) (-3.59)  (-5.37) (-4.15)  (4.38) (-4.42)  (6.00) 
Block >25% 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 
 (0.21) (1.05)  (-0.02) (0.85)  (0.73) (1.14)  (1.38) 
Change in free float -0.037** 0.013  -0.031 -0.024**  0.008 0.002  -0.013 
 (-2.04) (0.94)  (-0.89) (-2.33)  (0.27) (0.10)  (-1.07) 
Crisis -0.048 0.022  0.024 0.005  0.055 -0.019  0.101** 
 (-0.67) (0.60)  (0.30) (0.12)  (0.65) (-0.36)  (2.53) 
Cross-listed -0.056* -0.021  -0.073** -0.016  -0.06 -0.007  -0.061*** 
 (-1.94) (-1.45)  (-2.07) (-0.94)  (-1.07) (-0.44)  (-2.58) 
Past rights issues -0.002 -0.007**  -0.005 -0.003  -0.032** -0.002  -0.003 
 (-0.34) (-1.96)  (-0.58) (-0.60)  (-2.33) (-0.32)  (-0.48) 
ROA (pre offer) -0.660*** -0.750***  -0.604*** -0.833***  -0.807*** -0.800***  -0.382*** 
 (-9.27) (-19.47)  (-7.09) (-17.25)  (-10.25) (-16.49)  (-9.30) 
Leverage 0.241*** -0.022  0.159*** -0.010  0.048 -0.083***  0.055*** 
 (5.90) (-1.19)  (3.10) (-0.44)  (0.93) (-3.50)  (2.56) 
Market-to-book 0.020 -0.018**  0.064*** -0.041***  -0.037 -0.087***  -0.019† 
 (1.12) (-1.96)  (2.99) (-3.62)  (-1.47) (-7.32)  (-1.86) 
Inv.Mills           -0.015 
          (-0.66) 
Year F.E. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 2,940   2,530   2,717   3,502 
  
2.10. Conclusion 
We study how firms choose between alternative ways of raising equity. We exploit a unique dataset 
with all the worldwide equity issues over the period 1995-2011 with a detailed breakdown between 
cash and rights issues, with rights either tradable or non-tradable.  
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We entertain three alternative hypotheses. The first (adverse selection hypothesis) posits that rights 
issues help to prevent the wealth transfer from the existing shareholders when shares are 
undervalued and that non-tradability helps to completely eliminate any residual adverse selection 
problem. The second hypothesis (control hypothesis) posits that rights issues are designed to preserve 
private benefits of managerial control. Making rights non-tradable will make it more difficult for an 
investor to buy rights to obtain a large position in the firm and force the controlling shareholder to 
share the private benefits of control. The third hypothesis (distress hypothesis) posits that rights issues 
are a “financing of last resort” method mostly used when the firm is unable to attract outside investors 
through a cash offer. Restricting trading further reinforces the coercion on the existing shareholders, 
allowing to raise financing even when the restructuring prospects are more doubtful.  
 
The adverse selection hypothesis is clearly rejected by the data. First, rights issues are not followed by 
either short-term or long-term positive abnormal returns, but significant negative long-term returns. 
Second, although when trading is restricted excess returns are higher, this conclusion is reversed in 
the long run. The control hypothesis is also not consistent with many of our findings. While rights 
issues are more likely when there is a large blockholder, it is not the case that rights issues are followed 
by more negative short-term and long-term announcement returns than cash offers. Although non-
tradability lowers returns, the probability of making rights non-tradable is independent of the 
presence of a large blockholder. Moreover the long-term negative excess returns reported in this 
paper are simply too large to be explained by a destruction in shareholder value as a result of private 
benefits of control. Indeed, one would expect private benefits of control to be more relevant in 
profitable firms. Hence, everything considered, the evidence is more consistent with the financial 
distress hypothesis than with any other hypothesis. Indeed, after rights issues, stock price 
performance as well as profitability deteriorate substantially. The probability of making a rights issue 
rather than a cash offer is higher when the probability of financial distress is higher. Moreover, while 
the excess returns after rights issues are significantly negative although less so than in cash offers in 
general, firms with non-tradable rights have significantly lower long-run excess returns than the firms 
with tradable rights. These lower returns can be explained with lower long-run profitability of the 
firms that issue rights and restrict their tradability.  
 
2.10.1 Contribution 
This paper is the first to provide an overview of the choice between cash and rights offers and between 
trading and non-trading rights offers on a global scale. Additionally, short-term and long-term 
abnormal returns are studied as well as changes in operating performance up to three years after the 
59 
 
equity issue. Hence, we contribute to the finance literature by providing new insights into 
fundamental financing decisions. Our findings are more generalizable compared to single-country 
studies. Adverse selection, for instance, does not explain the choice of companies to issue rights offers 
rather than cash offers. Hence, we can question the relevance of mandatory rights offers as a means 
to protect shareholders. If rights are used by firms in financial distress or by blockholders securing 
their private benefits of control how would this protect the current shareholder base? 
These findings are also relevant for international studies controlling for shareholder protection. 
Preemptive rights as a reflection of minority shareholders protection are part of the “Antidirector 
rights index” of La Porta et al. (1998). Given our empirical evidence the protective nature of rights is 
doubtful and hence their corporate governance index might be biased. Consequently, we believe that 
the corporate governance index of La Porta et al. (1998) can be developed further based on our 
insights. 
2.10.2 Limitations and avenues for future research 
The global scale is a huge advantage of our study but at the same time it creates some difficulties in 
terms of interpreting our results. Depending on the institutional setting and the level of investor 
protection, one hypothesis might be more relevant compared to another. Given that the aim of this 
paper was to provide an overview of the global seasoned equity market, comparing the different 
institutional settings is beyond the scope of this paper. Based on the findings in our paper we 
encourage scholars to further disentangle firms’ choices between different issuing methods. 
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Appendix A: Bloomberg versus other data sources. 
 
This table reports the number of cash offers and rights issues listed in the Bloomberg, SDC, and 
Capital IQ databases, in order of the country’s SEO frequency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bloomberg
(2003-2011)
Capital IQ
(2003-2011)
SDC>
Bloomberg
Capital IQ>
Bloomberg
Country (underlying) Cash Rights Cash Rights Rights Rights (Rights) (Rights)
UNITED STATES 9,357 689 16,035 372 325 834 x
UNITED KINGDOM 4,159 1,430 6,164 571 377 312
AUSTRALIA 4,563 3,294 13,589 3,401 2,166 1,719 x
CHINA 1,717 2,172 1,026 171 1,362 71
JAPAN 2,278 56 3,746 68 17 1 x
HONG KONG 2,305 973 3,541 651 637 33
SOUTH KOREA 1,559 2,298 3,006 934 1,070 23
CANADA 8,756 363 18,955 130 122 149 x
GERMANY 401 1,097 819 452 540 195
TAIWAN 951 1,167 928 470 397 11
FRANCE 340 685 1,039 355 455 120
MALAYSIA 443 564 628 443 269 173
SWEDEN 212 1,075 470 499 794 276
SINGAPORE 503 284 818 367 188 182 x
BRAZIL 277 1,179 623 83 527 18
GREECE 153 753 197 67 421 43
TURKEY 58 1,297 83 73 792 4
ITALY 162 402 405 186 252 63
SOUTH AFRICA 144 423 248 74 60 69 x
THAILAND 102 394 352 287 195 85
NORWAY 283 356 476 116 215 91
INDONESIA 129 366 159 259 191 85
SWITZERLAND 174 244 319 115 93 49
INDIA 647 669 975 262 269 224
SPAIN 146 392 364 97 290 37
POLAND 210 187 233 42 146 21
CHILE 53 272 149 313 91 13 x
MEXICO 64 215 185 40 66 6
AUSTRIA 74 190 116 74 114 42
NETHERLANDS 236 38 529 47 22 27 x x
DENMARK 100 157 221 107 92 22
NEW ZEALAND 108 179 297 110 101 59
IRELAND 266 55 306 23 17 19 x
PORTUGAL 43 113 114 67 23 11
PHILIPPINES 93 106 205 111 35 50 x x
BELGIUM 93 81 202 44 28 13
PAKISTAN 5 306 32 0 223 55
FINLAND 88 64 231 60 42 26
BERMUDA 220 80 236 3 64 181 x
ISRAEL 188 153 227 11 65 34
PERU 7 232 57 41 81 0
EGYPT 12 120 65 105 108 30
ARGENTINA 13 114 55 87 38 6
KUWAIT 4 103 16 28 103 12
SRI LANKA 4 208 7 71 186 54
RUSSIA 123 131 248 23 125 5
JORDAN 1 121 21 29 119 1
UAE 8 42 13 4 40 14
QATAR 1 28 7 16 28 11
OMAN 1 57 8 12 55 12
Others 710 2,266 1,621 723 1,861 2,086
Total 42,544 28,240 80,366 12,694 15,897 7,677
SDC
(1995-2011)
Bloomberg
(1995-2011)
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APPENDIX B: Definitions of variables. 
Variable Definition 
  
Country/Market 
  
Accounting LLSV (1998) estimate of accounting standards (where 90 represents a high level of 
transparency) 
Anti-director LLSV (1998) estimate of shareholder protection, ranging from 0 to 6 (where 6 
represents a high level of protection) 
Choice One if trading of preemptive rights is not mandatory and 0 otherwise 
Debt/GDP Ratio of government debt to GDP 
FDI inflow/GDP Ratio of net foreign direct investment inflow to GDP 
GDP/capita Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current US dollars. 
Governance (GMI) GMI country governance index 
HML High-minus-low factor from Ken French's website 
Index returns Log return on the regional MSCI index 
Judicial efficiency LLSV (1998) estimate of the efficiency of the judicial system, ranging from 0 to 10 
(where 10 represents a high level of efficiency) 
Legal origin LLSV (1998) legal origin 
Market/GDP Ratio of equity market size to GDP 
Prevote Spamann (2010) estimate: 1 if preemptive rights can be waived by a simple 
majority vote (0 otherwise) 
Preright Spamann (2010) estimate: 1 if waiver is subject to special conditions (0 otherwise) 
Preexpl Spamann (2010) estimate: 1 if the law makes special mention of shareholders' first 
opportunity to buy shares (0 otherwise) 
Real interest Real interest rate 
SMB Small-minus-big factor from Ken French's website 
UMD Momentum factor from Ken French's website 
  
Liquidity  
Amihud Amihud (2002) measure with data corrections according to Lesmond (2005) 
Bid–ask Bid–ask spread divided by the average of bid and ask 
Rights below PCP One if #violated > 0 (0 otherwise) 
%violated Percentage of trading days on which the last price was below the put–call parity 
bound 
#violated Number of trading days on which the last price was below the put–call parity bound 
Underpriced by One minus the ratio of price to put–call parity bound if price is below the bound (0 
otherwise) 
Zero return days Fraction of days with zero return to total days traded 
  
Transaction  
Change in free float Changes in free float from the last year-end before announcement to the year-end 
after the effective date 
Cross-listed One if the offer was registered for securities listed in more than one country (0 
otherwise) 
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Discount Discount to the closing price five days prior to the announcement 
% sold Percentage of new shares sold as a fraction of shares outstanding prior to the offer 
Trading One if a market for rights existed (0 otherwise) 
Trading days (actual) Number of trading dates with positive volume 
  
Firm  
# Analysts Number of analysts covering the firm (on I/B/E/S) 
Assets Total assets (thousands of US dollars) 
Block >25% One if >25% of shares are held by a single blockholder, 2011 data from Orbit 
CAPEX/sales Capital expenditures/sales 
Distress (dummy) One if Altman Z < 1.8 and 0 otherwise 
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes (thousands of US dollars) 
Employees Number of employees (000) 
% held (>25%) Sum of percentage of shares held in blocks > 25% 
Interest coverage EBIT/interest expenses 
Leverage Net market leverage 
Market cap Price multiplied by shares outstanding (thousands of US dollars) 
Market-to-book Market to book ratio 
Past rights issues Number of rights issues previously announced by the same issuer in the sample 
period 
ROA EBIT/assets 
Runup Returns 6 months to 42 days before the announcement 
Sales Sales (thousands of US dollars) 
Z Altman Z-score 
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Chapter 3 
Acquisition Finance: Are European companies different? 
 
V. Mataigne a and T. Vermaelen b 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We follow the methodology of a U.S.-based study to compare determinants of the financing choices 
of European and American acquirers. Differences in bank dependence and ownership concentration 
between Europe and the U.S. are potentially important for the financing decision. Our results indicate 
that information asymmetry and corporate control issues explain the high incidence of cash payments 
rather than stock payments in Europe. In contrast to their U.S. counterparts, European acquirers do 
not use acquisition finance to get closer to their optimal capital structure. Finally, European acquirers 
are also able to time the market by paying with stock when shares are overvalued. 
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3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether European and U.S. firms use the same decision 
framework when choosing the method of acquisition finance. Vermaelen and Xu (2014) test a model 
that accurately predicts acquisition financing choices (i.e., cash or stock payment) for 89% of their 
sample of 2,183 U.S. based acquisitions. The model builds on the capital structure literature (Kayhan 
and Titman, 2007; Fama and French, 2002; Uysal, 2011; Harford et al., 2009) that explains acquisition 
finance as a movement to an optimal capital structure. Control variables suggested by the acquisition 
finance literature (Eckbo, 2009) are also found to be statistically significant predictors of acquisition 
finance. First, tender offers are more likely to be financed with cash than with stock; second, in 
contested bids with multiple bidders, bidders prefer to pay cash. Finally, targets prefer cash payment 
if the bidder stock is illiquid and if the target shares are held by institutional investors. While 11% of 
the firms deviate from the prediction of the model, only 1% pay with stock when the model predicts 
cash payment (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). This finding is explained by an adverse selection argument; 
that is, if a company wants to pay with stock when the model predicts cash payment, it creates 
suspicion among the target shareholders that its stock is overvalued (Schlingemann, 2004). Only when 
stock payment can be justified as a movement to an optimal capital structure are acquirers able to pay 
with stock. This interpretation is consistent with the evidence that equity-financed acquisitions that 
can be justified as a movement to an optimal capital structure are followed by long-term negative 
excess returns, while unexpected cash transactions are followed by long-term positive excess returns.   
 
We seek to test whether these results hold for a European sample. For example, compared to U.S. 
firms, European firms are more likely to finance acquisitions with cash than with stock. Among a 
sample of 2,798 U.S. transactions, Vermaelen and Xu (2014) found 47% were stock-only deals, and 26% 
were cash-only deals. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) found that 70% of U.S. M&A transactions 
in the 1990s involved stock financing, of which 58% were entirely stock financed. In contrast, in their 
study of European deals, Faccio and Masulis (2005) documented 27% of stock-only deals versus 60% 
of cash-only deals in their subsample of listed targets. Similar figures were reported by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2009): 63% of all-cash deals versus 18% of all-equity deals, although their sample contains 
private targets which bias the results towards more cash financing.  
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) explain their results by considerations of control. Since European firms have 
more concentrated ownership, to preserve the private benefits of control acquirers may be reluctant 
to issue shares, especially to blockholders in the target firm. However, these differences in acquisition 
finance might be explained by the fact that at the time of the acquisition announcement, the typical 
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European firm is more underleveraged (relative to the predictions of optimal capital structure models) 
than the typical U.S. firm. Even in the absence of control benefits, acquirers may prefer to pay cash if 
they believe their shares are undervalued. So the lack of equity offers in Europe may also reflect the 
fact that most acquirers believe that at the time of the acquisition the stock is undervalued, or at least 
not overvalued. It may also reflect that timing the market, i.e., issuing overvalued stock, is not the right 
thing to do if the target has a blockholder who will become an important shareholder in the combined 
entity. If the blockholders realize that they have been issued overvalued stock, they may be less willing 
to participate in future equity offerings. In this sense, differences in ownership structure explain the 
difference in acquisition method choice between U.S. and European firms.  
 
Another difference is that European firms tend to do more cross-border acquisitions. A study by Rossi 
and Volpin (2004), for example, found that more than 90% of all U.S. acquisitions were between U.S. 
bidders and targets. If investors have a ‘home bias’ because they feel they can value domestic firms 
better, the target shareholders may be reluctant to accept shares of a bidder in another country. 
Hence, as European firms make more cross-border acquisitions, acquirers are more likely to use cash.  
 
Finally, another explanation for the preference for equity finance is that the selling shareholders do 
not pay capital gains tax (Huang and Walking, 1987). To the extent that capital gains tax is lower than 
in the U.S., European shareholders may be more willing to accept cash payment.  
 
This paper extends the research of Faccio and Masulis (2005) who study acquisitions by European 
public acquirers of public and private targets between 1997 and 2000. This narrow timeframe, 
coinciding with the dot.com bubble, however, may affect generalizations due to specific acquirer 
motives and acquirer returns during the internet boom. Focusing on corporate control issues versus 
the financial constraints of the bidding firm, they find evidence that both factors affect the financing 
choice: acquirers are more likely to use cash when corporate control is threatened, while stock 
financing is used by highly leveraged acquirers. In a similar vein, Martynova and Renneboog (2009) 
control for the acquirer’s financial condition ex-ante, using a sample of European deals between 1993 
and 2001. The evidence indicates that acquirers with excess cash and collateral prefer cash or debt 
financing rather than equity financing. Studying payment choices, their findings suggest that large 
acquisitions of listed targets by acquirers with a positive runup are more likely to be paid with cash. 
When payment may lead to a change in control, cash payment is preferred, as is the case for cross-
border and hostile bids.  
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Whereas the above research is based on acquisitions prior to 2002, we focus on European acquisitions 
announced between 1997 and 2014. We follow the systematic approach proposed by Vermaelen and 
Xu (2014), which involves the following steps. First we estimate to what extent the firm is 
overleveraged or underleveraged using the empirical capital structure models of Kayhan and Titman 
(2007) and Fama and French (2002) that are designed to capture the spirit of the static trade-off theory. 
Second, we calculate pro-forma leverage ratios for the combined (post-acquisition) firm assuming an 
equity-financed transaction and a cash-financed transaction. Third, we calculate Λ, i.e., the difference 
between the absolute deviation from the optimal leverage if the bidder pays cash and the absolute 
deviation from optimal leverage if the bidder pays with stock. The trade-off theory predicts that Λ is 
positively correlated with the probability of a stock payment. Fourth, after adjusting for the fact that 
leverage itself may predict the likelihood of becoming an acquirer (Uysal, 2011) we predict acquisition 
finance after including a number of control variables suggested by past research on acquisition finance. 
Fifth, we compare the predicted and the actual financing methods and classify firms into four 
categories: firms that are predicted to pay with cash (stock) and indeed paid cash (stock), and firms 
that are predicted to pay cash (stock) but actually paid with stock (cash).  Finally, we test whether firms 
that deviate from the predicted payment method were driven by market timing considerations, i.e., 
whether unexpected equity issuers are overvalued and unexpected cash payers undervalued. 
Replicating the Vermaelen and Xu (2014) approach on a European sample makes a “clean” comparison 
between U.S. and European acquisitions more straightforward. 
 
In some ways, the results for European acquisitions are similar to the U.S. results reported by 
Vermaelen and Xu (2014). Tender offers, acquisitions with multiple bidders, and bidders with illiquid 
shares are more likely to be financed with cash. Furthermore, the model does a good job in predicting 
84% of the financing decisions. However, in contrast to the U.S. sample, European acquisition finance 
does not seem to be driven by a move to a target capital structure. In other words, Λ, which was the 
most statistically significant predictor in the U.S. sample (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014), is not significantly 
related to the choice of financing method. The acquisition financing choice is driven by factors that are 
not significant (or relevant) in the U.S. First, cross-border acquisitions and acquisitions where the target 
firm has a large blockholder are more likely to be financed with cash. Second, hostile bids and bids for 
relatively large targets are more likely to be financed with stock. Finally, while in the U.S. sample firms 
that deviated from the predicted financing method were mainly those that were predicted to pay stock 
and actually paid cash, the opposite is true of the European sample: in 11 % of cases, firms that were 
predicted to pay cash actually paid with stock, while only 5 % of predicted stock payers paid cash.  
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Vermaelen and Xu (2014) explain the absence of firms that deviate from predicted cash payment by 
an adverse selection (market timing) argument: firms that try to pay with stock when it looks like they 
should be paying with cash reveal to the target management that their stock is overvalued. However, 
it seems that European targets accept overvalued stock even when the acquisition financing model 
suggests that cash payment would be more appropriate. One explanation may be that target firms 
ignore leverage considerations when assessing the probability that the bidder’s stock is overvalued. Or 
they simply believe that European bidders don’t engage in market timing, given the presence of 
substantial target shareholders in the surviving firm. Notwithstanding, the fact that bidders earn 
significant long-term (2 year) negative excess returns of -28 % after “unexpected” equity-financed 
transactions suggests that they do engage in market timing. Put differently, the target firm 
management could use the predictions of our model to assess whether a bidder’s stock is likely to be 
overvalued. Note that consistent with market timing considerations, bidders who “unexpectedly” pay 
with cash (i.e., when the model predicts equity payment) experience significant excess returns of 43% 
two years after the acquisition.  
3.2. Hypotheses and data 
3.2.1 Hypotheses 
We consider the following hypotheses to explain acquisition financing choices. According to the target 
capital structure hypothesis, acquisitions allow firms to move to their “optimal” target capital 
structure. They trade off the benefits from debt (such as interest tax shields) against the expected costs 
of financial distress (Harford et al., 2009). When firms deviate from the optimal capital structure, it 
must be because they believe their shares are undervalued or overvalued (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002). In the first case they prefer cash payment and in the second case they issue 
stock. This is essentially the hypothesis supported by Vermaelen and Xu (2014) employing U.S. data, 
with one important twist: paying with stock when target capital structure arguments suggest cash (i.e., 
unexpected equity issues) will reveal to targets that the bidder’s stock is overvalued. Only firms that 
use capital structure reasoning to justify equity finance (expected equity issuers) can issue overvalued 
shares. Note that if the financing decision reveals the overvaluation of the bidder, as in Myers and 
Majluf (1984), timing the market to take advantage of overvalued stock becomes impossible.  
 
Alternatively, according to the control hypothesis, major shareholders are reluctant to issue stock 
financing because they will lose control and its associated private benefits (Ghosh and Ruland, 1998; 
Amihud, Lev, and Travlos, 1990; Stulz, 1988; Jung, Kim, and Stulz, 1996). Moreover, they will be 
particularly concerned if the target firm also has large blockholders, which means creating a new 
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blockholder in the bidder (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). This will be especially important if the target is 
relatively large. Hence, the control hypothesis predicts that firms with large blockholders prefer to pay 
cash, especially when the target firm has large blockholders and is relatively large.  
 
According to the information asymmetry hypothesis, targets are reluctant to accept stock in companies 
that are difficult to value – particularly small firms, firms in a different industry, or firms located in a 
different country (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). Bidders should care about this as this reluctance 
means targets will ask higher takeover premia to compensate for the risk. Hence, the hypothesis 
predicts cash payment when the bidder is small, in cross-border deals and cross-industry deals (Faccio 
and Masulis, 2005). 
 
Note that these hypotheses are neither mutually exclusive nor comprehensive. We also include control 
variables suggested by the acquisition finance literature (see e.g. Eckbo, 2009) that are not captured 
by our main hypotheses. 
3.2.2 Data 
Our sample comprises 664 acquisitions between listed European firms announced between 1997 and 
2014. Deals were retrieved from SDC, and additional deal and firm information was collected from 
Zephyr, Amadeus and Datastream. In line with prior studies (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014), we include only 
completed deals, with the target and acquirer being publicly listed companies, the acquirer taking over 
at least 50% of the target firm, and not from the financial, real estate or utilities sectors. All targets 
and acquiring firms are located in member states of the EU27.15 Based on these criteria, SDC lists 1094 
acquisitions. We eliminated acquirers doing more than one acquisition in the same year to reduce 
confounding effects and removed firms without the accounting information necessary to compute the 
optimal leverage. This reduces our sample to 664 transactions.  
 
320 out of the 664 deals (48%) are entirely paid with cash, whereas 179 deals (27%) are entirely paid 
with equity and the remaining 165 deals (25%) are mixed payment deals. These percentages are 
comparable to other European studies (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006; Faccio and Masulis, 2005), 
but differ significantly from the numbers reported in U.S. studies (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014; Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001) where the predominant financing method is equity finance. The 
distribution of deals across countries and their financing method is shown in Table 3.1. The sample is 
                                                          
15 EU27 member states:  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of 
Ireland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
73 
 
largely dominated by UK acquirers16 (49%), while France, Germany, and Sweden are the next three 
largest acquiring countries.         
Table 3.1. Country distribution. 
This table lists the number of deals per acquirer and target country. Additionally, the number of cash-only, shares-
only and mixed offers initiated by acquirers in that country are listed. 
           Method of payment (Acquirer country) 
 Acquirers  Targets  Cash only  Shares only  
Mixed 
payment 
Country N %   N %   N %   N %   N % 
Austria 7 1%  7 1%  4 57%  1 14%  2 29% 
Belgium 6 1%  6 1%  4 67%  0 0%  2 33% 
Bulgaria 0 0%  1 0%          
Czech Republic 1 0%  5 1%  0 0%  0 0%  1 100% 
Denmark 12 2%  14 2%  2 17%  4 33%  6 50% 
Estonia 1 0%  2 0%  1 100%  0 0%  0 0% 
Finland 18 3%  14 2%  12 67%  4 22%  2 11% 
France 93 14%  77 12%  48 52%  20 22%  25 27% 
Germany 47 7%  39 6%  28 60%  8 17%  11 23% 
Greece 9 1%  9 1%  6 67%  3 33%  0 0% 
Hungary 0 0%  1 0%          
Italy 12 2%  11 2%  6 50%  2 17%  4 33% 
Latvia 1 0%  1 0%  1 100%  0 0%  0 0% 
Lithuania 2 0%  1 0%  1 50%  0 0%  1 50% 
Luxembourg 0 0%  1 0%          
Malta 0 0%  0 0%          
the Netherlands 28 4%  27 4%  18 64%  5 18%  5 18% 
Norway 21 3%  38 6%  12 57%  7 33%  2 10% 
Poland 25 4%  28 4%  9 36%  8 32%  8 32% 
Portugal 0 0%  0 0%          
Republic of Ireland 9 1%  5 1%  4 44%  2 22%  3 33% 
Romania 0 0%  5 1%          
Slovak Republic 0 0%  0 0%          
Slovenia 0 0%  0 0%          
Spain 6 1%  8 1%  2 33%  2 33%  2 33% 
Sweden 43 6%  40 6%  20 47%  15 35%  8 19% 
United Kingdom 323 49%   324 49%   142 44%   98 30%   83 26% 
TOTAL SAMPLE 664     664     320 48%   179 27%   165 25% 
 
Further descriptive statistics are provided in Table 3.2. 26% of our deals are cross-border deals while 
284 deals (43%), are between UK targets and UK acquirers. This is not surprising as the U.K. has the 
                                                          
16 Our results are robust to excluding UK acquirers from our sample. 
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most active takeover market in Europe (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). 58% of all deals are intra-industry 
deals, meaning that 42% are diversifying acquisitions. In cash deals, the median ratio of the target’s 
enterprise value divided by the buyer’s (relative size in Table 3.2. (Panel A)) is 12%, while in equity- 
financed acquisitions the relative size is 34%. This means that the typical target is substantially smaller 
than the bidder, in contrast to U.S. deals where the relative size of target and bidders is 48% in cash 
transactions and 52% in equity transactions (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). The average premium paid over 
the stock price four weeks prior to the deal announcement is 39%, which is roughly comparable to 
other studies (Dong et al., 2006; Vermaelen and Xu, 2014).  
As indicated in Table 3.2. (Panel B), 31% of our acquiring firms are held by a blockholder (owning more 
than 25%), whereas insider ownership exceeds 5% for 71% of the acquirers. Similarly, 73% of the 
targets have significant insider ownership, while a blockholder is present in 51% of all targets. The 
average (median) market-to-book ratio of bidders is 2.03 (1.49). Moreover, the average (median) 
market-to-book ratio of European targets is only 0.5 (0.51). So the typical European acquisition involves 
a large high-growth firm buying a small low-growth firm. Furthermore, Table 3.2. (Panel B) shows that 
acquirers using cash are larger, both in assets and in sales, compared to acquirers using equity or mixed 
offers, a result also found in U.S. studies (Heron and Lie, 2002; Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). Finally, Table 
3.2. (Panel C) shows that the median acquirer leverage ratio in cash-only deals (0.54) is higher than in 
equity-only deals (0.46). This is the opposite of what is observed in the U.S., where Vermaelen and Xu 
(2014) find that acquirers in cash deals have leverage ratios (using market values of equity) 50% smaller 
than those of acquirers in equity deals – something we can expect if firms use acquisition finance to 
move to their optimal leverage. This is the first piece of evidence that suggests that European 
acquisition finance is not driven by movement to a target capital structure. 
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TABLE 3.2. Descriptive statistics. 
This table provides descriptive statistics on deal (Panel A), target and acquirer-level (Panel B) as well as on 
actual, pro-forma, and optimal leverage (Panel C). 
Panel A: Deal characteristics                 
 All transactions  Subsample median 
 
Nr of 
observations Fraction     Cash Equity Mixed 
cash only 320 48%        
shares only 179 27%        
mixed payment 165 25%        
cross-border 171 26%     32% 16% 24% 
intra-industry 385 58%     52% 63% 64% 
hostile 13 2%     3% 2% 1% 
tender offer 432 65%     69% 65% 56% 
multiple bidders 36 5%     7% 2% 4% 
toehold 92 14%     16% 14% 10% 
UK acquirer 323 49%     44% 55% 50% 
          
 Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
 
   
% cash paid 87% 100% 25% 1% 100%  100% 0% 50% 
% shares paid 80% 100% 29% 1% 100%  0% 100% 48% 
relative size 27% 17% 27% 1% 100%  12% 34% 21% 
premium 39% 34% 29% 1% 150%  36% 31% 36% 
Herfindahl index 0.085 0.052 0.094 0.016 1.00   0.053 0.049 0.054 
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TABLE 3.2. Descriptive statistics.         
Panel B: Acquirer and target characteristics 
 All transactions  Subsample median 
 Nr of observations Fraction     Cash Equity Mixed 
Acquirer blockholder 204 31%     34% 27% 28% 
Acquirer insider owned 470 71%     64% 71% 84% 
Acquirer institutional O. 513 77%     75% 78% 82% 
Acquirer R&D dummy 236 36%     38% 34% 33% 
Target blockholder 340 51%     58% 40% 51% 
Target insider owned 482 73%     74% 68% 75% 
Target institutional O. 511 77%     75% 78% 81% 
Target R&D dummy 111 17%     17% 15% 18% 
          
 Mean Median S.D. Min Max  
 
  
Acq. Total assets (th EUR) 6,375,571 735,697 15,243,770 5,688 101,183,000  1,426,590 253,065 544,107 
Acq. Sales (th EUR) 4,046,248 592,316 9,238,040 80 66,156,420  1,027,545 169,855 438,814 
Acq. Market-to-book 2.03 1.49 2.57 0.10 21.57  1.39 1.55 1.52 
Acq. ROA 3.6% 5.0% 14.6% -150.4% 56.4%  5.3% 3.8% 5.4% 
Acq. Runup  0.59% 0.51% 7.2% -22.5% 29.2%  0% 0.84% 0.84% 
Targ. Total assets (th EUR) 1,279,314 86,094 6,007,042 42 79,137,616  86,564 71,018 101,291 
Targ. Sales (th EUR) 1,079,751 91,838 3,871,645 0.00 41,000,000  98,502 71,055 84,278 
Targ. Market-to-book 0.50 0.51 0.16 0.04 1.33  0.51 0.51 0.51 
Targ. ROA 1.4% 4.1% 23.3% -336.2% 87.9%   5.1% 3.1% 3.1% 
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TABLE 3.2. Descriptive statistics.       
Panel C: Leverage  
 All transactions  Subsample median 
 Mean Median S.D. Min Max  Cash Equity Mixed 
Acquirer leverage 0.50 0.52 0.19 0.00 1.00  0.54 0.46 0.53 
Target leverage 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.00 1.00  0.35 0.42 0.36 
Optimal leverage 0.50 0.51 0.11 0.00 1.00  0.51 0.49 0.51 
Kayhan - Titman 
         
Optimal leverage 0.50 0.50 0.10 0.00 1.00  0.50 0.50 0.51 
Fama - French 
         
L(Cash) 0.64 0.66 0.18 -0.16 1.26  0.64 0.67 0.68 
L(Equity) 0.46 0.48 0.20 -0.73 1.00  0.51 0.42 0.47 
Lambda 0.053 0.058 0.112 -0.398 0.827  0.056 0.066 0.063 
Kayhan - Titman 
         
Lambda 0.043 0.040 0.114 -0.417 0.434  0.040 0.040 0.064 
Fama - French 
                  
 
3.3. Estimating “optimal” leverage and its implication for acquisition finance 
3.3.1 Determinants of financial leverage 
We start by predicting whether the acquiring firm should pay cash or stock if it wants to move to its 
optimal capital structure. This requires estimating a model that predicts “optimal” leverage. Following 
the logic of Vermaelen and Xu (2014), we estimate a firm’s optimal leverage (L*) based on the 
specifications of Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Fama and French (2002). Using all European listed firms 
in Compustat over the 1997-2014 timespan, we run two separate tobit regressions: one with UK firms 
only and another including all continental European firms, to which we also add country fixed effects. 
Continental Europe is said to be much more bank-dependent, whereas the U.K. is more capital market 
oriented and hence more similar to U.S. firms (Antoniou et al., 2008). Both regressions include industry 
and year fixed effects. All explanatory variables (definitions are given in Appendix A) are lagged one 
year in order to limit issues of reversed causality.  
The findings reported in Table 3.3. are largely in line with prior studies (Chang and Dasgupta, 2009). 
Firms with higher sales, larger assets, and higher tax shields typically have higher leverage, whereas 
high market-to-book firms, very profitable firms, and R&D-intensive firms typically have lower leverage 
(Harford et al., 2009). Furthermore, tangibility has a small positive influence on leverage for European 
firms. 
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TABLE 3.3. Leverage estimation regressions. 
This table reports the tobit regressions of leverage ratio predictions on all listed European firms in Compustat between 1997 and 2014, distinguishing between UK and continental 
Europe. *, **, *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Dependent variable: Leverage (net debt) 
 U.K.  CONTINENTAL EUROPE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 Kayhan & Titman  Fama & French  Kayhan & Titman  Fama & French 
  Book Market   Book Market   Book Market   Book Market 
ROA -0.229*** -0.362***  -0.131*** -0.267***  -0.424*** -0.816***  -0.379*** -0.743*** 
 (-20.31) (-17.42)  (-10.89) (-12.20)  (-37.17) (-30.79)  (-32.53) (-27.66) 
Market-to-book 0.003* -0.107***  0.001 -0.111***  -0.002 -0.148***  -0.004*** -0.151*** 
 (1.76) (-33.74)  (0.31) (-35.18)  (-1.23) (-43.61)  (-2.87) (-44.20) 
Tangibility 0.001 0.011***     0.003* 0.010**    
 (0.66) (2.71)     (1.88) (2.36)    
R&D/Sales -0.130*** -0.174***  -0.185*** -0.273***  -0.181*** -0.286***  -0.281*** -0.470*** 
 (-10.35) (-7.50)  (-16.16) (-13.07)  (-15.21) (-11.04)  (-22.34) (-16.89) 
R&D dummy -0.041*** -0.107***  -0.026*** -0.090***  -0.022*** -0.073***  -0.010** -0.052*** 
 (-6.42) (-9.09)  (-4.13) (-7.69)  (-5.44) (-7.76)  (-2.53) (-5.47) 
SGA/Sales -0.008*** -0.018***     -0.017*** -0.026***    
 (-2.82) (-3.35)     (-4.78) (-3.24)    
LN sales 0.038*** 0.052***     0.022*** 0.050***    
 (27.68) (20.79)     (23.69) (24.03)    
LN assets    0.022*** 0.037***     0.015*** 0.039*** 
    (16.01) (14.44)     (16.20) (18.11) 
Taxshield    0.762*** 0.710***     0.142*** -0.065 
    (10.49) (5.29)     (2.71) (-0.54) 
Intercept 0.173*** 0.529***  0.202*** 0.554***  0.158** 0.154  0.140* 0.075 
 (5.22) (8.55)  (6.11) (9.01)  (2.16) (0.99)  (1.91) (0.48) 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country FE       Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 10,790 10,790   10,914 10,914   21,488 21,488   21,544 21,544 
Pseudo-R² 52.19 21.90  44.26 20.44  77.23 21.19  74.65 20.64 
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Our results are robust to different specifications, as well as alternative measurements of leverage17 
(net debt, gross debt, or debt net of all cash). Based on this specification we can compute predicted 
values of optimal leverage (L*) for the 664 transactions in our sample. Note that we calculate the 
optimal leverage for the combined firm (acquirer plus target). 
3.3.2 Pro forma leverage and Lambda (Λ) 
Next, for every acquirer we compute the pro forma leverage of the combined firm in case the 
acquisition is fully paid in cash (L(Cash)) and the pro forma leverage of the combined firm in case the 
acquisition is fully paid in equity (L(Equity)). This approach assumes that deals paid in cash are actually 
financed with debt, so that cash is regarded as negative debt. We use the same approach as Vermaelen 
and Xu (2014) to calculate the pro forma leverage as follows: 
𝐿(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ) =  
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐴 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇 + 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐴 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
𝐿(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦) =  
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐴 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐴 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐴 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
The subscripts A and T refer to acquirer and target values respectively. Results for the average L(Cash) 
and L(Equity) can be found in Table 3.2., panel C. Note that the optimal leverage in Table 3.2. (Panel C) 
is the leverage of the combined target and bidder firm. As expected, the median L(Cash) is consistently 
higher than L(Equity) in all payment method subsamples. Furthermore, for all samples the median 
value of L(Cash) is higher than the optimal leverage while L(Equity) is equal or slightly below the optimal 
leverage. So a cash transaction seems to be more likely to move the capital structure away from its 
target leverage than an equity transaction. The fact that most transactions are cash transactions 
suggests that capital structure management is not the main driving force behind acquisition finance in 
Europe. The contrast with Vermaelen and Xu (2014) is striking: their Table 3 also shows that a cash 
transaction would move the firms further away from their target capital structure than a stock deal, 
but U.S firms respond by moving to their target leverage by financing most acquisitions with stock.  
 
We can now compare, for each transaction, the optimal leverage with the pro forma leverage. First, 
we compute the difference between the optimal leverage (L*) and the pro forma leverage in case of a 
cash deal (L(Cash)), which we call Δ(Cash). Second, we calculate the difference between L* and the pro 
                                                          
17 Leverage includes current liabilities given that depending on the industry the amount of current liabilities can 
be important. We do include industry dummies to control for this. 
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forma leverage in case of an equity deal (L(Equity)), denoted by Δ(Equity). To obtain lambda Λ, we now 
compare Δ(Cash) to Δ(Equity).  
𝐿𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎 (𝛬) =  |𝐿(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ) − 𝐿∗| −  |𝐿(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦) −  𝐿∗| 
This measure lambda tells us which payment method the firm should use if it wants to move to its 
optimal leverage. If Λ is positive, equity payment is preferred, while a negative Λ calls for cash 
payment. Panel C in Table 3.2. indicates lambda is positive for the average firm in our sample, which 
suggests that equity issuance should typically be preferred if we want to move to an optimal capital 
structure. In reality, however, 48% of our transactions are entirely financed with cash, and 27% with 
stock only.  
 
3.4. Predicting acquisitions and acquisition finance  
3.4.1 Estimating acquisition likelihood 
Before we estimate our acquisition finance prediction models, we use a Heckman (1979) procedure to 
control for the selection in the acquirer sample. As indicated by Uysal (2011), overleveraged firms 
(relative to their optimal leverage) are less likely to become acquirers, and when they do acquire they 
are less likely to pay with cash. So in a first stage regression we predict whether a firm makes an 
acquisition in a given year. We follow Uysal (2011), and calculate the “leverage deficit” as the 
difference between the actual and optimal leverage, and define firms in the upper and lower quartile 
of the deficit respectively as “overleveraged and underleveraged”. We use the industry average of 
these measures for the availability of overleveraged and underleveraged firms. We also control for 
other firm characteristics such as sales, stock returns, market-to-book, and ROA. Furthermore, we 
control for industry concentration by including the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Finally, we include 
year and country fixed effects. Our findings (Table 3.4.) are broadly similar to prior studies on U.S. 
samples (Uysal, 2011; Vermaelen and Xu, 2014). 
Acquirers that deviate too far from their optimal capital structure are less likely to become acquirers, 
especially overleveraged firms. Large profitable firms with high stock returns and revenues and high 
market-to-book ratios, on the other hand, are more likely to undertake an acquisition. Typical for the 
European sample – but not observed in U.S. data – firms in underleveraged industries are less likely to 
acquire. Overleveraged firms in underleveraged industries, however, are more likely to undertake an 
acquisition. We use the Inverse Mills ratio based on Model 3 (of Table 3.4.) for the second stage of the 
Heckman model. 
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TABLE 3.4. Acquisition likelihood estimation. 
This table reports the coefficients of the probit models on the acquisition decision. The dependent variable equals 1 
if the firm undertakes an acquisition in the next year and 0 otherwise. *, **, *** represent significance levels of 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively. 
  Firm   Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm leverage Underleveraged   -0.119*** -0.045* -0.034 -0.043 
    (-3.88) (-1.88) (-1.43) (-1.37) 
 Overleveraged   -0.081*** -0.156*** -0.165*** -0.196*** 
    (-2.60) (-6.38) (-6.69) (-6.10) 
 Deficit   -0.348***    
    (-3.88)    
 Average (3y)    -0.095 -0.107* -0.105* 
     (-1.60) (-1.79) (-1.75) 
Industry leverage    Underleveraged   -0.074*** -0.091*** 
      (-3.56) (-3.43) 
   Overleveraged   0.027 0.009 
      (1.34) (0.34) 
Interactions Underleveraged x Underleveraged    -0.007 
       (-0.15) 
 Underleveraged x Overleveraged    0.082 
       (1.47) 
 Overleveraged x Underleveraged    0.164*** 
       (2.63) 
 Overleveraged x Overleveraged    0.030 
       (0.62) 
Controls Sales   0.180*** 0.180*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 
    (42.16) (41.66) (41.79) (41.80) 
 Stock returns   0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
    (4.52) (4.75) (4.81) (4.80) 
 Market-to-book   0.073*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 
    (9.72) (9.93) (9.68) (9.65) 
 ROA   0.400*** 0.397*** 0.390*** 0.391*** 
    (6.69) (6.95) (6.82) (6.83) 
   Herfindahl -0.712*** -0.808*** -0.786*** -0.780*** 
    (-7.97) (-9.18) (-8.91) (-8.84) 
 Intercept   -1.861*** -1.631*** -1.605*** -1.603*** 
    (-15.03) (-14.34) (-14.06) (-14.02) 
 Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R²    10.00 9.99 10.04 10.07 
Observations       30,658 32,608 32,608 32,608 
 
3.4.2 Predicting acquisition finance 
We estimate the determinants of the payment method choice using a tobit or probit model. The tobit 
model uses the percentage shares offered in the settlement as a dependent variable, whereas in the 
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probit model the dependent variable equals 1 (one) for all equity financed deals and 0 (zero) for all 
cash deals, hence mixed deals are ignored. The first two models (Table 3.5.) are similar to the 
specification used by Vermaelen and Xu (2014). Models 3 and 6 (Table 3.5.) are augmented with 
variables used by Faccio and Masulis (2005). Two important variables related to the information 
asymmetry hypothesis are included: a dummy equal to 1 for cross-border deals and a dummy equal to 
1 for intra-industry deals. The argument is that target shareholders will be less able to value firms based 
in foreign countries and unfamiliar industries (Martynova and Renneboog, 2009). This makes them 
reluctant to accept shares in such deals, or alternatively they will seek higher takeover premia from 
bidders to compensate for the risk of adverse selection.  
 
We also include a dummy variable which is set equal to 1 if there is a blockholder in the target and/or 
acquiring firm, or if there is an insider in the target and/or acquiring firm who owns more than 5% of 
the shares (Ghosh and Ruland, 1998). This is to test the control hypothesis that bidders are reluctant 
to share control with large target shareholders and prefer to pay cash (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Our 
other independent variables are control variables suggested by the M&A literature such as the 
takeover premium and dummy variables set equal to 1 if the bid is a tender offer (Loughran and Vijh, 
1997), if it is hostile, when there are multiple bidders (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990), or when the 
bidder has already a toehold. To test whether the financing method can at least partially be explained 
by a move to a target capital structure, lambda is included as an independent variable that we expect 
to be positively correlated with the dependent variable. Although not significant in the U.S. tests 
(Vermaelen and Xu, 2014), we also include the size of the target relative to the size of the acquirer as 
an independent variable. Following Uysal (2011), we also include acquirer-related control variables 
such as excess cash (Harford, 1999; Jensen, 1986), illiquidity of the bidder stock measured by Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure, market-to-book (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005), and runup. The institutional 
ownership dummy is included because institutional investors are typically much more active than 
individual shareholders, making equity payment more complicated (Baker et al., 2007). We also add 
the capital gain tax rate in the target’s country (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) as an independent variable, 
as this might affect the target’s preference for equity versus cash. To control for selection effects, the 
Inverse Mills ratio based on Model 3 of Table 3.4. is included. Year and country fixed effects are 
included in order to cover potential macro-economic factors which are not included (Harford, 2005). 
Finally, multicollinearity is not expected to influence our results given that the variance inflation factor 
reaches a maximum of 2.74, which is well below the critical limit of ten. 
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TABLE 3.5. Payment method prediction. 
This table reports the tobit regressions (Model 1, 2, 3) with the % shares used in the payment offered. Models 4, 5, 6 report probit 
regressions, where the dependent equals 1 if the payment is 100% paid in equity and 0 for 100% cash payment (mixed payments are 
excluded). *, **, *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Main regression            
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
 
Kayhan 
Titman     
tobit   
Fama 
French   
tobit  
Kayhan 
Titman    
tobit  
Kayhan 
Titman 
probit  
Fama 
French 
probit  
Kayhan 
Titman  
probit  
Dependent % shares used in payment  1 equals shares only, 0 equals cash only 
 
            
Lambda 0.278  -0.512  0.129  0.160  -0.685  0.093  
 (0.36)  (-0.70)  (0.17)  (0.24)  (-1.11)  (0.14)  
Tender offer -1.614  -1.623***  -1.557***  -1.127***  -1.134***  -1.171***  
 (-5.43)  (-5.46)  (-5.31)  (-5.22)  (-5.26)  (-5.23)  
Hostile bid 1.520**  1.535**  1.324**  1.041*  1.067*  0.961*  
 (2.24)  (2.26)  (1.96)  (1.90)  (1.95)  (1.66)  
Bid premium -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  
 (-0.56)  (-0.68)  (-0.86)  (-0.75)  (-0.87)  (-0.97)  
Relative size 1.087***  1.143***  0.949***  0.874***  0.903***  0.813***  
 (3.93)  (4.12)  (3.50)  (4.02)  (4.17)  (3.60)  
Target insider ownership -0.497**  -0.485**  -0.420*  -0.352*  -0.337*  -0.309  
 (-2.05)  (-2.01)  (-1.75)  (-1.84)  (-1.78)  (-1.58)  
Target institutional 
ownership 1.142  1.025  1.227  0.591  0.478  0.776  
 (1.46)  (1.31)  (1.57)  (0.88)  (0.71)  (1.11)  
Target blockholder -0.593***  -0.594***  -0.505***  -0.507***  -0.529***  -0.437***  
 (-3.09)  (-3.09)  (-2.66)  (-3.34)  (-3.47)  (-2.78)  
Acquirer illiquidity -36.145**  -35.496**  -41.167**  -28.347*  -27.744*  -29.967*  
 (-2.10)  (-2.07)  (-2.30)  (-1.95)  (-1.92)  (-1.93)  
Multiple bidders -1.077**  -1.042**  -1.017**  -0.927**  -0.899**  -0.853*  
 (-2.48)  (-2.41)  (-2.38)  (-2.13)  (-2.08)  (-1.90)  
Toehold -0.229  -0.227  -0.261  -0.062  -0.055  -0.095  
 (-0.87)  (-0.86)  (-1.01)  (-0.30)  (-0.27)  (-0.46)  
Acquirer excess cash -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0001  
 (-1.10)  (-1.09)  (-0.92)  (-0.65)  (-0.66)  (-0.42)  
Cross-border     -0.471**      -0.552***  
     (-1.99)      (-2.60)  
Intra-industry     0.292*      0.250*  
     (1.66)      (1.74)  
Acquirer runup     0.680      -0.211  
     (0.52)      (-0.21)  
Acquirer insider ownership     0.338      0.141  
     (1.34)      (0.69)  
Acquirer institutional ownership    -0.173      -0.147  
     (-0.65)      (-0.69)  
Acquirer blockholder     -0.488**      -0.277*  
     (-2.54)      (-1.75)  
Target capital gain tax      -0.054      -0.040  
     (-0.91)      (-0.77)  
Acquirer market-to-book     0.031      0.021  
     (1.01)      (0.72)  
Inverse Mills 2.252***  2.260***  2.098***  1.924***  1.925***  1.815***  
 (4.72)  (4.76)  (4.43)  (5.00)  (5.04)  (4.52)  
Intercept -2.860**  -2.811**  -0.778  -2.535***  -2.471***  -0.639  
 (-2.24)  (-2.21)  (-0.40)  (-2.79)  (-2.73)  (-0.41)  
Year Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country Fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 606  606  604  490  490  488  
Pseudo R² 15.87   15.90   17.31   27.60   27.78   30.01   
 
84 
 
TABLE 3.5. Payment method prediction. 
Panel B: Predicted and realized payment method        
Prediction Actual (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Cash Cash 65%  65%  64%  65%  65%  65% 
Stock Stock 19%  19%  19%  18%  18%  18% 
Stock Cash 5%  5%  7%  7%  7%  8% 
Cash Stock 11%   11%   10%   9%   10%   9% 
 
The results in Panel A of Table 3.5. confirm that acquirers are less likely to use shares when buying 
firms abroad in the case of a tender offer when multiple firms are bidding for the same target (Betton 
et al., 2008) or when their shares are less liquid. Equity payment is more likely in hostile takeovers, 
which is surprising considering that an argument can be made that a hostile bid should ideally be 
financed with cash (Martin, 1996)18. However, note that only 2% of the transactions are hostile. When 
the target is relatively large, the bidder is more likely to pay with stock, which is consistent with earlier 
research (Hansen, 1987; Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Control concerns would predict the opposite result 
but this might indicate that some deals are simply too large to be entirely paid with cash.  
 
A remarkable finding is that in strong contrast to the results reported on U.S. firms (Vermaelen and Xu, 
2014), lambda is not significantly related to acquisition financing choice. Recall that if firms use 
acquisition finance as a way to move to their target capital structure, we would expect a positive 
relation between lambda and the percentage of stock financing. We do find support for the 
information asymmetry hypothesis, i.e., the idea that target shareholders are less willing to accept 
shares in less familiar companies or from companies with less liquid shares: the cross-border and intra-
industry dummy as well as the acquirer’s illiquidity measure point in that direction. We find evidence 
for the corporate control hypothesis, as acquirers are less likely to use shares when the target firm has 
a blockholder or has high insider ownership. We also find evidence consistent with the private benefits 
of control, as acquirers with blockholders are less likely to use shares as payment method. 
 
Note that our pseudo R² ranges between 15.87% and 30.01%, which is somewhat smaller than the 
18.58% to 38.33 % range reported by Vermaelen & Xu (2014). Nevertheless, the model does a very 
good job in predicting acquisition payment method choice. Panel B of Table 3.5. shows that depending 
on the specification used, 83% or 84% of the deals use the expected payment method. Hence, 16% of 
the deals involve unexpected payment methods. Within the group of unexpected payment deals we 
find more unexpected stock deals than unexpected cash deals. This contradicts the findings in a U.S. 
setting by Vermaelen and Xu (2014), who justify the lack of unexpected equity issuance by arguing that 
                                                          
18 Note that in Vermaelen and Xu (2014) find no significant relation between hostility and payment method. 
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it would immediately send a warning sign to the target management that the bidder is trying to pay 
with overvalued stock. From our study it would seem that European targets are not concerned about 
this type of opportunistic behavior by acquiring firms. In the next section we test whether this 
assumption is justified. 
3.5. Short-term and long-term excess returns 
3.5.1 Announcement returns 
We observe a high incidence of cash paid deals as well as a relatively high incidence of unexpected 
payment deals. In contrast to U.S. acquirers, European firms do not seem to move towards their 
optimal capital structure (at least based on the Kayhan-Titman (2007) and Fama and French (2002) 
models).  
 
We now analyze whether investors react differently to expected and unexpected payment methods 
using an event study. If a company unexpectedly pays cash (stock) is this interpreted as a signal that 
the stock is undervalued (overvalued)? We use the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985) as the 
model of expected returns and an estimation window starting 360 days prior to the announcement 
and ending 60 days prior to the announcement. The event window is defined as [-1,+1], but results are 
robust to longer windows. The CAR of the acquirer is used as the dependent variable and our main 
variables of interest are dummies for the expected and unexpected cash and stock deals. Specifications 
1 and 2 are based on Vermaelen and Xu (2014), while specifications 3 and 4 are based on Uysal (2011). 
Following their approaches, we include control variables such as acquirer leverage, leverage deficit, an 
intra-industry dummy, relative size, as well as a dummy for tender offers, and hostile bids, a dummy 
for deals with multiple bidders, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. We also control for acquirer 
market-to-book, sales, ROA, runup, and annual stock return. In Specification 5 we add controls used in 
related studies: the level of stock market development (market capitalization/GDP), a cross-border 
dummy (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006), and target firm ROA, sales, and market-to-book (Li, 2013). 
All specifications include year, country, and industry fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 3.6. 
 
In the short run, whether or not bidders deviate from the optimal financing method does not affect 
their stock price. So European investors do not suspect a market timing motivation for moving away 
from the “optimal” financing method.  When U.S. firms announce acquisitions, Vermaelen and Xu 
(2014) find that stock prices fall when the financing method is consistent with the prediction of an  
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TABLE 3.6. Acquirer announcement returns. 
This table reports OLS regressions with the acquirer’s announcement return (CAR) as dependent variable. *,**,*** represent significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Window [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-1,+1]   [-5,+5] 
Anticipated cash -0.016  -0.013      -0.014  -0.018 
 (-1.41)  (-0.98)      (-1.00)  (-0.98) 
Anticipated stock -0.029*  -0.028      -0.026  -0.050* 
 (-1.80)  (-1.27)      (-1.17)  (-1.67) 
Unanticipated cash -0.010  0.031      0.031  0.002 
 (-0.51)  (0.72)      (0.73)  (0.04) 
Unanticipated stock -0.012  -0.007      -0.012  -0.022 
 (-0.66)  (-0.26)      (-0.46)  (-0.64) 
Acquirer deficit     -0.103***       
     (-2.72)       
Overleveraged acquirer       -0.018     
       (-1.16)     
Underleveraged acquirer       -0.024     
       (-1.51)     
Tender offer   0.012      0.010  0.002 
   (0.86)      (0.67)  (0.08) 
Relative size   0.030  0.031  0.031  0.032  0.042 
   (1.46)  (1.56)  (1.56)  (1.55)  (1.51) 
Hostile bid   -0.042  -0.044  -0.043  -0.036  -0.047 
   (-1.02)  (-1.11)  (-1.08)  (-0.86)  (-0.86) 
Intra-industry   0.010  0.010  0.011  0.012  -0.013 
   (0.82)  (0.78)  (0.93)  (0.98)  (-0.77) 
Acquirer sales   -0.001  -0.002  -0.003  0.00002  -0.005 
   (-0.40)  (-0.54)  (-0.96)  (0.01)  (-1.05) 
Acquirer avg leverage   -0.005  -0.001  -0.014  -0.003  -0.007 
   (-0.22)  (-0.05)  (-0.69)  (-0.14)  (-0.25) 
Acquirer market-to-book   -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  0.001 
   (-0.75)  (-0.71)  (-0.53)  (-0.54)  (0.31) 
Acquirer ROA   0.003  0.009  0.016  -0.0004  0.082 
   (0.08)  (0.23)  (0.39)  (-0.01)  (1.40) 
Acquirer runup   -0.094      -0.105  0.076 
   (-1.35)      (-1.49)  (0.81) 
Herfindahl index   0.001  0.006  -0.011  0.012  -0.056 
   (0.0)  (0.08)  (-0.15)  (0.15)  (-0.54) 
Acquirer stockreturn     -0.0002  -0.0002     
     (-0.85)  (-1.08)     
Cash only     0.011  0.010     
     (0.93)  (0.86)     
Marketcap/GDP         -0.0004  0.000 
         (-1.17)  (-0.65) 
Cross-border         -0.019  -0.002 
         (-1.38)  (-0.09) 
Multiple bidders     0.002  0.003  0.013  0.016 
     (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.46)  (0.45) 
Target ROA         0.016  -0.014 
         (0.62)  (-0.41) 
Target sales         -0.002  -0.002 
         (-0.67)  (-0.37) 
Target market-to-book         0.027  0.001 
         (0.79)  (0.01) 
Intercept 0.011  0.101  0.109  0.124  0.145  0.171 
 (1.37)  (1.23)  (1.32)  (1.49)  (1.60)  (1.43) 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R² 1.05  22.95  23.48  22.57  23.85  29.71 
Observations 505   446   446   446   446   446 
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optimal capital structure model. This short-term finding is subsequently confirmed by long-term 
negative returns. 
3.5.2 Long-term excess returns 
As the market may underreact to the financing choice, we also compute long-term abnormal returns 
following the Ibbotson RATS methodology (1975). If firms try to time the market, we should see long-
term negative excess returns when they pay with stock (and positive excess returns when they pay 
cash) (Agrawal et al., 1992).  This would especially be the case if the financing method is not predicted 
by a capital structure model. We use the Fama French - Carhart four-factor model to compute the 
normal returns (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997). Regional factors are obtained from the 
website of Kenneth R. French. Table 3.7. reports the abnormal returns up to 6, 12, and 24 months after 
the month of the acquisition announcement. Additionally, cumulative abnormal returns from the first 
month until 24 months after the announcement are shown in Figure 3.1., where we distinguish 
between expected and unexpected cash and equity payment. 
TABLE 3.7. Long-run abnormal returns. 
This table reports long-term abnormal returns of the acquirer up to two years after the acquisition. We used the 
Ibbotson RATS methodology. *,**,*** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Payment method  Ibbotson RATS (in months)   
Prediction Actual   (1,6) (1,12) (1,24) 
Cash Cash  6.19% ** 4.99% 12.92% * 
   1.98 1.04 1.76 
Stock Stock  -6.26% -1.45% -6.86% 
   -0.98 -0.16 -0.51 
Stock Cash  17.27% ** 25.10% * 42.94% ** 
   2.01 1.78 2.17 
Cash Stock  0.57% 2.27% -28.19% * 
      0.08 0.26 -1.93 
 
Expected cash deals are followed by long-term significantly positive abnormal returns of 12.92%. 
However, consistent with a market timing motivation, unexpected cash deals are followed by large 
significant long-term excess returns of 42.94%. At the same time, expected stock deals are not followed 
by significant long-term excess returns, in contrast to the unexpected stock deals that are followed by 
significant (at the 10% level) negative returns of -28.19%.  Hence, it seems that bidder undervaluation 
or overvaluation is an important factor driving the unexpected cash and equity deals in Europe. This 
suggests that, similar to U.S. firms (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014), deviating from the “optimal” financing 
method in Europe is also driven by market timing. However, in the U.S., target shareholders are 
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suspicious when a bidder can’t explain the financing choice by a move to an optimal capital structure, 
or by other (non-market timing related) factors suggested in the acquisition literature. Hence, firms 
cannot pay with stock when they don’t have a good “capital structure story” to tell. In Europe, target 
shareholders ignore the warning signal that the equity issue is “unexpected” according to our 
prediction model, and it turns out that this is a mistake, at least for the target shareholders who don’t 
sell out immediately after the announcement of the bid. 
Fig 3.1. Long-run abnormal returns (IRATS). 
 
 
3.6. Unexpected payment deals 
In this final section we devote special attention to the deals with unexpected payment methods. We 
use specification Model 3 of Table 3.5. in this section to determine which deals have unexpected 
payment methods. As such, we observe a higher incidence of unexpected stock (10%) deals compared 
to the unexpected cash deals (7%) which is exactly the opposite of what was observed in the U.S. 
(Vermaelen and Xu, 2014).  
On closer inspection of the cash paid deals (n=320), we observe a seasoned equity offering (SEO) for 
61 (19%) of the acquiring firms within one year after the acquisition announcement. Roughly, one out 
of five cash payers eventually raises equity through a seasoned equity offer. This indicates that firms 
refinance after the M&A announcement and as such move towards their optimal leverage (Fama and 
French, 2005). Furthermore, our measure lambda is higher for the cash payers that do an SEO 
afterwards (Λ = 0.075) compared to the cash payers that do not raise equity through an SEO (Λ = 
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0.046)19. This finding supports the idea that the firms that needed an equity payment the most (higher 
lambda) actually do an equity offer to move towards their optimal capital structure. In the U.S. sample, 
however, only 9% of the acquirers raise equity in the year following the acquisition (Vermaelen and 
Xu, 2014). Taken together, this might explain to some extent why we observe more cash deals in 
Europe compared to the U.S. Additionally, the strong bank dependence in Europe as well as the good 
relationships of European companies with banks (Antoniou et al., 2008), can explain why acquirers 
delay the equity financing and rely on short-term debt to pay the target with cash. This indirect 
evidence, however, suggests that European firms move towards their optimal leverage with some 
delay, but that they care about corporate control, information asymmetry, and stock valuation when 
choosing the method of payment. 
 
While the seasoned equity offers post-M&A partially explain the occurrence of unexpected cash deals, 
they do not help to explain the high number of unexpected equity deals. The fact that we observe so 
many unexpected equity deals combined with the negative long-term abnormal returns indicates that 
European acquirers are able to time the market.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
To some extent, European and American acquisition financing is driven by the same factors: tender 
offers, acquisitions with multiple bidders, and bidders with illiquid shares are more likely to be financed 
with cash. However, the capital structure hypothesis which predicts that the financing method helps 
firms to move to their target capital structure is rejected in the European sample. Although for the 
typical firm a cash transaction moves it further away from its target capital structure than a stock 
transaction, transactions are typically financed with cash. We believe the difference can be partially 
explained by the fact that blockholders are more frequent in European firms than in U.S. firms, i.e., the 
fact that blockholders are more dominant in the bidder and the target encourages bidders concerned 
about losing control to pay cash. This is especially important in deals where there are large 
blockholders in the target. We find evidence consistent with this control hypothesis: cash payment is 
more likely if the target or the acquirer is controlled by a blockholder. We also find evidence consistent 
with the information asymmetry hypothesis: targets are reluctant to accept bidder shares if the bidder 
is headquartered in a different country. Hence, the prevalence of cross-border transactions in Europe 
may also explain the preference for cash payment, even at the expense of a less optimal overall capital 
structure. 
                                                          
19 The difference is significant at 5% significance level, with a T-statistic equal to -2.27. 
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Finally, market timing seems to be an important driver of financing choices of European bidders. Both 
the very positive long-term returns following unexpected cash deals, and the very negative long-term 
returns following unexpected equity deals, are consistent with the hypothesis that misvaluation of the 
bidder’s shares drives the financing choice. It is remarkable, however, that European target 
shareholders ignore the warning sign that based on capital structure and other control/information 
asymmetry considerations, equity financing makes no economic sense. Moreover, unexpected equity 
transactions are more common than unexpected cash transactions in Europe, which is the opposite of 
what Vermaelen and Xu (2014) found in their U.S. sample. 
3.7.1 Contribution 
This study contributes to the debate of firms moving towards an optimal capital structure. We confirm 
earlier research in that firms do not move instantaneously towards their optimal leverage. In our 
European setting, agency considerations as well as problems of information asymmetry are more 
important for acquirers than moving towards the optimal leverage. As such, market frictions play a 
considerable role in European financing decisions.  
On the other hand, it seems that European acquirers are skilled at timing the market when choosing 
their acquisition financing. It is puzzling, however, that target firms accept these overvalued shares. 
We acknowledge that more research will be needed to determine the reasons why market timing 
shows to be easier in Europe. But this finding could be very valuable to many financing decisions. 
Market timing is an important hypothesis in M&A research as well as SEO research and the capital 
structure research in general. If the likelihood of market timing in European firms is higher than in the 
U.S., many other U.S.-based paradigms might be questionable. 
3.7.2 Limitations and avenues for future research 
As any other empirical study, this paper also has some limitations which at the same time can provide 
fruitful avenues for future research. First, our methodology rests on the assumption that the capital 
structure of the average European firm (in the entire Compustat universe) is at its optimal leverage. 
Given that we do not observe large differences between the optimal and actual leverage our 
assumption seems valid. If this would not be the case, our model predicts the commonly applied 
leverage rather than optimal leverage. Given that the goal of our paper was to compare European firms 
to U.S. firms we closely follow the approach of Vermaelen and Xu (2014). We highly encourage other 
scholars to further investigate whether European leverage is at its optimal level on average.  
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Second, even though comparing financing behavior of European companies to U.S. companies is an 
important question, it does engender some specific issues. Internal validity might be threatened given 
that accounting rules can be applied or interpreted differently in different countries within Europe. We 
try to take this into account by distinguishing between continental Europe and the U.K. when predicting 
the optimal leverage and by including country fixed effects in our models to control for country specific 
variance. However, we cannot entirely rule out potential biases. Hence, future research can dig deeper 
into country specific factors explaining cross-country differences within Europe. As we have 
demonstrated important differences in financing choices in Europe compared to the U.S. more 
research on the intrinsic differences can be extremely valuable. 
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Appendix A: Definitions of variables. 
Amihud illiquidity Amihud illiquidity measure defined as: 
 
𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
1
𝐷𝑖𝑦
∑
|𝑅𝑖𝑦𝑑|
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑦𝑑
𝐷𝑖𝑦
𝑡=1
 
 With Riyd the return of stock i on day d of year y and VOLDiyd the daily 
volume in Euro 
Blockholder Dummy equals one if one shareholder holds 25% or more of the 
shares 
Capital gains tax Tax rate on capital gains (in cash paid acquisitions) 
Cross-border Dummy equals one the target and acquirer are located in different 
countries 
Excess cash Value of the combined cash (target and acquirer) in excess of the 
industry average (normalized by total assets) 
Hostile bid Dummy equals one if board did not recommend the offer to the 
shareholders 
Insider ownership Dummy equals one if management and employees hold 5% or more 
of the shares 
Institutional ownership Dummy equals one if institutional investors hold 5% or more of the 
shares 
Intra-industry Dummy equals one if target and acquirer are active in the same 
industry 
Lambda (Λ) Difference between pro forma (cash pay) leverage and optimal 
leverage minus the difference between pro forma (shares pay) 
leverage and optimal leverage 
Leverage Net debt over total assets; net debt is the sum of current liabilities 
and long-term debt minus cash above industry mean (normalized by 
assets) 
Leverage deficit Difference between the actual and the optimal leverage 
Market-to-book Ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets 
Market capitalization / 
GDP 
Country total market capitalization divided by gross domestic product 
Multiple bidders Dummy equals one if multiple firms made a bid for the target 
Overleveraged Dummy equals one if leverage deficit is in the highest quartile 
Premium Transaction value minus the average target market value four weeks 
prior to announcement divided by the latter 
95 
 
Relative size Average of the target’s enterprise value (42-30 days prior to 
announcement) divided by the acquirer’s enterprise value 
ROA EBIT divided by total assets 
Runup Cumulative abnormal return of window [-42,-30] relative to 
announcement date 
R&D dummy Dummy equals one if the firm has R&D expenses  
R&D / Sales Ratio of R&D expenses on sales 
SGA / Sales Selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by sales 
Stockreturn Annual stock returns 
Tangibility Property, plant, and equipment divided by sales 
Taxshield Ratio of depreciations and amortizations over total assets 
Tender offer Dummy equals one if a formal cash offer, for a determined duration, 
was made to the target shareholders 
Toehold Dummy equals one if the acquirer holds a stake in the target firm 
prior to the announcement 
Underleveraged Dummy equals one if leverage deficit is in the lowest quartile 
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Chapter 4 
Acquisition premium: The interplay of debt financing and target firm’s R&D 
 
V. Mataignea, W. De Maeseneireb, and M. Luypaertb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The height of premia paid in acquisitions is of great importance  given the vast amounts paid to target 
shareholders and the disappointing returns realized by acquirers. In this letter, we provide evidence 
on how target-related R&D, acquirer debt financing, and the interaction of both affect the acquisition 
premium. Based on a sample of 407 listed European acquisitions between 1997 and 2010, we 
demonstrate a positive effect of both target R&D and debt financing on the premium. Yet, when 
acquirers finance the acquisition of a R&D-related target with debt, the positive effects on the 
premium paid disappear. Hence, we demonstrate that the R&D funding gap also affects M&A 
decisions. 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
The acquisition premium paid by acquiring firms in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) has been an 
important topic of interest to both finance and strategy scholars. Research has typically focused on 
acquirer and deal characteristics. Only more recently, also target characteristics were studied as 
drivers of the acquisition premium. Target R&D investments in high-tech industries, for instance, were 
found to positively affect the premium (Laamanen, 2007). The R&D funding gap20 literature, however, 
indicates how difficulties to finance R&D investments can affect firms’ investment decisions (Takalo 
and Tanayama, 2010). Moreover, Vladimirov (2015) demonstrated how the acquirer’s financing 
sources also affect the premium paid. He argues that firms with access to “competitive financing”, 
being debt financing rather than equity financing, pay higher premia. As such, this paper studies how 
these two determinants – target R&D and debt financing - interact in terms of the acquisition premium 
paid. 
 
The acquisition premium is an important aspect of an M&A transaction as it reflects the potential 
value creation as well as the relative bargaining power of the target and acquiring firm. Furthermore, 
average acquisition premia range between 40% and 50% (Kisgen et al., 2009; Dimopoulos and 
Sacchetto, 2014) and hence represent huge dollar values. As such, more research on which deals 
receive higher premia is highly valuable. We build on the arguments of Laamanen (2007) according to 
which R&D-intensive targets receive higher premia because these R&D investments represent 
potential synergies. While Laamanen restricts his study to high-tech industries, we impose no industry 
restrictions as the value of R&D investments is not restricted to high-tech industries only (Chesbrough 
and Crowther, 2006). Also in manufacturing industries, for instance, firms have to keep innovating in 
order to stay competitive. In light of the R&D funding gap literature, however, we investigate how 
financing sources for these target firms with R&D affect the acquisition premium. More specifically, 
we study the impact of debt financing on the premium for R&D targets. As such, we follow Vladimirov 
(2015) and acknowledge the importance of financing sources for acquisition premia. We do, however, 
consider the interaction between R&D investments and debt financing on acquisition premia. Hence, 
we add to the R&D funding gap literature by studying R&D and financing sources as contingency 
factors of acquisition premia.  
 
This paper investigates the drivers of acquisition premia in 407 acquisitions between European listed 
firms, announced between 1997 and 2010. Given the research focus on debt financing in high 
                                                          
20 The R&D funding gap refers to the inability of firms to raise financing for R&D-related investments. 
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information asymmetry projects, the European context is an extremely interesting setting as bank-
relationships are typically more developed compared to the U.S. context (Antoniou et al., 2008). Our 
results confirm the positive effect of target R&D investments and debt financing on the premium paid, 
but only under certain conditions. Debt financing allows to pay a higher premium, unless the target 
has R&D investments. As such, our results provide empirical evidence of the funding gap for R&D 
investments in a European M&A setting. 
4.2. Hypotheses development 
Based on the extant literature two main drivers of acquisition premia can be identified: anticipated 
synergies and negotiating power (Calcagno and Falconieri, 2014). First, expected synergies, either 
rationally predicted or overestimated due to hubris (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), induce bidders to 
pay a higher premium compared to the stand-alone value of the target. Second, more negotiating 
power for the target, either due to multiple bidders or strong target management resistance, will also 
lead the acquirer to pay more for the target firm. Empirical studies have yielded a couple of robust 
findings in terms of determinants of acquisition premia. For instance, large and high performing 
acquirers were found to pay higher premia (Moeller et al., 2004; Kim et al., 2011; Hayward and 
Hambrick, 1997). Furthermore, large deals and deals with multiple bidders are also associated with 
larger premia (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; Reuer et al., 2012). Target size, on the other hand, 
negatively affects the premium as was demonstrated by Alexandridis et al. (2013), among others. 
Finally, cash paid deals typically come with higher acquisition premia (Slusky and Caves, 1991; Huang 
and Walkling, 1987; Fishman, 1989). 
 
Synergies are typically referred to as the key motivation for the deal and hence, affect the acquirer 
returns as well as the premium paid. Finding evidence of the presence of synergies, however, has 
proven to be a challenging task (Devos et al., 2009). One source of potential synergies are the R&D 
investments by the target firm (Laamanen, 2007). Potential acquirers will carry out a due diligence to 
gather more information regarding the value of the target’s assets and R&D investments, resulting in 
heterogeneous valuations for the target firm. The eventual acquirer of a target with R&D is expected 
to value the R&D investments higher than the stock market does, leading to a premium otherwise a 
discount would be observed. Hence, the acquirer sees potential synergies or value-creation potential 
in the target firm’s R&D investments. Provided that target R&D investments are a source of potential 
synergies, targets with R&D investments are expected to receive a higher acquisition premium 
(Laamanen, 2007). This interesting study by Laamanen, however, does not consider the sources of 
financing used to acquire these targets with R&D investments. 
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Finding resources to finance R&D investments is typically quite a challenging task (Kochhar, 1996). The 
high information asymmetry associated with R&D investments as well as the lack of collateral provided 
by these R&D investments makes that investors are typically hesitant to finance R&D projects (Hall, 
2002). Consequently, the required rate of return by external investors is much higher compared to the 
required rate of return of the insider (Szewczyk et al., 1996). Hence, financing R&D investments is 
extremely costly and sometimes virtually impossible (Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012). Research 
has indicated that R&D investments are typically equity financed if internal resources are not available 
(Brown and Petersen, 2009). The high information asymmetry and confidentiality related to R&D 
investments, the lack of collateral provided by the specific investment, as well as the increased costs 
of financial distress explain why debt financing is less likely for R&D investments (Brown et al., 2009). 
Equity financiers are more willing to provide financing as they require no collateral and only share in 
the upside returns (Brown et al., 2009; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The problems of obtaining debt 
financing are mostly studied in the context of young, high-growth firms given their lack of reputation 
or other forms of collateral. Larger firms might, however, still obtain debt financing based on their 
reputation or relationship with the bank, but the terms might be more strenuous (Herrera and Minetti, 
2007). Furthermore, David et al. (2008) highlight that relational debt in contrast to transactional debt 
can be used in the context of R&D investments. Relational debt, which is a private transaction such as 
roll over loans, is characterized by tighter corporate governance mechanisms to accommodate the 
higher risk and uncertainty of R&D investments (David et al., 2008). This confirms that (long-term) 
bank relationships enable firms to obtain debt financing also for riskier investments such as R&D. 
Especially in a European context, which is more bank-oriented compared to the U.S. (Antoniou et al., 
2008), debt financing is still an important resource for R&D investments. 
 
Recently, Vladimirov (2015) indicated that the sources of acquisition financing have a significant 
impact on the premium paid. Prior studies, typically control for the method of payment, either cash, 
stock, or a combination, while Vladimirov introduces the method of financing: either cash, debt, stock, 
or a combination. In his sample of cash paid deals, Vladimirov observes a 5% to 8% lower premium if 
the acquisition is not financed with debt. He argues that if firms do not have access to competitive 
financing, being debt financing, they have no other choice but to use the more expensive equity 
financing. The higher required return by the financier of equity financing will constrain the acquirer’s 
negotiation flexibility and typically lead to a lower premium. Debt financing, on the other hand, is 
more competitive in terms of costs and allows for more managerial flexibility which enables the 
acquirer to bid higher.  
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First, we investigate whether R&D investments in target firms are perceived as sources of synergies 
leading to higher acquisition premia, outside the high-tech industry. Second, we test whether debt 
financing has a positive effect on the premium offered in our European sample. The main contribution 
of this paper, however, is to test whether the R&D funding gap affects acquisition premia. The high 
information asymmetry related to R&D investments creates a lemons problem (Hubbard, 1998; 
Akerlof, 1970). As such, debt providers will try to mitigate the adverse selection risk by requiring a 
higher return and increasing their monitoring activities. This in turn will refrain the acquirer from 
paying a higher premium for R&D-related targets. Hence, we hypothesize that debt financed acquirers 
of targets with R&D will not pay higher premia. 
4.3. Sample selection and Methodology 
Our sample is drawn from the Thomson One SDC database and includes all deals between listed 
European21 firms, announced between 1997 and 2010. Next, we exclude deals where no majority 
stake was obtained through the acquisition. Furthermore, we exclude financial companies and require 
financial statement information to be available in Datastream for both the target and acquirer. Finally, 
we collect deal financing information on Zephyr and Reuters LPC Dealscan. Additionally, we hand-
collect data in Factiva, which is based upon media searches, to complement the often missing 
financing information in databases. Our final sample comprises 407 acquisitions with acquirers active 
in a broad range of industries. As such, the three most represented industries in our sample are: 
Manufacturing (39%), Services (24%) and Transportation and Communication (15%). 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics. 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the most important variables. 
 Mean Median Min Max  S.D. 
Premium 41.26% 30.79% -74.08% 354.50% 56.53% 
Acquirer ROA 8.54% 8.71% -22.05% 29.98% 9.47% 
Acquirer size  
(thousands euro) 
7 723 787 922 634 7 434 92 100 000 17 000 000 
Target size 
(thousands euro) 
828 083 76 825 1 241 23 500 000 2 956 539 
Relative deal size  52.08% 28.04% 0.33% 318.44% 69.57% 
(trans.value/acq mark.value)     
Debt financed 24.8% (N = 101)    
R&D target 28.5% (N = 116)    
Multiple bidders 9.8% (N = 40)    
Cash paid 50.1% (N = 204)    
N 407         
                                                          
21 Headquarters of both the target and acquirer have to be in one of the EU-27 member states: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Republic 
of Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
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In Table 4.1. we present univariate statistics of the most important variables. First, the average 
premium paid, measured as the ratio of the difference between the transaction value and the target’s 
market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement relative to the latter (Reuer et al., 2012)  is 41.3%. 
As such, European acquirers pay premia which are comparable to U.S. acquirers in terms of size 
(Eckbo, 2009). Furthermore, 116 out of the 407 targets have reported R&D expenses, meaning that 
approximately 70% of the targets do not have R&D expenses. This number is slightly below the 38% 
of all western European firms reporting R&D expenses reported by Munari et al. (2010). Finally, 
approximately 25% of the deals is entirely debt-financed. 
 
In Table 4.2. we report the multivariate OLS regressions with the premium as dependent variable. We 
include several control variables based on the existing literature. First, we include a dummy for 
multiple bidders, and for cash paid deals, next to acquirer size and performance as well as target size 
and relative size. Additionally, we include dummies for tender offers, hostile deals, intra-industry22 
deals, and cross-border deals (Reuer et al., 2012; Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2003; Coff, 1999). 
Finally, target market-to-book is included (Laamanen, 2007) as well as acquirer financial constraints 
proxied by the acquirer’s leverage and cash flow ratio (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). Models (1) to 
(3) are run on the entire sample and we gradually add our variables of interest: Target R&D dummy, 
Debt financing dummy, and the interaction term. Next, we apply a sample split (models (4) and (5)) to 
investigate which factors affect the acquisition premium dependent on whether or not the deal is 
financed through debt. All models include year and country dummies to control for unobserved 
macro-economic factors. The variance inflation factors never exceed the critical limit of ten (VIFmax = 
7.85 in model (5)) as such multicollinearity is not expected to affect our results. 
 
4.4. Results 
The results in Table 4.2. largely confirm previous findings regarding the drivers of acquisition premia. 
For instance, acquirer size and relative deal size positively affect the premium, while target size and 
market-to-book are negatively correlated with the premium paid. When acquirer and target are active 
in the same industry, we also observe a higher premium. Furthermore, model (2) confirms that R&D-
related targets receive a higher premium of 11% on average compared to targets without R&D. Hence, 
we generalize the findings of Laamanen (2007) and provide evidence of the value of R&D as potential 
synergies in a broader set of industries. Additionally, we verify the assertions of Vladimirov (2015) in 
that debt financing allows acquirers to pay a higher premium of 17% on average. However, the 
                                                          
22 Intra-industry deals are deals with the target and acquiring firm active in the same 3-digit SIC industry. 
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negative interaction term demonstrates that the acquisition of a R&D-related target through debt 
financing will not lead to a higher premium. Figure 4.1. provides additional insights into the 
relationship between debt financing ,target R&D investments, and the acquisition premium. In fact, 
debt financed acquirers will pay higher premia for targets without R&D while acquirers without debt 
financing will pay higher premia for targets with R&D investments. Results in models (4) and (5) yield 
the same conclusion: in case of debt financing acquirers do not pay higher premia for targets with 
R&D. Management’s discretion is severely tightened when they choose to acquire a R&D-related 
target with debt financing as is reflected in the premium. Hence, we provide evidence consistent with 
the adverse selection problem of financing R&D investments.  
Table 4.2. Multivariate analyses. 
This table reports the OLS regressions with the premium as dependent variable. The coefficients of the OLS 
regressions are reported as well as their level of significance: *,**,*** respectively significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%. 
Dependent variable: premium  Sample split 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
         No debt fin Debt fin 
Constant -0.589 -0.449 -0.450  -0.503 -0.595 
Target R&D  0.110 * 0.180**  0.148 * -0.067 
Debt financing  0.157 * 0.241***    
Target R&D * Debt financing  -0.309**    
Multiple bidders -0.022 -0.022 -0.010  0.024 -0.098 
Acquirer ROA 0.325 0.338 0.323  0.305 -1.078 
Acquirer size 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.077***  0.054** 0.162*** 
Target size -0.044* -0.064*** -0.063**  -0.032 -0.141** 
Deal size 0.164*** 0.183*** 0.180***  0.155*** 0.360 
Cash payment -0.020 -0.107 -0.110    
Tender offer 0.061 0.038 0.037  0.051 0.145 
Hostile bid 0.060 0.035 0.052  0.046 -0.086 
MTB -0.015** -0.016** -0.017**  -0.017* -0.014 
Intra-industry 0.111* 0.123** 0.123**  0.086 0.072 
Cross-border 0.063 0.045 0.059  0.078 -0.150 
Acquirer leverage 0.147 0.144 0.131  0.116 0.085 
Acquirer CF ratio 0.027 0.030 0.013  0.063 0.020 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 407 407 407  306 101 
R² 16.15 17.49 18.48   21.94 41.38 
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Figure 4.1. Interaction effect of debt financing and target firm R&D investments on the acquisition 
premium. 
  
4.5. Conclusion  
This study investigates how the presence of R&D in the target firm and the acquirer’s financing sources 
interact in terms of acquisition premia. Our analyses are based on a sample of 407 European listed 
deals between 1997 and 2010. In line with our hypotheses we confirm that the presence of R&D 
investments in the target firm as well as debt financing positively affect the acquisition premium. The 
interaction, however, is negative. Hence, acquiring a target firm with R&D by means of debt financing 
will not give rise to a higher premium. This finding confirms that debt financing for R&D investments 
is characterized by higher costs or higher monitoring which severely restricts managerial flexibility.  
 
As such, we contribute to the R&D funding gap literature as well as the transaction cost economics 
literature. While large firms do not have a gap as such to obtain financing for R&D investments, they 
do encounter higher costs  due to the tighter governance mechanisms attached to this relational debt. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider the impact of R&D financing difficulties in a 
M&A setting. Hence, we help to uncover the complex drivers of acquisition premia.  
 
Despite our efforts, this research also has some limitations which could provide interesting avenues 
for future research. First, we focus on debt financing, but a more in-depth analysis of the implications 
of different sources of financing on the premium paid could yield new insights. It might also be fruitful 
to explore other sources of information asymmetry or other types of interactions or contingencies. 
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Finally, given that the level of bank dependence of European firms is relatively high compared to, for 
instance, the U.S., it would be interesting to analyze whether the same dynamics are observed in other 
contexts.  
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Chapter 5 
Competitive effects for rivals of divestitures and stand-alone acquisitions 
V. Mataigne a, S. Manigart a,b, and M. Luypaert b 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on rivals has received little attention in the M&A 
literature, both empirically and theoretically. Drawing on the competitive dynamics literature, we 
study how acquisitions of divested assets and stand-alone targets affect rivals differently and we 
further distinguish between public and private stand-alone targets. Using a unique sample of 776 
direct rivals in 182 European deals, we show that rivals of divested assets realize lower returns than 
rivals of stand-alone targets and this relation is stronger when acquirers gain more. Rivals of private 
targets outperform rivals of public targets, but this effect is attenuated when acquirers gain more. 
Taken together, our findings are in line with a lower relative efficiency for rivals of divested assets and 
an increase in information availability for rivals of private targets. Hence, we advance the M&A 
literature by showing more nuanced wealth effects for direct rivals in M&As. 
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5.1. Introduction 
In April 2014, two of the world’s largest cement producers, Lafarge (France) and Holcim (Switzerland), 
announced their merger agreement. On the day of the announcement, the share prices of Lafarge and 
Holcim were up by 8.90% and 6.86%, respectively, representing a $2.02 billion gain for Lafarge 
shareholders and a $1.83 billion gain for Holcim shareholders. The same day, the shares of Irish-based 
rival CRH also rose by 4.04% ($845 million), German rival HeidelbergCement saw an increase of 3.40% 
($586 million), and the third rival Cemex (Mexico) noticed an increase of 3.63% ($677 million). These 
huge changes in valuations indicate that the implications of M&As reach far beyond the acquirer and 
target directly involved in the process. 
 
While the consequences of an M&A for acquirer and target firms are well documented, less is known 
about the impact of M&As on direct rivals. Typically, finance scholars have focused on target and 
acquirer returns, thereby ignoring the strategic environment. Moreover, empirical studies on rival 
effects are inconsistent. On average, rivals gain small positive abnormal returns around the M&A 
announcement of two competitors (Clougherty and Duso, 2009), although some authors find zero or 
even negative rival returns (Eckbo, 1983). Moreover, the explanations as to why rivals are affected are 
highly fragmented (Clougherty and Duso, 2011). This suggests that shifting the focus back to the 
strategic nature of M&As can help to understand how M&A announcements affect direct rivals. 
 
In this paper, we investigate how rivals of horizontal23 M&As are affected, depending on the type of 
target. We first differentiate between rivals of divested assets and stand-alone targets and then 
between rivals of public and private stand-alone targets. Prior research has highlighted that the type 
of target drives acquirer returns: Acquirers of divested assets outperform acquirers of stand-alone 
targets (Laamanen, Brauer, and Junna, 2014) and acquirers of private targets outperform acquirers of 
public targets (Capron and Shen, 2007). These findings indicate fundamental differences between 
acquisitions of distinct types of targets and raise the question as to whether rivals are also affected 
differently by acquisitions of divested assets and public or private targets. Nevertheless, research on 
how rivals are affected by M&As has exclusively focused on M&As involving public targets, despite the 
observation that the vast majority of all M&A deals worldwide involve private targets or divested 
assets (Martynova and Renneboog, 2011). Hence, studying how distinct types of targets impact rivals 
differently is non-trivial in both theory and practice. 
                                                          
23 We focus on horizontal deals (i.e., in which the target and acquirer operate in the same industry), since rivals 
of the target and the acquiring firm are more likely to be comparable in these deals, allowing for a more 
straightforward interpretation of rival effects (Fee and Thomas, 2004). 
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Our premise is that M&As are competitive moves that not only impact the combining firms but also 
affect the entire competitive scenery in which they operate, particularly their direct rivals. Competitive 
dynamics theory suggests that a firm’s competitive position depends on two fundamental principles: 
(1) access to resources and using them efficiently and (2) a thorough understanding of the competitive 
battle the firm faces to be able to compete and defend the firm’s competitive advantage (Warren, 
2002; Grant, 2010). We argue that M&As affect rivals by changing the nature of relative efficiency and 
available information and thus impact rivals’ competitive positions. The importance of these two 
effects is expected to differ depending on the type of target. The acquisition of divested assets entails 
a parent company willing to sell the assets. It is well documented that parent companies mainly divest 
assets that are non-core to their business line and/or which are underperforming (Lee and Madhavan, 
2010). Laamanen et al. (2014) have found that a better asset fit with the acquirer compared to the 
selling parent allows acquirers of divested assets to obtain higher returns. We propose that better 
utilization of the assets post-M&A will negatively impact the relative competitive positions of rival 
firms. This change in relative position should lead to less positive rival reactions following the 
acquisition announcement of divested assets compared to that of stand-alone targets. This effect will 
be stronger if markets interpret the M&A announcement as more positive for the acquirer. 
 
Within the group of stand-alone targets, we further distinguish between public and private targets, 
since they differ in information availability (Perry and Rainey, 1988). The scarcity of information about 
privately held firms is an established finding (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008) and can be exploited by 
acquiring firms during the merger negotiation (Capron and Shen, 2007). However, the acquisition 
event itself as well as the integration of the formerly private target into a publicly quoted acquirer will 
produce additional information on the target for all market participants. Enhanced media exposure as 
well as analyst coverage will further decrease information asymmetry (Otchere, 2007). We advance 
that information spillover allows rivals to strengthen their competitive position, leading to more 
positive rival reactions at the acquisition announcement of a private compared to a public target. This 
effect will be attenuated, however, when acquirers benefit more from the acquisition. 
 
To test our propositions, we use a unique hand-collected sample of rivals of divested assets and public 
and private targets. Our dataset is composed of deals that were analyzed by the European Commission 
(EC) under the antitrust legislation between 1997 and 2011. Experts of the EC have scrutinized these 
deals and identified the directly competing firms. Hence, while the rival literature typically uses broad 
industry classification codes to identify long lists of sector peers, our sample has the important 
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advantage of only consisting of directly competing rivals. This allows us to study real competitive 
effects rather than industry changes. We therefore identify only 4.26 direct rivals, on average, per deal 
(i.e., 776 rivals in 182 M&As) compared to, for example, the 75.55 sector peers Fee and Thomas (2004) 
find. 
 
The empirical results confirm our predictions. We find lower rival wealth effects after the acquisition 
of divested assets compared to the acquisition of stand-alone targets and this difference is stronger 
for more positive acquirer wealth effects. Further, compared to rivals of public targets, rivals of private 
targets experience more positive performance effects, although this effect is attenuated for more 
positive acquirer wealth effects. Several robustness tests confirm our theory and findings. 
 
The main contributions of our study are as follows. First, we contribute to the strategic management 
literature by extending the applicability of competitive dynamics theory to the M&A context. Prior 
studies on rivals of M&As mainly rely on the finance literature to study valuation effects (Clougherty 
and Duso, 2009). Given the strategic and competitive nature of M&As, competitive dynamics theory 
helps to refocus on the core aspects of competition in an M&A setting. Second, we differentiate 
between rivals of divested assets and private and public targets and show a more nuanced picture of 
rival spillover effects. Studying different types of acquisitions allows us to identify different channels 
through which rivals are affected by M&A announcements. Third, we empirically advance the rival 
literature by including only direct rivals rather than using a broad industry definition of rivals. 
 
5.2. Theoretical Background 
The aim of this paper is to build on competitive dynamics theory to provide a better understanding of 
rival valuation effects following M&A announcements. The competitive dynamics literature studies 
the impact of competitive moves, which are visible actions of a firm, on their rivals (Venkataraman, 
Chen, and MacMillan, 1997; Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal, and Wan, 2005). M&As are highly visible to 
rivals. As such, competitive dynamics theory is well suited to study the effects of horizontal M&As. 
Nevertheless, few studies have used competitive dynamics theory to study M&A effects (Haleblian, 
McNamara, Kolev, and Dykes, 2012) or, more specifically, how rivals are affected by an M&A involving 
one of their close competitors. We provide a brief overview of the literature before developing our 
hypotheses. 
 
The majority of studies on rival effects at M&A announcement have documented positive effects of 
M&As for rivals of public targets, explained by three main mechanisms. First, a lower number of 
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industry players post-M&A increases collusion potential or buyer power vis-à-vis suppliers and 
customers, which generates positive rival effects (Eckbo, 1983, 1985; Fee and Thomas, 2004). Second, 
the finding of mergers being clustered in merger waves can explain why rivals are positively affected: 
An M&A within the industry increases the acquisition likelihood of other industry incumbents (Song 
and Walkling, 2000). Third, the productive efficiency hypothesis encompasses all cost improvements 
related to production, marketing, and distribution post-M&A (Fee and Thomas, 2004). Markets expect 
rivals to be able to achieve comparable efficiency gains, which explains positive rival returns. In 
contrast, some studies have found negative wealth effects for rival firms, which have been explained 
by efficiency improvements for the combining entities without spillover effects for rivals through pre-
emptive merger motives or intensified competition (Shahrur, 2005; Clougherty and Duso, 2011). The 
mixed and sometimes contradictory findings from prior studies thus incite more research on why rival 
wealth is affected by M&As. 
 
5.2.1. M&As in the strategic management literature 
 
At the core of competitive dynamics lies the concept of competition. Two main determinants of a 
firm’s competitive position are a firm’s resource base and its access to information (Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Wan, and Yiu, 1999; Baum and Korn, 1996). First, resources are the fundamental sources of value 
creation within firms (Warren, 2002). Having access to resources and using them efficiently are 
prerequisites to compete in any market (Barney, 1991; Sirmon, Gove, and Hitt, 2008). Within the 
competitive landscape all firms vie for access to resources to defend or strengthen their competitive 
advantage. Hence, acquisitions are competitive moves in the battle for resources (Warren, 2002). In a 
rational world, firms will acquire resources only when the new resources are expected to create value 
beyond the price paid (Barney, 1986). 
 
The strategic importance of information about competitors is a second determinant in competitive 
dynamics literature in general (Barnett, 1997) and information economics in particular (Capron and 
Shen, 2007). Through the use of competitor analysis, competitor information is useful to rivals’ 
strategy formulation processes (Prescott and Smith, 1987; Ghoshal and Westney, 1991; Chen, 1996; 
Bloodgood and Bauerschmidt, 2002). A thorough understanding of a firm’s competitors can be turned 
into a competitive advantage (Porter, 1980; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Competitive intelligence 
enables a firm to better react and anticipate to changes in the competitive environment (Tsai, Su, and 
Chen, 2011) and consequently improve its performance. 
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In what follows, we build on these two channels of competition to hypothesize how distinct types of 
M&As affect rivals differently. 
 
5.2.2 Divested assets versus stand-alone targets 
Every acquisition gives the acquirer access to new resources and new value-creating opportunities, 
creating a potential threat for rival firms, all other things being equal. To understand a firm’s 
competitive position, its access to and efficiency in deploying resources should be assessed in relative 
terms, compared to competing firms (Smith, Ferrier, and Ndofor, 2001). We propose that the 
efficiency with which acquirers deploy the target’s newly acquired assets depends on the type of 
target. Before the acquisition, divested assets, in contrast to stand-alone targets, are embedded 
within a larger corporate structure in which the parent company typically decides  to sell the assets. It 
is well established that sellers of divested assets mainly sell their non-core, underperforming assets 
(John and Ofek, 1995; Chang, 1996). Divisions that are core to the parent and fit with its overall 
strategy or divisions that outperform are typically not up for sale (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995). 
 
In contrast, an acquirer of divested assets typically has a better fit with the divested assets compared 
to the seller (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Laamanen et al., 2014). Divested assets are hence shifted 
from corporates in which their fit was low to new corporates in which their fit is high. The utilization 
of divested assets is therefore expected to improve significantly post-M&A, explaining acquirer value 
increases after the announcement of the acquisition of divested assets. Deals involving stand-alone 
targets, on the other hand, are not typically motivated by underperformance, nor is there a 
consistently better asset fit with the acquirer (Draper and Paudyal, 2006). In line with these 
arguments, acquirers of divested assets are found to have higher announcement returns compared to 
acquirers of stand-alone targets (Laamanen et al., 2014). 
 
We expect that these specific characteristics of divested asset acquisitions have implications for rival 
firms. Due to the transfer of divested assets to an acquirer with a better fit and improved asset 
utilization, the competitive position of the acquirer will improve more strongly than when acquiring a 
stand-alone company. Hence, the relative position of the rival firms is expected to be more negatively 
affected in an acquisition of divested assets than in a stand-alone acquisition. Hence, we hypothesize 
the following. 
H1: Rivals of divested assets experience lower returns compared to rivals of stand-alone 
acquisitions. 
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We propose that this relation will be moderated by acquirer returns. Higher acquirer returns result 
from a unique fit between the target and acquiring firm (Barney, 1988). Hence, a higher acquirer 
return should reflect a better asset fit or greater efficiency improvement potential for the acquiring 
firm, leading to a worsened relative competitive position for rivals. Since improved asset fit is a primary 
driver of value creation in divested assets, a high acquirer return is especially bad news for rivals of 
divested asset acquisitions. Given that M&As of stand-alone companies are less driven by 
considerations of improved asset fit, higher acquirer returns should not have an equally strong 
negative effect on rivals of stand-alone M&As. This leads to our second hypothesis. 
H2: Higher acquirer returns reinforce the negative effect on rivals of divested assets compared to 
stand-alone targets. 
5.2.3 Stand-alone: Private versus public targets 
Information, a second central determinant of competition, is also affected differently depending on 
the type of target. Within the group of stand-alone targets, acquirers of privately held targets 
consistently and significantly outperform acquirers of public targets (Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin, 
2006). This finding is explained by a difference in information availability. There is less publicity for a 
deal involving a private target due to its opaque nature. This, in turn, leads to fewer bidders, lower 
competition for the deal, and a lower acquisition premium compared to public targets (Capron and 
Shen, 2007). This explains why acquirers of private targets have higher announcement returns than 
acquirers of public targets. 
 
We argue that the difference in the information availability of the target also affects rival firms. Ex 
ante, a private target is more opaque and provides only limited information to stakeholders 
(Mantecon, 2008). As such, a private firm’s investments, strategies, and goals are hard to assess by 
rivals. During the acquisition process, acquirers will produce information on the private target to 
determine its value. This may lead to information leakage to rivals, since media attention surrounding 
the merger announcement will make the target firm more visible. Information production related to 
the private target and information leakage will increase not only during the acquisition process, but 
also thereafter. Since the private target becomes part of a listed acquirer, the acquirer will have to 
provide much more information on the previously private target under segment disclosure 
requirements. Consequently, the information environment will improve (Blanco, Garcia Lara, and 
Tribo, 2015). Further, media attention and analyst coverage on the target will increase substantially 
after the transaction (Ekkayokkaya, Holmes, and Paudyal, 2009). Following the acquisition, rivals will 
have access to more channels of information and much more in-depth information about the target 
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firm. Since competitor information is highly valuable for firms to build and defend their competitive 
advantage, the increased information availability on formerly private targets will improve rivals’ 
competitive position. This leads to the third hypothesis. 
H3: Rivals of private targets experience higher returns compared to rivals of public targets. 
 
We again expect this relation to be moderated by acquirer returns. Superior acquirer returns are based 
on the acquirer’s ability to take advantage of private information (Barney, 1988). In particular, 
acquirers can optimally exploit the scarcity of information on private targets when acquirers reduce 
information asymmetry related to the target firm while information asymmetry between the target 
and rivals remains high (Capron and Shen, 2007), hence, when there is limited information leakage to 
rivals. Accordingly, higher acquirer returns could signal that acquiring firms are able to benefit to a 
larger extent from their private information advantage while limiting informational advantages for 
rivals. This will make it more difficult for rival firms to extract some of the value resulting from 
improved information production and disclosure. Hence, we hypothesize the following. 
H4: Higher acquirer returns reduce the positive effect on rivals of private targets compared to 
public targets. 
 
5.3. Data and Methods 
5.3.1. EC procedure 
 
Since December 1989, one of the major roles of the EC has been to examine proposed mergers to 
prevent harmful effects on competition. Merger regulations require notification if one of the following 
conditions is met: The combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the merging parties exceeds 
€5 billion, the combined aggregate turnover of the merging parties throughout the European Union 
(EU) exceeds €250 million, or the companies involved achieve more than two-thirds of their European 
turnover within one and the same member state. All deals meeting any of these conditions are 
automatically screened by the EC (Phase 1). Only when antitrust concerns arise can deals be further 
analyzed in Phase 2. 
 
Before the merging parties formally notify the EC, the firms start a more informal exchange of 
information with EC officials. During this pre-notification phase, the merging parties provide 
information about product and geographical markets, as well as information on and the contact details 
of customers, suppliers, and competitors. The EC assigns a case team with country and industry 
experience in charge of the investigation and the communication with the involved parties. 
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After the official notification is filed, the Phase 1 investigation is initiated. During the Phase 1 
investigation, the case team gathers as much information as possible. Written requests for 
information are sent in the form of electronic questionnaires to customers, suppliers, competitors, 
and any other relevant parties identified by the merging parties. These questionnaires ask the 
respondents to define the product market in which they are competing. The case team can also solicit 
external industrial or economic experts to provide guidance on specific matters. Further, any third 
party can articulate any competition concerns to the EC. This allows the case team to collect as much 
information as possible on the parties involved in or affected by the proposed merger and to perform 
its own economic evaluation. After all the information is collected, meetings are organized with the 
merging firms and all the other parties involved to encourage open discussions. The case team writes 
a report and decides on the potential antitrust issues and required actions to be made public on the 
EC’s website. Only in case of severe concerns related to antitrust is a more in-depth investigation 
initiated (Phase 2), postponing the actual merger. This EC procedure allows for a precise identification 
of the rivals affected by the proposed M&A. We use these reports to identify the direct rivals of the 
merging firms in our sample. 
 
5.3.2 Sample 
To test our hypotheses, we analyze a sample of 182 horizontal acquisitions in manufacturing industries 
drawn from the transactions investigated by the EC (Phase 1). This implies that the acquisitions in our 
sample are large, widely publicized transactions that attracted the attention of industry analysts, 
business press, and rivals. Acquisitions that are not appropriately publicized could remain unnoticed 
by investors and create a bias toward finding zero abnormal returns (Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2007). 
This sampling frame, focusing on large and highly prominent deals, creates a bias against finding 
support for H3 and H4, since information on large private targets is more abundant compared to 
information on small private targets. Information production will hence be more limited in our sample 
compared to samples including smaller targets. In our sample, only two mergers were scrutinized 
under Phase 2. Hence, our sample is not affected by a selection bias with respect to potential antitrust 
issues.24 
 
A major advantage of sampling transactions analyzed by the EC is that EC experts identified rivals on 
a case-by-case basis, taking into account both geographical and product markets. In previous research, 
                                                          
24 We retain these deals in the sample, since the announcement date precedes the announcement of a Phase 2 
investigation. Robustness checks excluding these deals yield qualitatively similar results. 
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rivals have been typically identified as firms with the same industry classification code. Although some 
of these may be close rivals, others could be customers or suppliers or even unrelated and thereby 
bias the results (Clougherty and Duso, 2009, 2011). The fact that rivals have been accurately identified 
by EC experts on a case-by-case basis allows for a much more precise comparison and is a notable 
strength of this sample. 
 
From October 1997 to October 2011,25 682 horizontal acquisitions of European targets in 
manufacturing industries underwent a mandatory investigation by the EC. We only retain horizontal 
acquisitions because rival effects are more straightforward to interpret (Clougherty and Duso, 2009). 
To make sure that only horizontal acquisitions were included, all EC files were meticulously read. 
Acquisitions had to fulfill additional criteria to be included in our final sample (see Appendix A). First, 
acquirers had to be publicly listed companies, since we need stock price data for the event study. 
Second, all joint ventures and acquisitions in which the merging parties were already related prior to 
the acquisition announcement were eliminated to rule out anticipation by the stock market and to 
make deals more comparable. Third, privatizations, minority acquisitions, and cases with multiple 
acquisition announcements in the event window were dropped to reduce potential confounding 
effects (Fee and Thomas, 2004). Finally, all the necessary data at the deal level as well as the firm level 
had to be available. This reduces the final sample to 182 acquisition announcements. Of the 182 cases, 
80 (44%) involve divested assets, 49 (27%) public targets, and 53 (29%) private targets. This again 
points to the importance of divested assets and private targets in acquisitions, even when focusing on 
large acquisitions. 
 
The EC files identified 838 public and 336 private rival firms of the 182 acquisitions. In line with 
previous studies (e.g. Eckbo, 1983, 1985; Song and Walkling, 2000; Fee and Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 
2005; Clougherty and Duso, 2009), only publicly traded rivals are retained, since the valuations of 
private rivals are not continuously available. Of the 838 public rivals, 62 are eliminated because the 
stocks are not frequently traded26 or because of missing stock prices.27 This reduces the number of 
listed rivals in the present study to 776, or 4.26 rivals per deal, on average. Of these, 361 (46%) are 
related to asset divestitures, 240 (31%) are related to public targets, and 175 (23%) to private targets. 
                                                          
25 Due to data constraints, the data set covers deals announced between October 1997 and October 2011. The 
deal information provided by the Zephyr database starts in 1997. A detailed overview of the sample selection 
process can be found in Appendix A.  
26 An infrequently traded stock is a stock that is traded on fewer than 50 days during the window (-300, 5). We 
exclude these, following McWilliams and Siegel (1997).  
27 These rivals do not have stock prices during the window (-300, 5). This can be due to the fact that the rival firm 
was delisted immediately after the acquisition announcement or the rival firm was only listed on the stock 
exchange after the start of the estimation period. This procedure is in line with that of Clougherty and Duso (2009). 
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We complement the data from the EC files with acquisition announcement dates. The event dates 
were hand-collected and cross-checked in several sources, including the business press, Factiva, and 
company websites. Deal information was obtained from the Zephyr database, which is 
commercialized by Bureau van Dijk and consists of detailed information on more than half a million 
M&As worldwide. The advantage of Zephyr is better coverage of European M&As compared to that 
of  the SDC Platinum database of Thomson Financial and Mergerstat (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). 
Accounting data were retrieved from the Amadeus and Datastream databases and market data 
(including stock price returns and a market index) from Datastream (Brouthers and Dikova, 2010). The 
Amadeus database, also commercialized by Bureau van Dijk, is an exhaustive European database with 
accounting data for more than 11 million public and private companies in 41 European countries 
(Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, 2011). All items are presented in a uniform format across various 
European countries to allow for reasonable cross-border analysis. Additionally, information on 
variables such as location was gathered from company websites and the press. 
 
5.3.3 Measures 
The dependent variable in our analyses is the rival firm’s cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around 
the M&A announcement. CARs have the advantage of being precise and not influenced by 
confounding factors (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The CARs are calculated using the standard 
methodology for event studies (Brown and Warner, 1985). The coefficients of the market model are 
estimated over a 240-day trading period ending 60 days prior to the announcement date (Clougherty 
and Duso, 2009). Following prior studies (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara, Carpenter, and Davison, 2009; Gaur, Malhotra, and Zhu, 2013), a short five-day event 
window [-2, +2] is used to reduce noise. However, the same analyses are performed on longer event 
windows to control for a potential price runup or a slower market reaction. 
 
The main independent variables of interest in the multivariate regression models are two dummy 
variables to distinguish between rivals of different target types. First, divested assets is a dummy 
taking a value of one for rivals of divested asset targets, which include all entities, business lines, and 
subsidiaries that are not stand-alone companies, and a value of zero for rivals of stand-alone targets. 
The second dummy, private, is used in the subsample including solely rivals of stand-alone targets and 
takes the value of one for rivals of private targets and zero for rivals of public targets. We also include 
the interaction term between the target type dummies and the acquirer’s CAR (Oxley, Sampson, and 
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Silverman, 2009). The regression analyses control for deal, target, acquirer, and rival characteristics. 
Summary statistics of our control variables are given in Table 5.1. 
 
At the deal level, we control for industry concentration and industry size by including the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) based on sales in the year before the deal and the number of public and private 
rivals. Following the collusion hypothesis, we expect industries with a large number of rivals or a low 
HHI to benefit to a lesser degree from the advantages of monopsonistic and monopolistic collusion 
(Tong and Reuer, 2010). The mean HHI is 0.48 and the mean number of rivals per deals is 6.45. Neither 
of these variables differs between the subsamples of different types of targets. We include the dummy 
variable Competing bid, which is equal to one if the target received more than one bid and zero 
otherwise. More interest for the target indicates a higher takeover likelihood, which is positive for 
rivals (Song and Walkling, 2000). On average, 24% of the targets receive more than one bid. As 
expected, significantly more public targets (35%) receive more than one bid than private targets (17%) 
do. 
 
At the target level, the dummy Target initiative is included, which is equal to one if the target initiated 
the deal, which occurs in 26% of the deals, and zero otherwise. If the target initiated the deal, no 
increase in rivals’ acquisition probability is expected; hence less positive rival effects are anticipated. 
As expected, the probability of a deal being initiated by an acquirer (in contrast to being initiated by 
the seller) is significantly higher for public targets (63%) compared to both private targets (28%) and 
asset divestitures (9%). 
 
Concerning acquirers, we include the acquirer’s CAR (provided in Table 5.3.). Typically, acquirer CARs 
control for potential industry sentiment effects (Cai, Song, and Walkling, 2011), given that M&As that 
are positively perceived by acquiring shareholders indicate future industry growth, which, in turn, is 
beneficial for rivals (Gaur et al., 2013). Additionally, the market’s reaction to acquirers could signal 
industry inefficiencies and hence also influence rival firms’ abnormal returns. We further include a 
dummy equal to one if the acquirer is non-European, the dummy equals zero for European acquirers. 
About two-thirds of the acquirers (64%) are European; this proportion is not significantly different for 
different target types. 
 
At the rival firm level, we include a dummy equal to one for U.S. rivals and a dummy equal to one for 
rivals from the rest of the world (ROW), the base case being European rivals. Given that all the targets 
in our sample are European, rivals from outside Europe could gain more or lose less compared to 
European firms, since nearby competitors are potentially more harmful (Campa and Hernando, 2008; 
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Clougherty and Duso, 2009). European rivals account for 54% of all rivals, U.S. rivals for 28%, and ROW 
rivals for 18%. These proportions are not significantly different for different types of acquisitions. 
Additionally, we control for the relative size, measured by total assets, of the rival compared to the 
acquiring firm as a proxy for the relative importance of the deal for the rival firm. On average, rivals 
are larger than the acquirer; the size difference is not significantly different for different target types. 
Finally, we control for year and industry effects by introducing year and industry dummies. The 
correlation between the variables is provided in Table 5.2. The maximum correlation between 
variables is 0.401 (between the variables Competing bid and Target initiative). 
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Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics. 
This table gives an overview of all the control variables used in the regression analyses. The first column reports the values for the entire sample, whereas the next three 
columns stand for deals with asset divestitures and public and private targets, respectively. The last two columns test for differences in the distribution between the subgroups 
using a Pearson chi-squared test for categorical variables and a t-test for continuous variables. Significance levels are denoted as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  (6) 
   
Sample 
  
Asset divestiture   Public target   Private target   
Asset divestiture 
vs. stand-alone 
 
Public vs. private 
Deal level   Mean S.D. N  Mean S.D. N  Mean S.D. N  Mean S.D. N  Diff.  p-Value  Diff.  p-Value 
 HHI 0.48 0.26   0.48 0.27   0.45 0.25   0.53 0.25   -0.01 0.83  -0.08 0.12 
 Number of rivals per deal 6.45 5.74   6.31 5.23   6.86 6.23   6.26 5.20   -0.24 0.94  0.59 0.83 
 Competing bid 24%  44  23%  18  35%  17  17%  9  0.31 0.58  2.47 0.12 
 No competing bid 76%  138  77%  62  65%  32  83%  44  0.46 0.50  2.95 0.09 * 
Target level                      
 Target initiative 26%  48  30%  24  19%  9  28%  15  1.20 0.27  1.28 0.26 
 Acquirer initiative 29%  53  9%  7  63%  31  28%  15  23.64 0.00 ***  13.61 0.00 *** 
 Unknown 45%  81  61%  49  18%  9  44%  23  11.87 0.00 ***  8.52 0.00 *** 
Acquirer level                      
 European acquirer 64%  116  58%  46  76%  37  62%  33  0.34 0.56  0.58 0.45 
 Non-European acquirer 36%  66  42%  34  24%  12  38%  20  0.75 0.39  0.17 0.68 
Rival level                      
 U.S. rival 28%  221  27%  96  30%  72  30%  53  0.86 0.35  0.00 0.99 
 ROW rival 18%  138  19%  69  17%  41  16%  28  0.57 0.45  0.28 0.60 
 European rival 54%  417  54%  196  53%  127  54%  94  0.07 0.80  0.15 0.70 
 Relative size (rival–acquirer) 2.99 9.30   2.63 6.22   3.49 11.26   3.04 11.38   -0.68 0.32  0.45 0.69 
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Table 5.2. Correlation matrix. 
This table reports the pairwise correlations between the dependent variable and the control variables used in the regression analyses. Correlations 
significant at the 5% level are in bold. 
 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Rival CAR 1.00             
2 Acquirer CAR 0.085 1.00            
3 HHI 0.022 0.011 1.00           
4 Number of rivals -0.035 0.150 -0.235 1.00          
5 Competing bid -0.008 -0.067 0.042 0.132 1.00         
6 Target initiative 0.010 0.038 0.024 0.149 0.401 1.00        
7 Non-European acquirer -0.064 0.020 -0.075 -0.086 0.093 -0.000 1.00       
8 U.S. rival -0.065 -0.003 -0.030 0.061 0.056 0.020 0.016 1.00      
9 Rest of the world rival 0.045 0.051 0.067 0.030 0.004 0.031 0.159 -0.287 1.00     
10 Relative size (rival–acquirer) 0.019 0.082 0.091 -0.114 -0.005 -0.093 0.096 0.054 -0.041 1.00    
11 First in wave -0.038 -0.074 0.060 -0.058 0.013 -0.120 0.069 -0.031 -0.016 0.062 1.00   
12 Acquirer hubris 0.053 0.092 -0.004 0.210 0.056 0.101 -0.024 -0.048 0.052 -0.020 0.061 1.00  
13 Acquirer empire building 0.061 0.075 -0.150 0.156 -0.093 0.079 -0.170 -0.019 -0.037 -0.165 -0.059 -0.045 1.00 
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5.3.4 Methodology 
First, we analyze the CARs of rivals and acquirers using an event study method. Thereafter, we use an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model with rival CARs as the dependent variable. Since multiple rivals are 
identified for each acquisition, regressions are clustered at the deal level to take unobserved deal-
specific variation into account. Furthermore, robust standard errors are computed to deal with a 
potential heteroscedasticity problem. The low correlations and the variance inflation factors never 
exceeding the critical limit of 10 (the maximum variance inflation factor equals 4.34) suggest that 
potential problems due to multicollinearity are limited. 
5.4. Results 
First, we run an event study on acquirer returns to assess whether acquirer CARs in our sample are in 
line with earlier research. Table 5.3. shows that acquirers of divested assets have significantly positive 
abnormal returns of 1.31% in the five-day event window (t-stat = 2.98). Acquirers of private targets 
also have positive abnormal returns of 1.13% (t-stat = 2.12), while acquirers of public targets have 
returns of 1.05% but these are only marginally significant (t-stat = 1.68). These results are largely in 
line with the positive returns for acquirers of divested assets and private targets and the insignificant 
or small negative returns for acquirers of public targets (Fuller et al., 2002). 
 
Second, we provide evidence of valuation effects for rivals of divested assets, public, and private 
targets, in line with our hypotheses (Table 5.3.). While rivals of divested assets experience negative 
wealth effects (-0.60%), rivals of private targets are positively affected (+0.74%), and rivals of publicly  
traded firms have insignificant CARs (-0.32%). T-Tests confirm that rivals of divested assets have 
significantly lower abnormal returns than rivals of stand-alone targets (t-stat = 2.27), which is in line 
with H1, and that rivals of private targets outperform rivals of public targets (t-stat = 2.32), in line with 
H3. 
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Table 5.3. CARs of acquiring and rival firms. 
Panels A and B report the CARs of acquirers and rivals, respectively, using a five-day event window [-2,+2] if the target is publicly traded (1) or privately held (2) or an asset 
divestiture (3). The mean differences in the CARs of the rivals of asset divestitures and stand-alone targets and in the CARs of the rivals of publicly traded and privately held 
targets are also reported. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between realized and market model benchmark returns, an approach similar to that of Martynova 
and Renneboog (2008) and Clougherty and Duso (2009). The t-statistics are computed as suggested by Dodd and Warner’s (1983) test of significance. Significance levels are 
denoted as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
PANEL A: Acquirer CARs [-2,+2] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Publicly traded Privately held Asset divestiture 
Asset divestiture, 
stand-alone 
Publicly traded, 
privately held     
  
Mean % Pos t-stat p-Value Mean % Pos t-stat p-Value Mean % Pos t-stat p-Value 
Mean 
diff. p-Value 
Mean 
diff. p-Value 
 1.05% 56% 1.68 0.09 * 1.13% 67% 2.12 0.03 ** 1.31% 58% 2.98 0.00 *** 0.22% 0.79  -0.08% 0.94  
Obs (n) 49  53  80   
PANEL B: Rival CARs [-2,+2] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Publicly traded Privately held Asset divestiture 
Asset divestiture, 
stand-alone 
Publicly traded, 
privately held     
  
Mean % Pos t-stat p-Value Mean % Pos t-stat p-Value Mean % Pos t-stat p-Value 
Mean 
diff. p-Value 
Mean 
diff. p-Value 
 -0.32% 46% -1.16 0.25  0.74% 61% 2.17 0.03 ** -0.60% 44% -2.01 0.05 ** -0.72% 0.02 ** -1.06% 0.02 ** 
Obs (n) 240  175  361   
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The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 5.4. Model 1 includes only control 
variables. Model 2 tests H1 by including a dummy to distinguish between deals with divested assets 
and deals with stand-alone targets. Model 3 includes the interaction term between divested assets 
and acquirer CARs to test H2. As for Models 4 and 5, we use a subsample of deals with stand-alone 
targets only to distinguish between deals with public and private targets. In Model 4, H3 is tested by 
including the private dummy. Model 5 contains the interaction term between private targets and 
acquirer CARs to test H4. 
 
In Model 2, the dummy for rivals of divested assets is significantly negative (p-value = 0.007). This 
indicates that the type of acquisition target significantly affects rivals’ wealth. Controlling for 
confounding factors, the CARs of rivals of divested assets are 1.05% smaller than those of rivals of 
stand-alone targets. The revaluation effects are hence not only statistically significant but also 
economically important. This finding supports H1. 
 
We test the interaction effect between acquirer CARs and divested assets in Model 3. Including the 
interaction term still yields a significantly negative coefficient for Divested assets and significantly 
improves the model fit. The coefficient of the interaction term is significant (p < 0.05) and negative. 
This result suggests that the impact of a divested assets deal versus a stand-alone deal is more negative 
for rival returns when acquirers obtain higher abnormal returns, supporting H2. Hence, we find 
evidence that a better asset fit between the acquirer and target after divested assets are acquired, as 
reflected in a higher acquirer return, decreases the relative position of rivals more strongly, which, in 
turn, leads to lower rival returns. 
 
The sample used in Models 4 and 5 includes only deals with stand-alone targets, to compare deals with 
public and private targets. The private dummy is positive and significant in all models (p < 0.01), which 
provides empirical support for H3: Rivals of private targets significantly outperform rivals of public 
targets by 1.85%. This finding remains significant when including the interaction term between 
acquirer CARs and the private target dummy in Model 5. The negative sign of the interaction term (p 
< 0.05) demonstrates that the positive effect on rivals of private compared to public targets is 
attenuated when acquirers have higher returns, which is the case if they can fully take advantage of 
the information asymmetry surrounding the private target. This provides strong support for H4. 
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The control variables further indicate that acquirer CARs are positively related to rival CARs, which is 
in line with prior studies (Cai et al., 2011) and could reflect expected industry growth (Gaur et al., 2013). 
Further, rivals obtain lower returns when facing more competitors. In the subsample of stand-alone 
acquisitions, the HHI is negative and significant. Hence, the market expects more negative externalities 
for rivals in more concentrated industries, which goes against the collusion hypothesis. An explanation 
Table 5.4. Multivariate regression analyses. 
This table presents the results of the OLS regressions, clustered at the deal level. The dependent variable is the 
CAR of the rival firms [-2, +2]. Models 1 to 3 include all deals, whereas Models 4 and 5 include deals with stand-
alone targets only. All models includes year and industry dummies. Robust standard errors are given in 
parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
 
Dependent variable RIVAL CAR [-2,+2] 
 
  
  Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Divested assets  -0.0105*** -0.0090**   
   (0.004) (0.004)   
 Private target    0.0185*** 0.0212*** 
     (0.006) (0.006) 
 Divested Assets * Acquirer CAR   -0.1344**   
    (0.060)   
 Private target * Acquirer CAR     -0.2176** 
      (0.109) 
       
Deal level HHI 0.0027 0.0018 0.0013 -0.0324** -0.0363*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
 Number of rivals -0.0006 -0.0007** -0.0007** -0.0006 -0.0007 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Competing bid -0.0016 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0065 -0.0068 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Target level Target initiative 0.0019 0.0041 0.0042 -0.0004 -0.0010 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Acquirer level Acquirer CAR 0.0596* 0.0636* 0.1157*** 0.0934** 0.1402*** 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.036) (0.039) 
 Non-European acquirer -0.0100 -0.0091 -0.0083 -0.0103 -0.0072 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Rival level U.S. rival -0.0041 -0.0044 -0.0044 0.0006 0.0002 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
 ROW rival 0.0075 0.0078 0.0085 0.0079 0.0072 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) 
 Relative size (rival–acquirer) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Constant 0.0088 0.0124 0.0094 0.0138 0.0161 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
 Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES 
 Observations 726 726 726 392 392 
 R² 0.044 0.056 0.061 0.110 0.120 
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could be that, according to the acquisition probability hypothesis (Song and Walkling, 2000), 
acquisition probabilities are lower in highly concentrated industries due to potential antitrust issues. 
 
5.5. Robustness Tests 
We perform several robustness tests. First, the same analyses are performed using shorter and longer 
event windows in the event study ([-1, +1], [-5, +5], and [-35, +5]). Shorter event windows have the 
advantage of a lower potential for confounding effects, while longer event windows take into account 
possible leakage of information or a slower market response. Following Eckbo (1983), we also 
construct portfolios of rival returns, which control for cross-correlation in rival firms’ abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, equally weighted portfolios remove potential biases of outlier cases. All results were 
qualitatively similar but not reported here because of space considerations. Additionally, we run the 
multivariate regression models excluding the acquirer CAR. Our main results are confirmed: The type 
of target significantly affects rival CARs. Hence, even though industry sentiment explains an important 
part of the variation in rival CARs, it is not the main driver. 
 
Second, deals with divested assets are screened on the motives leading to the deal. In line with our 
contentions, in 49% of the cases, the selling parent explicitly mentions company-wide restructuring or 
problems within the business unit as the reason for the divestiture. In another 25% of the cases, the 
parent company’s financial problems are given as the reason for the divestment. Three deals out of 80 
were either mandatory sell-offs following a decision of the EC or were anticipating potential objections 
from the EC. Removing these three deals from the dataset does not qualitatively change the results. 
Further, the rivals of these three deals were more positively affected by the acquisition announcement 
compared to rivals of asset sell-offs without EU antitrust motivation (difference = 2.62%, p-value < 
0.01). The non-voluntary nature of the sell-off could explain the more positive rival effects. 
 
A more direct test of the effects of future acquisition activity is performed; the results are presented 
in Table 5.5. Following Song and Walkling (2000), the first acquisition announcement in a merger wave 
should spur more positive rival reactions. We test the acquisition probability explanation by including 
a dummy for the first deal in a merger wave (Table 5.5., Models 1 and 2). In line with Song and Walkling 
(2000), the first deal in a wave is identified as the first merger in an industry (two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification code) after a period of at least 12 months without M&A activity. Since the 
divested assets and private dummies remain significant while the merger wave dummy is not 
significant, this alternative interpretation is not supported. 
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Fourth, we test two alternative explanations for rival wealth effects. Several authors in the M&A 
literature have advanced agency issues as drivers of M&As. It is argued that managers could be driven 
by hubris or empire-building when undertaking value-destroying acquisitions (Roll, 1986; Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008). These acquisitions do not create value for acquiring shareholders (Clougherty and 
Duso, 2011). Given that deals with public targets are more prominent in the press and are perceived 
as more prestigious, we expect managers driven by hubris or empire building to be more interested in 
acquiring public targets, compared to private targets or divested assets (Ang and Kohers, 2001; 
Antoniou, Petmezas, and Zhao, 2007). Along these lines, hubris or empire-building could explain the 
lower effects for rivals of public targets. 
 
We test these alternative explanations in a multivariate setting. In the case of hubris, managers are 
over-confident and consequently overestimate their synergy creation potential. Based on Hayward 
and Hambrick (1997), who find that hubris is likely to occur after a period of superior performance, we 
use prior performance as a proxy for hubris (Ghosh, 2001). Empire-building, on the other hand, is 
characterized by managers who acquire companies motivated by the desire to manage a larger, more 
prestigious company. Chief executive officers with higher media coverage can be expected to be more 
sensitive to media attention (Malmendier and Tate, 2009). Empire-building is thus more likely when 
managers are often mentioned in the press and when their actions are strongly monitored by the 
media. Hence, the number of mentions of the acquirer in the press in the year prior to the acquisition 
can be used to measure empire-building (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
 
Univariate tests of acquirers’ performance in the three years prior to the acquisition do not show 
significant differences between acquirers of divested assets or public or private targets. This suggests 
that hubris is not more prominent in deals involving public targets. The multivariate models in Table 
5.5. include measures of hubris and empire-building. Models 3 and 4 show that acquirer prior 
performance is not significant and does not explain rival CARs. The type of target dummies, however, 
remains highly significant. Next, acquirer media coverage is included as a measure for empire-building. 
The number of mentions in Factiva in the year prior to the acquisition announcement does not differ 
significantly between acquirers of divested assets or public or private targets. Similarly, acquirer media 
coverage is not significant, even though the type of target dummies remains highly significant (Models 
5 and 6). Hence, our main results are not driven by agency issues. 
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Table 5.5. Robustness tests. 
This table presents the additional analyses of the OLS regressions, clustered at the deal level, performed to support our 
hypotheses. The dependent variable is the CAR of the rival firms [-2, +2]. Models 1, 3, and 5 include all deals, whereas Models 
2, 4, and 6 include deals with stand-alone targets only. All models includes year and industry dummies. Robust standard 
errors are given in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Dependent variable RIVAL CAR [-2,+2] 
 
   
  Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Divested assets -0.0089**  -0.0089**  -0.0089**  
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
 Divested assets * Acquirer CAR -0.1333**  -0.1333**  -0.1385**  
  (0.061)  (0.059)  (0.060)  
 Private target  0.0216***  0.0213***  0.0217*** 
   (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
 Private target * Acquirer CAR  -0.2182*  -0.2193*  -0.2512** 
   (0.110)  (0.111)  (0.113) 
        
Deal level HHI 0.00125 -0.0359*** 0.0011 -0.0358*** 0.0018 -0.0339*** 
  (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) 
 Number of rivals -0.0007* -0.0007 -0.0007* -0.0007 -0.0007* -0.0008* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Competing bid -0.0026 -0.0065 -0.0028 -0.0066 -0.0017 -0.0057 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Target level Target initiative 0.0041 -0.0008 0.0039 -0.0012 0.0035 -0.0015 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Acquirer level Acquirer CAR 0.1152*** 0.1350*** 0.1117*** 0.1423*** 0.1173*** 0.1514*** 
  (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
 Non-European acquirer -0.0083 -0.0076 -0.0072 -0.0071 -0.0063 -0.0054 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
Rival level U.S. rival -0.0045 0.0002 -0.0039 0.0000 -0.0041 0.0005 
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
 ROW rival 0.0084 0.0069 0.0085* 0.0073 0.0090* 0.0084 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) 
 Relative size (rival–acquirer) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Robustness 
checks First deal in wave -0.0006 -0.0039     
  (0.005) (0.007)     
 Acquirer hubris   0.0422 -0.0221   
    (0.039) (0.045)   
 Acquirer empire building     0.0000 0.0000 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
 Constant 0.0094 0.0164 0.0097 0.0147 0.0042 0.0071 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) 
 Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Industry effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Observations 726 392 726 392 726 392 
 R² 0.061 0.120 0.063 0.120 0.063 0.123 
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5.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our study presents the following main findings: (1) Acquisitions of divested assets affect rivals more 
negatively than the acquisitions of stand-alone targets; (2) acquisitions of private targets create more 
positive spillover effects for rivals compared to acquisitions of public targets; (3) these relations are 
moderated by the magnitude of the acquirer’s value gains. The findings can be explained in a 
competitive dynamics framework. Acquirers of divested assets strongly benefit from integrating assets 
from a corporate that was not able to fully exploit them, thereby creating a relatively stronger 
competitor. This negatively affects the competitive position of rivals. Alternatively, acquirers of private 
companies produce information during and after the acquisition process; information spillover will 
thereby benefit rivals. This is a strong finding, since our sample of large, highly publicized M&As is 
biased against finding this information effect. 
 
5.6.1. Contribution 
 
Research on rivals originates mainly from the finance field, which has shifted attention away from the 
fundamental competitive nature of M&As. While prior studies have investigated mechanical reasons 
for the changes in stock prices, such as increased acquisition likelihood, they have ignored the changes 
in strategic factors that affect the competitive scene. This paper therefore contributes to the M&A 
literature by focusing on competitive dynamics theory to build our hypotheses. Applying this strategic 
angle to the M&A field creates new insights on rival effects and allows for a more nuanced 
interpretation.  
 
By showing the applicability of competitive dynamics theory to the M&A setting, we also contribute 
to the strategic management literature (Haleblian et al., 2012). Competitive dynamics scholars have 
typically studied broad sets of strategic actions, among which mergers and acquisitions. By 
concentrating only on M&As we demonstrate the applicability of a competitive dynamics framework 
to the M&A field. Studies in the competitive dynamics field have typically studied firms’ moves and 
rivals’ countermoves in a dyadic relationship (Ferrier, 2001). We look at the immediate reaction after 
the firm’s initial move. A better insight of what drives this immediate stock price reaction can provide 
ground for a better understanding of the rivals’ countermoves later on. As such, we believe that many 
more puzzling M&A findings can be studied from this competitive dynamics perspective. 
 
We advance a change in relative efficiency of rivals following asset divestitures and an increase in 
information availability surrounding private target acquisitions as explanations for the empirical 
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findings. While the effects of improved asset fit and information asymmetries have been 
demonstrated for acquirers of divested assets and private targets, respectively, it is remarkable that 
no prior studies have investigated the implications for rival firms. Furthermore, studying rivals of 
divested assets and private and public targets separately provides more accurate results on how and 
why rivals are affected by M&A announcements. Hence, prior studies that combine asset divestitures 
and private targets as non-listed firms could yield different results when treating these as separate 
groups. Also, by studying different types of target firms we are able to identify different dynamics that 
are more pronounced for some type of target relative to another. Focusing solely on listed companies 
has limited researchers when unravelling the complexities of M&As. 
 
An additional empirical strength of this study is its unique dataset, which includes direct rivals. By 
studying firms that compete directly with the merging firms, our findings are cleaner and less biased 
by confounding industry trends. Typically, prior studies use industry classification codes to identify 
rivals. While this approach is fast and straightforward, it is inaccurate. This shortcoming could drive 
the often contradictory or mixed findings of prior studies. Furthermore, results based on industry 
codes could be substantially biased due to the inclusion of customer or supplier effects. 
5.6.2 Limitations and avenues for future research 
Our study also has limitations. In line with the M&A literature, our sample focuses on the 
manufacturing industry (Fowler and Schmidt, 1988; Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell, 1998). This 
industry is often studied because of its stable characteristics, considerable size, and comparability to 
other M&A studies. Replicating this study in more diverse industries, such as the fast-growing high-
tech industry, other knowledge-intensive industries (Makri, Hitt, and Lane, 2010), or the financial 
services industry, would enhance the generalizability of our results. 
 
While we focus on M&As, the differences between divested assets and public and private firms could 
also be important to explain rival reactions following other strategic events, such as new product 
introductions, technological shifts, or changes in regulations. The intrinsic differences between 
divested assets and stand-alone firms and between public and private firms make these firms react 
differently to outside shocks. Information on these reactions is not equally available for every type of 
firm. Hence, these differences could be studied in different contexts. Similarly, a more fine-grained 
analysis of ownership types could be carried out. Family ownership, institutional ownership, and 
blockholders within the target firm, for instance, could affect M&A dynamics and competitive changes 
differently. 
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Finally, given our methodological approach, we only study listed rival firms. It would, however, be 
interesting to study whether listed and non-listed rival firms are similarly affected. One could thus, for 
example, study whether ownership similarities between target and rival firms affect competitive 
dynamics. Acquisition likelihood, for instance, could be higher for rivals with an ownership structure 
similar to that of the target. 
 
5.6.3 Prescriptive implications 
Our study provides implications for managers as well as policy makers. First, acquirers access 
significant efficiency improvement potential by acquiring divested assets, which strengthens their 
relative competitive position compared to rivals. This finding should make the selling company aware 
of the potential value of the divested assets. Furthermore, acquirers who perform thorough due 
diligence to obtain information on a private target must realize that some of this information could 
spill over to competitors once the target is incorporated. Hence, sellers of divested assets as well as 
acquirers of private targets should consider the competitive implications of the deal before settling 
on the consideration. 
 
We also want to spur rivals into paying attention to M&As within their industry. Based on earlier 
studies, rivals could have a falsely positive perception of rival effects (Clougherty and Duso, 2009). 
They should, however, be especially cautious when divestitures are announced, given that their 
relative competitive position could be at risk. The announcement of a private target acquisition, on 
the other hand, should be seen as an opportunity to gather more information and improve one’s 
knowledge of competitors. 
 
Identifying the drivers through which rivals are affected is highly relevant for policy makers. A better 
understanding of what drives competition, information, and resource efficiency should improve 
antitrust policies. Based on this and hopefully future research, a more comprehensive assessment of 
M&A proposals should improve decision making and guarantee free competition. 
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Appendix A: Sample selection process.  
Phase in sample selection process Number of cases 
Horizontal acquisitions of European targets investigated by the EC between 
October 1997 
and October 2011 in the manufacturing sector 
682 
Acquisitions excluded because of  
- Privately held acquirers 92 
- Previous relationship between merging parties 47 
- Privatizations, minority acquisitions, multiple acquisition 
announcements 
68 
Relevant horizontal acquisitions 475 
- Missing information (on deal or firm characteristics) 293 
Final sample  182 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
The goal of this dissertation was to get a better understanding of how listed companies make their 
financing and investment decisions. In study 1 we extend the literature on equity financing by studying 
which issuing method is preferred under which conditions and how the issuing method affects 
valuations. The second study focuses on acquisition financing choices and the move towards the 
optimal capital structure. In study 3 we analyze the impact of financing sources and target firm R&D 
investments on the acquisition premium. In the last study, we propose two competitive forces to 
explain why rivals are revalued following horizontal M&As. Studying acquisitions of different types of 
target firms enables us to uncover mechanisms that are otherwise difficult to observe. 
 
As such, our four studies have yielded interesting and novel insights and have contributed in several 
ways to the existing literature and to theory. The next section provides an overview of our overall 
contributions, without reviewing the individual contributions of the four studies. Furthermore, we also 
identify some limitations as well as avenues for future research and we end with some implications for 
practice. 
6.1. General conclusions and contributions 
First, we contribute to the finance literature by studying the impact of market imperfections for large 
listed corporations. More specifically, we focus on three types of informational asymmetries: between 
management and shareholders, between majority and minority shareholders, and between 
management and outside investors. 
 
The study of agency problems between shareholders and management has a long tradition in the 
finance and corporate governance literature (Jensen, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Especially in the 
context of acquisitions, a large stream of literature has demonstrated the numerous agency problems 
of anti-takeover provisions, free cash flow, and empire-building (Masulis et al., 2007; Jensen, 1986; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Yet, agency problems are pertinent in other domains of corporate finance 
as well.  Problems of information asymmetry in seasoned equity offerings are typically focused on the 
management – outside investors relationship (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Our findings, however, 
indicate that management does not always give a preference treatment to existing shareholders. 
When financial distress is looming management coerces current shareholders into exercising their 
139 
 
rights in order to avoid bankruptcy. As such, we shed a new light on the agency problems between 
management and current shareholders in seasoned equity offerings.  
 
Private benefits of control are another important dimension within the agency framework (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004). Not only managers but also large shareholders can expropriate minority shareholders 
(Morck et al., 1988). Measuring these private benefits of control is typically carried out in the context 
of control transactions. With the value of these private benefits reaching up to 65% of the equity value 
of the firm, depending on the institutional setting (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Furthermore, Wu et al. 
(2014) provide a theoretical model in which private benefits explain why firms prefer to raise equity 
through a rights offer rather than a cash offer. Hence, we provide empirical support for the role of 
private benefits of control in the issuing choice. Indeed, we show that in the presence of blockholders 
rights are issued rather than cash offers. 
 
Finally, the agency problems between management and outside investors have far-reaching 
implications in terms of investment decisions and cost of capital (Easley and O’Hara, 2004). On the one 
hand, moral hazard problems can lead to excessive risk-taking by managers given that the risk is borne 
by debt-providers or shareholders (Hölmstrom, 1979; Sufi, 2007). While on the other hand, well-
intentioned managers face difficulties raising financing for more unique, hard-to-value, investments 
(Litov et al., 2012). This is the premise of the literature on the R&D funding gap (Hall, 2002). Our 
findings confirm that debt-providers impose restrictive conditions on acquirers of targets with R&D 
which refrains the acquirer from paying a higher premium. Given the importance of acquisition premia 
to win takeovers negotiations, the restrictions imposed by debt-providers could have serious 
implications for firms’ acquisition behavior. As such, we demonstrate how market imperfections such 
as informational asymmetries can hamper large firms in their investment decisions.  
 
Our second contribution also concerns the finance literature and more specifically the capital structure 
literature. Finance scholars have agreed that sources of funds matter and that firms have an optimal 
capital structure (Opler and Titman, 2001). Yet, empirical evidence of firms moving towards this 
optimal capital structure is quite ambiguous (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Based on our evidence, 
however, we propose that European firms show different patterns compared to their American 
counterparts. U.S. acquirers, for instance, take optimal capital structure into account when choosing a 
source of financing. European acquirers, on the other hand, do not consider the impact on their capital 
structure and rather choose financing sources based on corporate control issues and informational 
asymmetries. While existing literature has indicated that capital structures worldwide are driven by 
fundamentally the same factors (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Antoniou et al., 2008), our results re-open 
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this discussion. Additionally, we indicate that institutional differences, and in particular the difference 
in bank-dependence, have broader implications than previously assumed. The strong bank-
dependence, for instance, allows European acquirers to obtain short-term debt financing to pay the 
target firm in cash. Later on, the acquirer often issues equity to rebalance the capital structure. U.S. 
firms, which typically do not have these strong relationships with banks will often have no other option 
but to pay with equity. In the end, both firms will have raised equity and the impact on their capital 
structure will be the same but the European firm has paid in cash, whereas the U.S. acquirer has paid 
with equity which has significant implications for the shareholder structure. This is one way to explain 
some of the fundamental differences between U.S. and European acquisition behavior. 
 
Finally, we also contribute to the strategic management and M&A literature by emphasizing the 
differences between stand-alone firms and divested assets and between public and private stand-
alone firms. First, we show how different types of firms are associated with different dynamics in terms 
of competitive changes. Second, more importantly, we show how studying not only listed firms allows 
to  uncover mechanisms otherwise unnoticed. As some mechanisms are relatively more important for 
divested assets compared to stand-alone firms it is through a comparison of both that we can advance 
our understanding of rival effects. 
6.2. Limitations and avenues for future research 
Our studies provide interesting findings and novel insights, but are not without limitations. First, the 
three studies on M&As are based on European samples of listed corporations. Studying European 
mergers and acquisitions is very interesting given the high incidence of cross-border mergers as well 
as the tight ownership structure in many European firms (Faccio and Lang, 2002; Rossi and Volpin, 
2004). These specific characteristics of European M&As imply that U.S.-based results might not be 
generalizable to Europe. Furthermore, most studies have focused on U.S. acquirers (Haleblian et al., 
2009) which are not per se comparable to continental European acquirers (Moschieri and Campa, 
2009). Additionally, the differences in stock market development as well as bank-dependence in 
Europe compared to the U.S. (Antoniou et al., 2008) are crucial given that we study acquisition 
financing choices and the influence of these financing choices on the acquisition premium. Yet, 
focusing on European firms also has implications in terms of both internal and external validity. An 
implicit assumption made in our studies is that accounting information in different European countries 
is equally reliable and comparable across countries. While the Amadeus database is a reliable source 
and strives for comparability across countries (Faccio et al., 2011), we should not neglect differences 
in accounting regulations and interpretations. Also, the difference in financial market development 
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across countries can affect the internal validity of the studies. While we do include country fixed effects 
to control for some of the heterogeneity, we cannot entirely rule out the impact of cross-country 
differences. As any study, we also face issues related to the external validity of our findings. Hence, 
some of our findings might be limited to the European context. As such, more research on a global 
scale as well as replicating studies could help to build unifying theories to explain some of the 
complexities in M&A research.  
 
Second, in three of our studies we acknowledge the importance of ownership structures in firms’ 
decision making processes. As such, we control for the presence of blockholders or institutional 
investors given that these typically take a more active role or are more likely to be associated with 
agency problems between blockholders and minority shareholders (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). 
Given that we find evidence of the importance of ownership concentration, a more fine-grained 
analysis regarding the type of shareholder might lead to new perspectives. Finance scholars, for 
instance, have indicated how family ownership can lead to agency problems (Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). Studying these family-related agency problems in a M&A setting could thus be a fruitful avenue 
for future research. Furthermore, a more in-depth analysis of financing choices related to managerial 
ownership could shed more light on acquisition financing choices. 
 
Third, in three of our studies we use an event study approach to study both short-term as well as long-
term valuation effects. The event study methodology, however, has been a topic of debate for scholars 
in different fields (Eckbo et al., 1990). While methodological issues have been solved over time (Brown 
and Warner, 1985), a fundamental problem is the joint testing of the specification used for expected 
returns and market efficiency inherent to the event study approach (Kothari and Warner, 2007). In our 
first study, we also look at operational performance measures such as ROA to complement our event 
study-based findings. These operational measures, however, are deemed less relevant to study rival 
firms given that establishing causality will be troublesome. By studying narrow event windows, 
confounding factors can be excluded as much as possible (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) to enable us 
to study the impact of the M&A announcement on rival firms. Operational performance measures are 
stretched in time making it much more difficult to link it to the M&A announcement of competitors. In 
the second study, we also restrict our analyses to short-term and long-term abnormal returns given 
that in this study we are interested in testing the market timing hypothesis. Hence, no other measures 
seem appropriate in this context. 
 
Related to the issues of studying cumulative abnormal returns, is the fact that we focus on financial 
and accounting variables when studying rival firm implications. Given the highly strategic nature of 
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mergers and acquisitions it would be interesting to also study more operational and strategic variables. 
A more in-depth analysis of rivals’ counteractions would certainly advance the competitive dynamics 
field in developing our understanding of implications and consequences of horizontal M&As. Yet, this 
type of information is only available through case studies or interviews and is often difficult to obtain 
given the confidentiality related to this highly strategic and valuable information (Herrera and Minetti, 
2007). 
 
Another limitation in this dissertation is the global scale used in the first study on seasoned equity 
offerings. On the on hand, more cross-country research is needed to go beyond the single-country 
findings in the literature and to establish more generalizable findings and theories. On the other hand, 
our sample of 127 countries brings some well-expected problems of finding conclusive evidence. 
Trading off the benefits of external and internal validity, however, is an often heard issue in 
management research. Our results indicate that one single theory cannot explain firms’ choices in 
equity financing. While this is not surprising, we cannot rule out that the heterogeneity in our sample 
explains the lack of compelling evidence in favor of one explanation. Hence, we highly encourage other 
scholars to dig deeper into the institutional differences that could alter the relationships observed in 
firms’ preferences for one issuing method. 
 
A final limitation is related to the methodological problems of including interaction terms in probit 
regression models, as we do in study 2  (Table 3.4.). Strategy scholars have indicated that interpreting 
coefficients of interaction terms in probit models is  not straightforward (Hoetker, 2007; Zelner, 2009). 
While we follow the approach of prior studies that included interactions in probit models for 
consistency (Vermaelen and Xu, 2014), we do acknowledge that interpreting the coefficients requires 
additional attention. As such, we report the models with interactions but include the Inverse Mills ratio 
of a model without interaction terms in the follow-up regressions. 
6.3. Implications 
The findings in this dissertation go beyond academia and yield interesting insights for practice. In this 
section we provide an overview of the implications of our results for managers, investors, and policy 
makers. 
6.3.1. Implications for management 
First, managers should be aware of the potential problems or consequences of raising different types 
of financing. Debt financing, for instance, is said to be cheaper and more competitive compared to 
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equity financing (Vladimirov, 2015). Our results, however, indicate that debt-providers can also impose 
restrictive conditions which can severely constrain managerial discretion. Obtaining debt financing to 
acquire targets with R&D-investments can be challenging and restrict acquirers from paying higher 
premia. Given that external growth is an important growth strategy for many firms (Capron and 
Mitchell, 2004), firms should balance their capital structures wisely taking into account that debt 
financing might not be easily obtained for R&D-related targets.  
 
Additionally, we show that cash paid acquisitions are followed by higher abnormal returns than equity 
financed acquisitions in Europe. More generally, our findings indicate that raising equity negatively 
affects shareholder wealth in the long term, irrespective of the type of issuing method (cash /vs/ 
rights). On the other hand, equity financed acquisitions, especially when not motivated by capital 
structure reasons lead to negative long-term returns in Europe. Further, Schlingemann (2004) proposes 
that ex-ante equity financing is positively associated with acquirer abnormal returns. Taken together, 
acquirers considering a capital increase might prefer to raise equity ex-ante or at announcement (when 
not driven by overvaluation) rather than ex-post. 
 
Our study also provides interesting results with respect to the implications of mergers of two 
competitors. The popular perception with managers is that a merger of two competitors poses a 
serious threat to the firm. Our findings, however, add more nuance to this perception and highlight 
some important opportunities for rivals. As such, we indicate that M&As trigger changes in information 
flows as well as changes in relative efficiency which can have important competitive implications. 
Hence, rivals should be aware of these changes and take full advantage of new information becoming 
available. Firms should also closely monitor their relative efficiency position given that it could 
deteriorate quickly if the merging firms improve their asset utilization. 
 
Finally, high ownership concentration has several severe implications. When firms with concentrated 
ownership structures are acquired they typically receive a cash payment rather than an equity 
payment. Similarly, blockholders in the acquiring firm will prefer cash payment rather than equity 
payment in order to safeguard their ownership stake and associated benefits. Additionally, cash paid 
acquisitions receive higher acquisition premia on average. Managers of target or acquiring firms as well 
as boards of directors should thus consider these implications when they observe blocks of ownership 
building up.  
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6.3.2. Implications for investors 
High ownership concentration also has important implications for investors. Large blockholders can 
have a strong influence on important strategic and financial choices of the firm (Dalton et al., 2003). 
Firms with blockholders will typically raise equity financing through rights offers to make sure that the 
blockholder’s stake is not diluted and that private benefits do not have to be shared with ‘intruders’ 
(Wu et al., 2014), sometimes at the detriment of minority shareholders.  
Our evidence also highlights the negative long-term abnormal returns of seasoned equity offerings. It 
was long argued that cash offers are used by overvalued firms, while rights offers are used by firms 
that are undervalued or not overvalued at least (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). We provide evidence of 
negative long-term abnormal returns for both cash and rights offers. Hence, we conclude that investors 
should be careful when investing in seasoned equity offerings given that it’s not only overvaluation 
and undervaluation that induce managers to issue equity. Other motivations such as financial distress 
or high private benefits of control can motivate managers to raise equity through a rights offer. 
6.3.3. Implications for policy makers 
Based on this dissertation, we also provide some implications for policy makers. First, we underscore 
that the problems associated with obtaining financing for R&D investments are not limited to small, 
high-growth companies but also affect large listed firms. On the one hand, R&D investments are 
sources of potential synergies and thus potentially value creating (Capron and Pistre, 2002). On the 
other hand, acquirers encounter difficulties financing these investments due to the high information 
asymmetry related to these investments. As such, company growth might be limited because of market 
frictions. Policy makers might therefore consider to broaden the availability of, for instance, subsidies 
or other R&D-promoting incentives to listed companies. Typically, R&D-promoting incentives have 
targeted smaller, high-growth companies (Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2012) because financing 
problems are expected to be higher for smaller firms. As such, our evidence sheds a new light on this 
important policy question.  
 
Mergers and acquisitions have been an important topic of debate in many countries and for many 
antitrust authorities (Aktas et al., 2007). These antitrust officials are often suspicious about large 
mergers or acquisitions because of potential negative effects for free competition. Empirical findings, 
however, have failed to provide evidence of collusion (Shahrur, 2005). The results of the last study 
indicate that besides direct market share other factors such as information availability and relative 
efficiency should be considered when studying the market-wide implications of horizontal acquisitions.  
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Finally, we add to the discussion on whether or not rights offers should be mandatory and whether or 
not tradability of rights should be mandatory. Many countries request explicit approval by 
shareholders to waive the rights to be able to go to the open market for a cash seasoned equity offering 
(La Porta et al., 1998; Spamann, 2010). Yet, rights offers are not always the best issuing method for 
(minority) shareholders. In case of financial distress, for instance, current shareholders can be forced 
to exercise their rights in order to avoid bankruptcy. On the other hand, rights offers can be used when 
private benefits of control are high which harms minority shareholders. Consequently, one could 
question whether rights issues are actually protecting all shareholders or only the majority 
shareholders. 
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